Implementation of an Anonymous Location-based Efficient Routing Protocol into a Network

Introduction

A Sybil attack is a type of security threat in which a malicious node on a network illegitimately claims to be several different nodes simultaneously. A Sybil attacker can either create multiple identities on a single physical device to launch a coordinated attack on the network or switch identities to weaken the detection process, thus promoting a lack of accountability within the network. In this scenario, the relay node may act as the attacker, creating a new identity to pose as a neighbor to a particular node. It then sends a message to the relay node with a different identity, causing the relay node to route packets to the wrong relay node that is not closer to the destination. Such actions result in the unnecessary draining of energy from the nodes involved in the network.

Implementation of an Anonymous Location-based Efficient Routing Protocol into a Network

To provide high anonymity protection for sources, destinations, and routes at a low cost, this project proposes an Anonymous Location-based and Efficient Routing protocol (ALERT). ALERT dynamically partitions a network field into zones and randomly chooses nodes in these zones as intermediate relay nodes, forming a non-traceable anonymous route. Specifically, in each routing step, a data sender or forwarder partitions the network field to separate itself and the destination into two zones. It then randomly selects a node in the other zone as the next relay node and uses the GPSR algorithm to send data to the relay node. In the final step, the data is broadcast to k nodes in the destination zone, providing k-anonymity to the destination. Moreover, ALERT employs a strategy to conceal the data initiator among several initiators to enhance source anonymity protection. ALERT is also resilient to intersection attacks and timing attacks. This project analyzes ALERT in terms of anonymity and efficiency, and experiments were conducted to evaluate its performance compared to other anonymity and geographic routing protocols.

Anonymous Routing

In summary, the contributions of this work include the following aspects: firstly, Anonymous routing. ALERT provides route anonymity, identity, and location anonymity for both source and destination. ALERT primarily utilizes randomized routing of a single message copy to ensure anonymity protection. This approach not only enhances security but also maintains network efficiency. It is important to note that the randomness in routing decisions adds an additional layer of unpredictability, making it difficult for attackers to trace the message's path.

Resilience to Attacks

Another significant contribution is the resilience to intersection and timing attacks. ALERT has a strategy to effectively counter intersection attacks, which have proven to be a challenging open issue. The proposed protocol offers high anonymity protection at a low cost while increasing the nodal lifetime in the network. Similar to ALERT, the proposed EALERT also dynamically partitions a network field into zones and randomly selects nodes in these zones as intermediate relay nodes, forming a non-traceable anonymous route. In each routing step, a data sender or forwarder partitions the network field to separate itself and the destination into two zones. It then randomly chooses a node in the other zone as the next relay node and employs the EGPSR algorithm, a variant of GPSR in ALERT, to send data to the relay node. This consideration of inherent battery backup during geographical forwarding ensures that even though a node may be the best forwarder based on distance, it is only selected if it has sufficient battery power to forward the data packets. In the last step, the data is broadcast to k nodes in the destination zone, ensuring k-anonymity to the destination. Additionally, the protocol employs a strategy to conceal the data initiator among multiple initiators to enhance source anonymity protection.

Detection of Sybil Attacks

The second strategy included in the protocol addresses the detection of Sybil attacker nodes, which aim to create duplicate identities for themselves as different nodes at different locations. This increases routing overhead and wastes the inherent battery power of legitimate nodes by responding to these faulty identities. By preventing the battery drainage of nodes due to unnecessary routing policies, the overall lifetime of all nodes in the network can be significantly increased. This strategy not only improves network efficiency but also fortifies the network against potential security threats.

Conclusion

Thus, the proposed EALERT presents an efficient strategy towards increasing nodal lifetime in a low-cost anonymous routing protocol. This innovative approach not only enhances the security and efficiency of network operations but also ensures the sustainability of network resources.

References

Johnson, D. B., & Maltz, D. A. (1996). Dynamic source routing in ad hoc wireless networks. Mobile Computing, 353, 153–181.

Douceur, J. R. (2002). The Sybil attack. Proceedings of the 1st International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems, 251–260.

Kar, A., & Bose, S. (2014). An efficient algorithm for the detection of Sybil attack in mobile wireless sensor networks. International Journal of Computer Applications, 98(10), 25–30.