A Detailed Review of The Natural Law Theory

Natural law theory holds that the concept which we have come to understand as law is significantly reflective of the moral judgments and standards that are exercised in society. Law, according to natural law theory, is simply a mirrored reflection of a societal “natural moral order”. It is a philosophy that embraces overall goodness and equality, but, that rejects the mere mention of evil. It requires that a law be implemented while respecting the fundamental rights of all its citizens, and at the same time promotes a common good. “Naturalism holds that human practices and institutions are to be measured against these “higher” standards, and where they fall short of the mark, specific human arrangements, whether statutes, executive orders, or constitutions, fail fully to have the character of law” (Adams p.19).

Moreover, according to St. Thomas Aquinas, natural law theory involves the notion of practical law. He argues that natural and practical law are intertwined in so much that they seek to accomplish an understanding and appreciation of what society should value, what society should seek out in life, and the proper means by which to fulfill these goals. In essence, Aquinas contended that “good is to be done, and evil avoided” (Adams p.23). An example of natural law, as Aquinas notes, would be the returning of a borrowed item to its rightful owner. This, under the eyes of natural law, is viewed as a morally sound and necessitated gesture. It is the “right” thing to do. Natural law, thus, places a great deal of emphasis on the concepts of morality and law, such as to suggest that an immoral law is not a law at all.

Legal realism, on the other hand, signifies a much more distinct quality when compared against the backdrop of natural law theory. Legal realism purposely failed to subscribe to the arguments posed by natural law, claiming that the theory was far too obscure and vague to hold any significant binding. “Instead, legal realism defines law roughly as a method of settling disputes by appealing to the higher authority of an office, or to put it more succinctly, it claims that law is exactly what judges say it is” (Adams p.116). The theory disputes that legal realism is not an entity of unyielding standardized and unchanging rules, but, rather that it lends itself to the law as a social institution with sufficient flexibility so that the competing interests of various groups within a society could be satisfied. Legal realism, in this sense, is highly influenced by experience, not logic or a set of generally applicable rules.

As previously mentioned, natural law was founded primarily upon the argument that law and morality are interdependent upon one another. The two had to coexist in order to validate a law. Legal realism, however, makes no distinguishable proposition between these two elements of legal reasoning. It places no significance on how “morally right” or “morally wrong” a statute is. Rather, decisions arrive from a Judge’s intuition, or mere hunch, but, are framed in a manner so as to appear that the conclusions in a case have been formulated in a systematic and logical manner.

More importantly, law, in reference to legal realists, is a matter of prediction. For example, by identifying the political ideology of a Judge (i.e., liberal or conservative), one might be able to infer how the judge might decide on a particular case. “Nonetheless, legal realism repeatedly emphasizes the indeterminacy or looseness of stare decisis by pointing out that a particular ruling never binds a decision maker in any future case, because the decision maker can always find some aspect of the later case to differentiate it from the prior one” (Adams p.64) Moreover, a holding in a specific case is considerably influenced by the personal social context which a Judge brings to a case. Decisions are the products of subjective, but, fairly consistent with legal history, points of view offered by the court. Decisions are composed of individual interpretations and individual social philosophies.

In applying Natural law to this particular case, it would very likely be argued in firm opposition of the Blue and Gray Taxi Company that the acts and practices, such as the ones that have surfaced here, seem plainly immoral and manipulative. Given the theoretical content of natural law, the Joneses’ allegations would have been immediately shot down by the courts. The case would have been concluded in a drastically alternate fashion. This case regularly defied the fundamental components that compose natural law.

First of all, the contract which the Blue and Gray Taxi Company and the railroad company had proposed, deprived other businesses (i.e., the Purple Taxi Co.) of their right to openly engage in a free commercial market. It negated the Purple Taxi Company, for example, to solicit business on or around the area which had been assigned exclusively to the Joneses. This designated area located adjacent to the railroad company’s depot, was to be utilized solely at the discretion of the Blue and Gray Taxi Company. They were to be the only solicitors of taxi-cab business. In essence, the two companies were forming somewhat of a coalition so as to implement a type of monopoly over other competing businesses. This sort of corporate monopoly that the two were forming served no moral purpose. It did absolutely nothing to promote a sense of equal opportunity, and furthermore, displayed minimal respect for the best interests of other citizens.

Secondly, the contract itself, under Kentucky State law was considered unlawful. Under Kentucky law, the contract negotiated between the railroad company and the Blue and Gray Taxi Company held no legal position. It was not valid, and therefore, could not be respected in legal terms. The legal counsel representing the Joneses was well aware of the invalidity of the contract, and acknowledged the fact that Kentucky would not uphold the provisions provided within. Knowing this, the council manipulatively abused the entire legal system of the state of Kentucky by transferring all assets and accounts of the company to another state. By doing so, he would be able to move the case from a state to federal level, where the case stood a very good chance of being decided in his favor. His intentions, then were not to respect Kentucky law, but, instead to make a mockery of it and of all its citizens. His tactics were strictly one-sided and selfish. As a result, a common good was never achieved. What he did, although legally permissible, was immoral and unjust. Henceforth, natural law would dictate that such conduct failed fully to depict the true character of law, and thus, would not stand as binding law.

In applying legal realism, the case would have not been concluded much differently from the manner in which it did. The decision would have remained the same. Given the nature of the content defining legal realism, it would have been deduced that what the Joneses and the railroad company had done was legally permissible; that no unlawful practice had been committed by either parties. The two parties had formulated a contract involving a citizen company of Tennessee and another of Kentucky. It provided the Blue and Gray Taxi Company with exclusive rights to solicit business in a specified locality. In accordance with legal realism, the contract was perfectly legal, and, thus, was to be respected by would-be offenders. Despite the obvious restrictions proclaimed within the contract, the Purple Taxi Company conscientiously failed to obey the provisions, and was therefore subjected to legal consequences.

More importantly, however, is the fact that the attorney representing the Joneses was fairly certain that by moving the case from a state to federal level, he would stand a much better chance of achieving a favorable holding. In other words, the attorney had formed an assumption, or prediction, about the likelihood of a beneficial decision. Legal realism stresses to a great extent the notion of predictability within a case; arguing that to understand the manner in which a particular court will decide a case, one has to look at the specific patterns of past decisions. Considering that Kentucky was one of the few states where a contract such as the one here was not legal, the Joneses’ attorney assumed that in a federal court, the Judge would most likely agree with the majority of other states honoring such a document.

Of the two theories discussed in relation to this case, the one that most appropriately applies here is legal realism. It is apparently clear to me that the general content, and the results of this case are best understood in light of legal realism. Although the case makes some implicit generalizations about a natural law theory, the majority of the content is mainly associated with legal realism.

Two main themes surface from within this case; one involving the legitimacy of the contract, and another involving the predictability of the decision. As I had noted earlier, although some of the intentions and procedures that the Joneses’ attorney had exercised may have seemed a bit unfair and immoral, his actions were , nonetheless, perfectly permissible under the eyes of the law. There was absolutely nothing unlawful about what he had done. This takes away from the concept of natural law, which argues that an immoral law is not a law at all. Despite the arguments that natural law provides, all three federal level courts held that the contract proposed by the two parties was perfectly legal. The courts further reasoned that any violation of this contract would result in legal action taken against the violator(s). The courts were more concerned with the legitimacy of the contract, rather than with how “morally sound” it seemed. Morality had a very little, if any, part to play in the decision of the court. The bottom line was that the contract was legal, and, thus, had to be followed.

It’s the same scenario when one finances a car at a dealership; a contract is signed by both parties (the buyer and seller) stating that in the case that the buyer can no longer make payments towards the car, the dealership shall have the right to repossess it. The car may be halfway paid for, but, if payments are stopped being made for a significant period of time, then that person loses privileges of ownership. Although, it may seem unfair to some people, the contract plainly states that in situations such as those, the dealership shall retain ownership of the car. In this sense morality, or natural law, has no say in the situation because of the fact that the contract was perfectly legal and valid.

Another shortcoming in applying natural law theory to this case is that it does not enable an individual, in this instance the Joneses’ attorney, to make inferences about the manner in which a particular case will be concluded. One cannot predict whether a court will decide a case in your favor or not. Here, however, the Joneses’ attorney successfully predicted that the federal level court would decide in his favor. He had a “hunch” that the court was likely to agree with the majority of other states which permitted contracts such as the one under question, to be legally enforced. Unlike natural law, legal realism grants individuals the ability to make inferential assumptions about how the law works, and how judges are likely to decide a case. In this sense, legal realism better fits into the legal context of this case.