Euthyphro Dilemma: The Modified Divine Command Theory

Introduction

For thousands of years, God has been taken as an unquestionable given. Even today, many intelligent philosophers jump through hoops to preserve as much of the Judeo-Christian depiction of God as possible in a way that is compatible with their argument. The modified divine command theory is no different. It offers an explanation for how God’s command defines morality while attempting to sidestep the problems that come with a traditional view of this theory, namely the Euthyphro dilemma.

The Divine Command Theory

The divine command theory is an ethical theory rooted in religion. It claims that morality is dependent on God and we are morally obligated to obey his commands. To accept a theory such as this, we first must establish the premise that there is sufficient evidence to believe in God (whom we will define to have three traditional characteristics: omnipotence, omnibenevolence, and omniscience). However, I argue that there is, in fact, more evidence pointing to the contrary.

The Logical Problem of Evil

One prominent objection is the logical problem of evil. If we assume that God exists and is all-loving, all-powerful, and all-knowing, we must ask why He allows His faithful children to suffer. A common defense is that suffering is necessary to appreciate life’s pleasures. However, this fails to explain the disproportionate suffering among individuals. Furthermore, it contradicts the notion of heaven as a paradise that exists independently of hell. This contradiction between God’s characteristics and human suffering challenges the assumption of His existence.

The Euthyphro Dilemma

Even if we accept God’s existence, the modified divine command theory faces issues like the Euthyphro dilemma. Plato, through Socrates in Euthyphro, asks: “Is the pious being loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is being loved by the gods?” In a monotheistic framework, the dilemma presents two options:

• God commands actions because they are morally right.
• Actions are morally right because God commands them.

If the former is true, morality is independent of God. If the latter, morality becomes arbitrary, as God could change His mind, rendering morality unstable.

Critique of Arbitrary Morality

Assuming that actions are moral because God wills them, morality lacks a clear framework. Without divine instruction, humans cannot determine moral correctness. Additionally, if morality is contingent on God’s will, it becomes unstable as God could theoretically alter His commands. This makes the theory “intellectually unsatisfying” as it fails to provide a reliable moral guide.

Independent Morality

If we assume God commands actions because they are morally right, morality exists independently of God, contradicting the core claim of divine command theory. This raises the question of morality’s origin, which the theory does not address. Hence, the theory falls short in explaining morality’s basis.

Robert Adams’ Adaptation

Robert Adams modifies the divine command theory to avoid these issues, assuming God is all-loving. He argues that while God could logically command cruelty, His benevolence ensures He would not. However, limiting God’s ability to will cruelty challenges His omnipotence. Alternatively, if God can will cruelty but chooses not to, morality still relies on a framework beyond God’s will, undermining divine command theory.

Adams’ Concept of Non-Moral Values

Adams counters that individuals can value kindness on non-moral grounds, allowing disobedience to cruel commands without undermining morality. Yet, this weakens the obligation to act ethically. If personal values override God’s commands, there is no consistent moral standard. This undermines the theory’s practical utility as a guide for moral behavior.

Conclusion

The modified divine command theory seeks to reconcile Judeo-Christian views of God with moral philosophy but fails to address key criticisms, such as the Euthyphro dilemma and the problem of evil. These unresolved issues, combined with insufficient evidence for God’s traditional characteristics, render the theory inadequate as a basis for morality.

References

• Adams, R. (1999). Finite and Infinite Goods: A Framework for Ethics. Oxford University Press.
• Plato. (2002). Euthyphro. (B. Jowett, Trans.). Dover Publications.
• Mackie, J. L. (1982). The Miracle of Theism. Oxford University Press.
• Singer, P. (2011). Practical Ethics. Cambridge University Press.
• Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (2009). Moral Skepticism. Oxford University Press.