Analysis of Epistemological Theories to Determine Individuals’ Beliefs About Knowledge

Numerous researchers in the field have tried to understand how children, adolescents and adults come to understand what it means to know. The five most famous epistemological theories, were focused on determining individuals beliefs about knowledge. In particular, these theories have many similarities and differences. Thus, the epistemological development theories which will be further discussed include: 1) “Perry’s Scheme of Intellectual and Ethical Development”; 2) Baxter Magolda’s (1986; 1992) “Epistemological Reflection Model”; 3) Kitchener and King’s (1981) “Reflective Judgements” model. ; 4) Belenky and colleagues’ (1986) “Women’s Ways of Knowing” model; and 5) Kuhn and colleagues’ (1991; 2000) “Argumentative Reasoning Model”. 

At first, research on epistemology was mainly focused on adults, so Perry (1970) delve into epistemological development research, by studying how adults (i. e. , undergraduate students) understood knowledge. His theory was based on determining how young adults (i. e. , undergraduate students) reason in different epistemological levels. Perry (1970) tested 313 undergraduate students on their experiences throughout their first year as an undergraduate student in university. The researchers further interviewed 31 of these students throughout their university degree, in order to determine the saliency of their experiences in university. Based on the results from the interviews, Perry (1970) created nine transitional positions that occurred in university and tested these stages in a second study with 109 participants. Hofer and Pintrich (1997) summarized Perry’s (1970) nine positions (i. e. , epistemological levels), which were encompassed into 4 main categories, which comprised of: 1) dualism (i. e. , an absolutist view of knowledge); 2) multiplicity (i. e. , the transitional period from dualism to relativism); 3) relativism (i. e. , the complete shift from being a dualist into an evaluativist); and 4) commitment within relativism (i. e. , an extension of relativism). More specifically, dualism was based on the notion that there was always an objective right or wrong answer, which portrayed one’s knowledge as being certain and absolute. On the other hand, when one transitions to multiplicity, the individual realized that there was uncertainty present in knowledge, and there was no absolute truth present, ultimately, allowing subjective and differing opinions between individuals. Finally, relativism and the commitment within relativism was defined as individuals viewing themselves as active agents in the construction of meaning, due to the fact that the individual began to analyze and recognize that knowledge was “relative, contingent, and contextual”. This level of epistemological development brought forth differing perspectives, where the individual had to decide based on what they learned if there was one judgement more truthful than another. Consequently, Perry’s (1970) research demonstrated that university students explained their experiences based on these nine epistemological positions (i. e. , epistemological levels), with regards to the developmental changes they experienced (i. e. , shifting from a dualist to a multiplist, and from a multiplist to a relativist) as opposed to changes in their own personality. Henceforth, Perry’s (1970) epistemological development theory, did not create a connection between epistemology and education, however, it allowed for the postulation that once students transitioned from dualism to relativism, there would possibly be shifts in the students’ learning and studying methods throughout their education. 

Furthermore, Baxter Magolda (1986; 1992) also wanted to advance Perry’s (1970) work by studying epistemological development in relation to education (as cited in Hofer & Pintrich, 1997). Specifically, Baxter Magolda (1986; 1992) and colleagues studied 101 participants over 5 years, using open-ended interviews, in order to determine the changes they experienced in their understanding of knowledge. Specifically, Baxter Magolda’s (1986; 1992) “epistemological reflection model” included 4 types of knowing. Firstly, “absolute knowing” (i. e. , based on dualism), was defined as individuals passively receiving knowledge and believing that authority figures were all-knowing. Secondly, “transitional knowing” (i. e. , based on multiplicity), involved individuals realizing that authority figures did not know all the answers, which brought forth uncertainty and subjectivity in knowledge, since there was now the understanding that individuals had different points of view. Thirdly, “independent knowing” consisted of individuals having their own opinions, as they had become active agents of their own learning. Finally, “contextual knowing” (i. e. , based on relativism), referred to evaluating knowledge and being critical thinkers by accepting that knowledge was constantly evolving. These types of knowing were similar to Perry’s (1970) epistemological positions, however the focus was on gender-related epistemological development. 

Similarly, Kitchener and King (1981) also furthered Perry’s (1970) work by creating their “reflective judgement model” (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997). The researchers tested participants using interviews, in order to determine their judgements about certain problems. In particular, their theory consisted of a seven-stage model, which included the pre-reflective, quasi-reflective and reflective stage. Particularly, in the pre-reflective stages, the notion of understanding was that individuals viewed the world in absolute terms, which is the case for most young children, because they think that there is only one right or wrong answer. Once children enter adolescence their understanding of knowledge becomes quasi-reflective. In this stage, adolescents have a multiplist view of knowledge, due to the fact that they began to realize that uncertainty was present, since individuals can have differing opinions and both be correct. Finally, by adulthood, there was a shift from the quasi-reflective to the fully reflective stages. In the final stages of the model, adults understood that knowledge was based on the evaluativist level, due to the fact that individuals acquired critical thinking and were able to determine if one claim was stronger than another, based on evidence supporting the claim (Kitchener & King, 1981). Henceforth, this model maps on similarly to Perry’s (1970) model of the nine position of understanding knowledge. However, Kitchener and King (1981) denote that an individual’s knowledge does not perfectly fit onto the individual’s educational learning, with regards to the fact that higher stages of reflective judgements were more common than lower stages. Particularly, these higher stages of reflective judgements (i. e. , the quasi-reflective and reflective stages) were associated with higher education, as opposed to the lower stages. Ultimately, this shed light on the differing levels of epistemological understanding and the association with learning in education. 

In contrast to the abovementioned, Belenky and colleagues (1986) attacked Perry’s (1970) work on epistemological development, as they believed that there was a lack of research on women’s epistemological development within Perry’s framework (as cited in Hofer & Pintrich, 1997). More specifically, Belenky and colleagues (1986) theory “women’s ways of knowing” was centered on women’s interpretation of the world, in order to further understand their epistemological development. Specifically, they studied 135 women using semi-structured interviews, in order to obtain information on women’s perspectives of the world. Based on the interviews, Belenky and colleagues (1986) brought forth their version of Perry’s nine positions (i. e. , as known as epistemological perspectives) which included: 1) “Silence”, that was based on passively listening and acquiring knowledge; 2) “Received knowledge” (i. e. , dualism), where the interpretation was that there was always a right or wrong answer; 3) “Subjective knowledge” (i. e. , multiplicity), where the individual recognized that other people may have differing subjective opinions, and can both be correct; 4) “Procedural knowledge”, which was based on “separate knowing” (i. e. , using critical and analytical thinking when reasoning, which was similar to the evaluativist position) and “connected knowing” (i. e. , using empathy and care when reasoning; Hofer & Pintrich, 1997, p. 95); and 5) “Constructed knowledge”, which was based on amalgamating both subjective and objective knowledge when reasoning. Thus, Belenky and colleagues’ (1986) research furthered the field by incorporating women’s epistemological development, which is similar to Perry’s theory, however with the added component of empathy and care. 

Finally, the most common theory of epistemological development in the field today, is centered around Kuhn’s (1991) model, known as the “argumentative reasoning” model. Kuhn (1991) was interested in everyday argumentative reasoning and how individuals comprehend and reason about knowledge. Specifically, Kuhn (1991) studied 40 participants using interviews, in order to determine the individuals beliefs about common social issues (i. e. , prisoners returning to crime, failing school, juror duty, etc. ). In particular, based on this study, Kuhn (1991) was able to determine that the participants’ responses were similar to her predecessor’s research regarding the epistemological levels of understanding, in which Kuhn (1991) now labeled “absolutist, multiplist and evaluativist”. 

In this vein, Kuhn and Park (2005) defined epistemological understanding based on the individual’s ability to manage subjective and objective knowledge. This connected epistemological development with children’s theory of mind research. Thus, in early childhood (i. e. , preschool) children receive knowledge from external factors, ultimately putting young children in the realist level of epistemological understanding. At this age, children were certain about their beliefs, in which they were passively acquiring, and did not have any hesitation in their beliefs, due to the fact that realists believed that everyone was perceiving the same information, ultimately, making them copies of the external world (Kuhn & Park, 2005). However, at age 4, children began to understand that individuals had internal mental states, which were not inevitably copied. 

This ignition of understanding that the self was incorporated in the equation when thinking about knowing, brought forth research on theory of mind. Specifically, Astington (1991) and Wellman (1990) claimed that a child developed a theory of mind if the child was capable of “(a) understand[ing] that others have mental states such as knowledge and intentions and (b) predict[ing] and explain[ing] behavior in a coherent fashion by ascribing these mental states to oneself and/or another”. Children usually had a general idea of theory of mind by age 3. However, in order to fully develop theory of mind, children first must have been able to understand what it meant to know. In particular, children can only claim to know, if they were able to distinguish the truthfulness of a claim, by differentiating a true claim from a false claim (i. e. , being able to successfully complete false belief tasks). These children also had to be certain in their judgements of claims, where they did not have any hesitation, resulting in speculation (i. e. , which is a lack of knowing). False-belief tasks, which assessed theory of mind, intended to determine how young children understood that other people had a mind and the contents of their mind were different from the contents of their own mind. For example, Keil (2014) explained the classic Sally-Anne task, where Sally put her toy in the basket and then left the room; Anne then moves Sally’s toy from the basket to the box and also leaves the room; when Sally comes back she will look in the basket (i. e. , which was a false belief). To be able to complete this false-belief task, the child must understand that Sally had a belief that was wrong (i. e. , thinking the toy was in the basket, where she had left it), which is different from the children’s right answer (i. e. , knowing that Anne moved the toy from the basket to the box). 

Thus, with regards to age related understanding of theory of mind, by age 4, children successfully completed false belief tasks, and were able to distinguish statements of certainty verus uncertainty. Specifically, by age 4, children understood what it meant to know, and by age 5, children completed complex false belief tasks correctly, due to the fact that they are able to understand that individuals can have different access to information. Although, it is vital to note that in this classic false belief task, not until age 4 or 5 could children understand theory of mind, however competing research has demonstrated that with an easier task, child as early as 2 years of age could understand basic theory of mind (Keil, 2014). Therefore, once children complete the false belief task, they understood that individuals have a mind and the contents of the mind vary from person to person, bringing forth the notion that one person can have the right answer and another person can have the wrong answer. Thus, theory of mind in children was a stepping stone for later epistemological development. 

At this point, realists become absolutists in their epistemological understanding, where children believe that facts (i. e. , having the right or wrong answer) represented reality (Kuhn et al. , 2000). Thus, absolutists were also certain in their beliefs, as they did not think that experts could be wrong, because they believed that there was only one right or wrong answer, which was centered on objectivity. Ultimately, in terms of age-related shifts, children were absolutists from age 4 or 5 until late childhood. 

Then, the absolutist turned into a multiplist by adolescence (Kuhn & Park, 2005). Specifically, at the multiplist level of epistemological understanding, the adolescent incorporated subjectivity in their beliefs, since beliefs of fact turned into beliefs of opinion. Therefore, at this level, adolescents understood that all opinions could be right, hence, tolerance of differences in opinion was required. Interestingly, up until the multiplist level of epistemological understanding critical thinking remained immaterial. 

Finally, the shift from adolescence to adulthood reflects the shift from multiplist to evaluativist. Specifically, in adulthood, the reintegration of objectivity in beliefs is present, thus, evaluativists hold both a subjective and objective dimension in their view of knowledge. The evaluativist adult understood that although everyone could have an opinion and this must be respected, there were opinions that were better than others, as a result of better arguments and evidence to support the claims (Kuhn & Park, 2005). Thus, critical thinking in the evaluativist level of epistemological understanding was necessary, in order to help improve justifications for certain judgements, which allowed for better arguments. Hence, at the evaluativist level, judgements “require[d] support in a framework of alternatives, evidence and argument”. Overall, these levels of epistemological understanding helped solidify one’s understanding of epistemology through age-related shifts across development. 

Thus, absolutists considered knowledge to be based on certainty and objectivity, where authority figures were all-knowing and knew what was right and what was wrong. On the other hand, multiplists considered knowledge to be uncertain and subjective, as individuals could have differing viewpoints and both be equally correct in their thinking. Finally, evaluativists thought knowledge was both subjective and objective, due to the fact that they were able to determine that there was uncertainty in reasoning, with regards to the fact that individuals had different opinions. However, it was vital to use critical thinking and analysis in order to determine if one option was more true (i. e. , based on comparative merits) than another. Thus, Kuhn’s (1991) model was a shortened version of the epistemological developmental models from previous research in the field, which focused on one’s abilities to think about their own knowledge. 

Overall, these epistemological theories discussed demonstrated how children, adolescents and adults understood what it meant to know. Hence, the most common epistemological theory used today in psychology, and which will be further discussed in relation to engaging in interpersonal disagreements was Kuhn and colleagues’ (2000) “argumentative reasoning” model.