Identification of Bioterrorism Attacks in America

The US Department of Defense (DOD) played a major role in mitigating the attacks by performing the initial identification of the infectious material and advising and participating in the decontamination process. The DOD biological defense program and similar defense programs have long involved research and focused 0n countering the application of biological as well as chemical weapons. However, given the history as well as experience of the defence-associated programs in the development of countermeasures and in planning for future research in this area, Bioterror: Anthrax, Influenza, and the Future of Public Health Security by R. William Johnstone (2008), provides an analysis for preparing to deal with attacks based on the events of the past, present, and future in America.

Throughout history, various regulatory agencies have been prepared to deal with acts of bioterror. Nevertheless, considering the subsequent 2001 anthrax attack through US mail, the anthrax attacks of 2001 glaringly showed the vulnerability of U.S. to bioterror. Even with warnings of experts as well as the years of funding and preparation for the anthrax attacks. Due to extensive research and development that scientists and physicians have accomplished in the treatment, prevention, as well as diagnosis medical countermeasures have been established but further discoveries that enhance national defense are necessary.

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) was assigned by the Department of Health and Human Services to be ready for the nation’s public system in providing a response to a bioterror attack. To improve state and local preparedness, CDC financed cooperative accords with every state and various municipalities that emphasized on efforts of preparedness. Five essential areas were focused within the first years of this program: preparedness arrangement as well as readiness appraisal; examination and epidemiology competence; biologic laboratory capability; chemical laboratory capability; and health vigilant system and information technology.

Based on the lesson from the previous anthrax attack, more assets and focus areas have been included: communication of health risks and health data distribution; education and training. Bioterrorists attacks can take place in one of the following scenarios, i.e., overt and covert. Since we do not have the aptitude to undertake real-time surveillance for the discharge of the biological attack in the U.S., an announced covert discharge of a biological agent would possibly go unidentified for a while, with the individuals exposed leaving the place long before the act of terror is apparent.

Because of an incubation phase, the first indication that a biological agent has been discharged may not become obvious or known until weeks after, when people start becoming critically ill and seeking medical attention. Therefore, the first responders to a concealed bioterrorism act will possibly be the intelligent clinical, laboratorian, or public health worker who knows the index case or recognizes the responsible causative agent (Khan, 2011). Due to their training in terror attacks, the normal first responders such as law enforcement personnel, firefighters, or hazmat, are the most likely individuals to act in response to announced overt release of biological agents or most likely, to a deception.

So, the first identification of a bioterrorism attack in America, whether announced or unannounced would be at the state level and local level. As a result, a wide-ranging public health reaction to a bioterrorist attack, or in case of an outbreak of a communicable disease will involve an epidemiologic examination, treatment by medical professionals and prophylaxis for the individuals affected, and the instigation of preventing disease practices. The accomplishment of such activities depends, to a larger degree, on the rapid and precise detection of the threat agent.