Conventional Constructivism: Norms, Culture and Identity

Introduction

Conventional constructivism, though less an International Relations theory than a social approach, further expands the purview of classical realism by providing a sociological examination of security concerning norms, culture, and identity. Based on the idea that global politics is a social realm marked by the dynamic and mutually constitutive relationship between actors (primarily states) and structures (primarily the nature of the international system), constructivists are concerned with the processes, such as ideational factors like norms, culture, and identity that are behind current realities in the world.

The mid-1990s work of Alexander Wendt, in particular, is credited with giving currency to the conventional constructivist approach, which draws from structuration (i.e., structure and agency) and symbolic interactionist sociology (social interaction through symbols).According to Wendt, law and norms govern most domestic policies, while coercion and self-interest seem to rule international politics.

In addition, the way international politics is carried out is made, not given, since state or government identities, used interchangeably in this research, and interests are socially constructed and sustained by intersubjective practice.Security interests, for instance, are defined by state actors who respond to cultural determinants.

Conventional constructivism is best defined about identity insofar as it “treats identity as an empirical question to be theorized within a historical context.”It also underscores how states construct their national interests and formulate relevant means to address them,such as threats and the response to threats.

Consequently, its ultimate focus is the national military security of the state.To that end, it emphasizes discursive power and the shared ideas or meanings, whether explicit or implicit, that are assigned to material objects or forces, such as borders or national flags, rather than the mere existence of the objects themselves. A conventional constructivist analysis emphasizes the importance of meaning and shared beliefsbut assumes the existence of an a priori reality, which places the approach on a middle-ground between classical realism and feminist geopolitics in security studies.

Norms

According to conventional constructivism, norms are collective expectations that define or regulate proper behavior for a given identity. At times, for instance, norms function like rules defining (and thus “’ constituting’”) an identity, while at other times, they have “’ regulative’” effects, functioning as standards for the proper behavior of an already defined identity. As a whole, then, norms (i.e., anarchy, states, sovereignty), which are intersubjective, establish expectations about who the actors will be in a given environment and about how these specific actors will behave particularly, about security behavior.

Further, norms can be strong or weak, which explains why the presence of norms does not always prompt compliance. Accordingly, conventional constructivism focuses on the impact of norms, such as male-as-norm and their frequent empowerment through institutionalization in national and international law in international security. Norms constitute actors and meaningful action by positioning both in social roles, such as state or military organizations, and social environments, such as the international system or the transnational security profession.

Additionally, for conventional constructivists, ideas are not just rules for guiding action, but rather ideas are conveyed “’ all the way down” to influence actors and actions in global politics. Put another way, when ideas are norms, they not only constrain but also constitute actors, which enables their action. For example, international law not only delineates legitimate state practice but also legitimates states and permits them to behave in ways that have meaning for other international actors. States, then, behave in ways that they perceive most appropriate.

Further, conventional constructivists see international norms as shaping similarity in state action and form, irrespective of the material resources of states.All states, for instance, despite the enormous differences in their ability to exercise internal control and exert international power, recognize each other as sovereign. Some conventional constructivists also recognize the impact domestic norms have on state action and behavior, which explains the differences between state behaviors. Norms, then, that are distinct to national organizations and communities are viewed as shaping distinct national military styles and organizational ways of war though research has also shown that some military norms originate outside of the state.

Culture

Culture refers to a set of evaluative standards, like values or norms, and to cognitive standards, like models or rules defining what actors (i.e., individuals or states) and entities (i.e., organizations) exist in a system and how they function and interrelate. State policies thus reconstruct or reproduce institutional or cultural structures.

According to Wendt, culture is a self-fulling prophecy to the extent that state actors act based on shared expectations, which tend to reproduce these expectations. Additionally, culture is fluid, continuously in motion, even as it reproduces itself. It is what people make of it, an “ongoing accomplishment,” even though it is a constraining force that informs their behavior at any given moment. Despite this conservative trait, culture is characterized by more or less contestation among its bearers, which serves as an ongoing resource for structural change─thus making culture, a social construct, both fluid and static.

Based on these premises, Wendt offers three cultures of anarchy in the international system: Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian. Each culture is constructed by a fixed idea regarding the basic relationships between states. A state, depending on its wants, may perceive its other as an enemy (Hobbesian culture), a rival (Lockean culture), or a friend (Kantian culture.). For instance, Hobbesian culture involves “’ threatening adversaries who observe no limits in their violence towards each other;’” Lockean culture, involves “’ competitors who will use violence to advance their interests but refrain from killing each other;’” and, Kantian culture involves “’ allies who do not use violence to settle their disputes and work as a team against security threats.’” Thus, states interacting in a particular culture come to know one another as the bearers of specific identities.

At the same time, three elements of cultural internalization (coercion, self-interest, and legitimacy) as a result of state interaction intersect with all three cultures of anarchy. These three cultures, according to Wendt, inform state identity and interests, which are secondary products, and generate different tendencies in the international system. Consequently, culture matters in national security and international relations because it is a decisive factor in how secure or insecure states feel. Culture, therefore, plays an important role in “determin[ing] the quality of their interactions under anarchy.”

Identity

Conventional constructivism centers on identities, such as corporate, type, role, and collective identity, which is considered more fundamental than their interests; as such, identities, which are influenced by cultural norms, provide the basis for interests in any given situation. Corporate (state) identity, for instance, which is based on the idea that states are sovereign actors who always possesses a material base, such as land and people,is viewed as the foundational identity from which all other identities flow, such as internal (i.e., nationalism) and external (i.e., distinct interests from other nation-states) identity.

Such identity is not only heavily influenced by social interaction within the international system, but also by domestic factors. For instance, states have certain needs that stem from their nature as self-organized political entities: needs for autonomy, physical and economic security, and collective self-esteem specifically, the group’s need to feel good about itself. Interests are therefore both objective and subjective though as Wendt argues, the “desire[s]” and “belief[s]” or subjective interests of states are partly defined by their “security needs” or objective interests. Most significantly, corporate identity has a memory and awareness of self as a particular site of activity and thought; as such, corporate identity sees the collective identity of individuals as fact.

Equally important, ideas of self and the environment (i.e., cultural and institutional elements), such as international sovereignty norms and practices, tailor interactions and are tailored by interactions otherwise known as mutual construction. In this way, social reality is created. Most significantly, nationhood or statehood identities, which often overlap with each other, not only arise through interactions with others, but they also essentially determine what kind of security environment will prevail.

Constructivism, for instance, holds that national identity (and cultural context or related historical experience) assists in determining the content of national interest, and, as a result, the way a particular state will behave in international relations. As Ted Hopf argues: “In telling you who you are, identities strongly imply a particular set of interests or preferences concerning choices of action in particular domains, and concerning particular actors.”

However, as Hopf further argues, “’ any state identity in world politics is partly the product of social practices that constitute that identity at home.’” Consequently, attention should be given not only to how a state’s identity is formed through social interactions with other states, but also how its identity is being formed in interacting with its own society and the many identities and discourses that make up that society. It is therefore important that both collective and corporate identity (at home and abroad) is taken into account when looking at how a state’s interests are defined and what security policies they give rise to. I

n addition, for constructivists, state identity is relatively stable something to be unearthed or discovered through analysis; Nevertheless, at the international level, there are times when identity may overcome self-interested identities (which may lead to a change in identity). In certain security environments, for instance, powerful states may find that it is within their self-interest to establish cooperative-based institutions. One of conventional constructivism’s main strengths is its emphasis on national identity in determining the content of national interest in matters of war and national security, and, in turn, state behavior.