Mediation as Third-party Conflict Management

Mediation is a type of negotiation involving third parties. According to Jakob Berkovic, "the provisions of some forms of third-party mediation have recently been discovered in the Amarna letters (referring to the reign of King Amenhotep IV about 3,500 years ago). " 1 References to facilities can be found in the Bible, Iliad Homer, Sophocles' Ajax, Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet. This method of conflict management was also known in ancient China, in the system of Greek city states, in Renaissance diplomacy, and so forth.

During the First Hague Conference of 1899, the Convention on the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes, article 2, was signed. "In case of disagreement or serious dispute, before the arms appeal, the signatories agree to resort to good offices or mediation to one or more friendly countries, Circumstances ". In the contemporary legal system, the most important legal basis for this form of conflict management is Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations, which states: " The parties to a conflict, the continuation of which is likely to jeopardize the maintenance of international peace and security, Solution through negotiation, investigation, mediation or fulfillment S arbitration or judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their choice. However, theoretical studies have not shown only in the second half of the twentieth century and the twenty-century atheist.

The most prominent mediators who use their work or ideas in this article are Ellen Papeet, John H. Barton, Jacob Berkovic, Melanie J. Greenberg, Margaret E. McGuinness, Jeffrey G. Robin, Lawrence Suskind, Saadia Toffal, and William Zartman. The main difference of opinion regarding the "mature" nature of the dispute for third-party participation and the utility of the use of reward and coercive force discussed in the text is noted on the basis of country experience. With regard to Qatari mediation, the most important research that is critically employed here is the work of Sultan Barakat, Andrew F. Cooper, Mohammed Hass Gass, Hansen, Mehran Kamrava, Halvard Lira, Basma Momani, Sarah Bolam, David B Roberts, and Christian Coates Ulrichsen. The main difference of views on the issues of the reasons for the country mediation and some of its tools and techniques discussed below was found. Before focusing on Qatari mediation, it is important to recognize several nuances.

First, the term "mediation" is used here in the definition by J. Bercovich, id est, "[. . . ] the process of conflict management, which is related but different from the efforts of the parties themselves, where the conflicting parties or their representatives request assistance or accept a offer of assistance, Of an individual, group, state or organization to change, conceive or influence their perceptions or behavior, without resorting to physical force or invoking the power of law. " Second, since it is derived from the accepted definition, mediation is the process of conflict management, not just a solution to the conflict. The reasons for resorting to this tool may be different; for example, reduce stress. As M. As a mediator, "mediation is necessary, but in and of itself it is not a sufficient element to resolve conflicts". Mediation is therefore a tool for conflict management and has different forms of implementation depending on the context of the conflict, the nature of the parties, the mediator (intermediaries), etc. Qatar’s mediation as one tool of its foreign policyQatar became independent only in 1971. Long before independence, the Al-Thani dynasty continued to face the dilemma of the so-called small state. Sheikh Khalifa bin Hamad Al-Thani has solved this problem by relying on Saudi Arabia's protection. The situation changed only in 1995 when Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani became a new Emir after the bloody coup. It changed the country's foreign policy and introduced innovations. In order to understand the role of mediation in foreign affairs, the cornerstone of Qatar's foreign policy should be discovered. Henry Lira criticizes in his article the approach that explains the application of the Doha foreign policy from the point of security dilemma of a small country as insufficient. "If Qatar has achieved maximum safety, [. . . ] we should expect to see a more coherent policy toward both the outside dominant (the United States) and the local superpowers (Saudi Arabia and Iran). "

The author adds, Inter alia, the maintenance of the system for reasons and reasons for foreign policy actions in Doha. Maintaining the regional system of international relations is in line with Qatar's maximum security. Maintaining the regional order as the principle of state sovereignty as a fundamental principle of international law ensures the security concerns of this lily. Mediation facilitates the enhancement of the image as a peace broker, as the champion of peace. These principles can also serve the purpose of maintaining the regional system. Moreover, the current state of regional balance of power is critical to Qatar's survival. The Gulf War of 1991 clearly made this conclusion because Kuwait is a small country in the same region. Qatari mediation in Yemen, Lebanon and Darfur can be interpreted as part of the strategy to limit the growth of Iran's agents. However, it is doubtful to be among the main reasons for such interference. Ensuring security is thus the primary objective of Qatar's foreign policy. The other goal of the foreign policy of the march is influence or leadership.

The second and third circles of recognition, where Qatar presents itself as "a state working for unity within the Arab world and Muslims" [11], and the fourth, seeking to be the first among the equals of small States, point to action to achieve this goal. . Doha has the wealth and resources to influence the regional system of international relations. Trying to take advantage of the opportunities available. As a result, you can also get a more secure environment in this way. Mediation can be another tool to achieve this goal. The effect can also be enhanced by soft power. The liberalization of the economy in Qatar has not only facilitated the diversification of the country's economy and the accumulation of vast amounts of wealth. Political reforms here were top-down, and people were not required to do so. In 1999, the general suffrage was introduced; in 2000, the ruling family council was established; in 1995, the elections of the Central Municipal Council were announced for women to vote and to vote. However, as S. Williams admits, "it was not until 2003 that a female was elected to CMC" 12. Because of uncertainty about the results of the Shura elections, the latter was postponed. This means that reforms are aimed at soft power. Mediation can be another means of the latter.

Article 7 of the 2003 Constitution provides that Qatar's foreign policy is "based on the principle of promoting international peace and security by promoting the peaceful resolution of international disputes". Mediation strengthens the soft power of the libote. In his famous work, "The Art of Negotiating with the Sovereign Sovereigns", Francois de Cagliere noted that "nothing [other than mediation] is more appropriate to raise the reputation of his power and make it respectable by all nations. " This soft power also contributes to the emirate's legitimacy in the international arena, its status and standing on the world stage, and thus can enhance Qatari influence and security. The brand of the state is a strategy to multiply and amplify the Presbyterian efforts in soft power and influence. Qatar publishes its attractive image. The main application for distribution of this image is Al Jazeera, which was founded in 1996 and started broadcasting in English in 2006. Officially, the media network is independent and free from censorship. However, it depends on state funding and therefore, "self-censorship continues to play an important role. " 15. The regime strengthened its control of the island when its director, Wadah Khanfar, was replaced in 2011 by Sheikh Ahmed bin Jassem al-Thani. In addition, Sheikh Hamad Bin Thamer Al Thani is the President of Al Jazeera Media Network. Thus, the channel provides an image that is important for the emirate's influence and soft power. The mediation of concrete conflicts is always accompanied by Al Jazeera broadcasts. On the basis of the above, it can be concluded that the main objectives of Qatar's foreign policy are its security and impact. For the early, the main contributors are their efforts in maneuvering, maintenance of the regional system, economic and financial aspects of survival. For the latter, the emirate uses opportunities and endeavors to obtain soft power that also contributes to its legitimacy and prestige. Mediation is only one tool to achieve these goals and goals. Conflict resolution is not a major driver of mediation. Reducing tension in most cases is sufficient to provide an image of a neutral peace broker, security and influence. In the next section, the tools, resources and modus operandi of the country are analyzed.

The circumstances necessary to ease tensions and the reasons for the mediation of Doha in major cases of conflict resolution are discussed later. The findings are based on the comparative analysis of mediation in Lebanon in 2008, between Hamas and Fatah in 2006 and 2012, in Yemen in 2008, 2010 and 2011, between Eritrea and Djibouti in 2010, and in Darfur in 2008-2011. It should be noted that separate case studies are not relevant to the objective of this paper. It is used here as a source and to the extent that it provides the basis for answering the second part of the above research question (since the first answer has already been answered). Necessary Elements of Qatari Conflict MediationSecond-tier stakeholdersThe Qatari mediation experience reveals that dealing with second-tier stakeholders is critical to successful conflict management. This is what Hans Hansen calls window opportunity. In most of its mediation cases, Qatar was not a key option for the facilitator. Only took the floor when other States agreed or were not against it. In Palestine, Doha mediated after Egypt's failure (pro-Fatah) in 2006, Egypt, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia's failure in 2008. Friendly relations with the Muslim Brotherhood (Egypt) helped to conclude the Doha agreement in 2012. Participation Doha in the conflict between Djibouti and Eritrea It was only possible because "Ethiopia did not have a few levers". 16. However, the most observable example is Yemen. The results of national efforts in 2008 and 2010 to mediate in the Saada war failed because of Saudi Arabia's negative attitude toward them, among other things. However, the joint intervention in 2011 led to the admission of a. Valid. Moreover, it is recognized for. Suskind and I. "The mediator must understand the interests of these second-tier parties and consult them during the negotiations. " In Lebanon, only after "the prince telephoned Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. . . [Hizbullah negotiators] announced their agreement to the terms of the agreement. " 18 Thus, the window of opportunity, the acceptance of the mediation itself and its results by second- Is vital to the success of conflict mediation. Inclusion and cohesion of conflict partiesIn the literature on mediation, the need to involve a wide range of actors in the mediation process is often stressed. Such integration is important for conflict resolution. However, for conflict management, it is enough to involve the main adversaries, the conflicting parties. In Darfur, failure to deal with the conflict was due, inter alia, to unsuccessful attempts to involve the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), a crucial fight, after signing a deal from the Sudanese government with the Liberation and Justice Movement. The situation of Yemen reveals the need for cohesion of the conflicting parties.

Qatar's failure to involve all tribes in the process contributed largely to the resumption of fighting in 2008. Impartial or acceptable mediatorThe question of integrity is one of the most controversial issues. On the one hand, "[. . . ] it seems that the choice of mediator depends on [. . . ] more than anything else, neutrality and impartiality" 19, according to J. H. Barton and M. C. Greenberg. On the other hand, S. Touval and W. Zartman point out that "the only biased mediator [. . . ] would be credible in this context". However, in the latter case, the other party must consider the facilitator to be impartial, or at least not an enemy. In 2011, a. It is good for Qatar to distance itself from the peace process, 21 because it is no longer viewed as neutral and acceptable. Qatari relations with Hamas, Hezbollah and various parts of Sudan mainly through humanitarian relief or other forms of aid have made them acceptable as a facilitator in the future. S. J. Hansen claims that Doha was biased in Lebanon and Palestine. However, it was still acceptable because it maintained positive contacts not only with Hamas, Hezbollah, Syria, Iran but also with Israel and the US, etc. Mediation will not be possible if Qatar is not accepted as a friend or at least not an enemy by two or more parties. "The third party [Qatar] can be trusted by the parties", 22 according to Jeffrey R. Peridge.

In the conflict between Djibouti and Eritrea, Doha had friendly relations with both countries. During the Saada war, Qatar was acceptable to Salih, who supported him in the 1994 and 1996 Uprising in the Hanish and Hutian conflicts as an alternative to Saudi Arabia despite the asymmetry in its relations with the parties. In addition, "Some places are chosen for negotiations because [. . . ] they are neutral territory. " [23] Doha is a kind of places like the capital of an independent and neutral state. The Arab Spring changed the concept of Doha as not part-time. Began to take positions in Libya by calling for military intervention against Gaddafi as well as in Syria by arming the rebels. Could have a negative impact on Qatar's future facilitation efforts. It also proves that mediation is only one strategy and one tool for foreign policy in Doha. Soft power and influence by taking advantage of other opportunities that have provoked a more active and biased position of Qatar in Libya and Syria. At the same time, the new Emir, Sheikh Tamim, seeks to regain his image as an honest broker. Thus, the success of conflict mediation depends heavily on the existence of an opportunity, on consultations with second-tier stakeholders, on the perception of the facilitator at least not an enemy, and on the involvement and cohesion of key parties. Reasons for the Failure of Conflict ResolutionA) Stalemate in conflict resolutionThe debate on the right moment and the diplomatic momentum of third-party participation reveal the complexity and uniqueness of each particular case. J. Z. Rubin points out that "interference by a third party can, in principle at least, occur at any point along the way". On the other hand, J. H. Barton and M. C. Greenberg refers to William Zartman, who points out that successful mediation can be achieved only when "deadlock" is reached. I agree with J. Z. Robin in the meaning of mediation success and reduce the short-term tension. However, in order to resolve the long-term conflict, the case of George Zartman is crucial. The most prominent example in the country practice corresponding to this problem is the case of Yemen. A. Saleh did not see the stalemate. And went to negotiate only for "appeasing local and international observers". Therefore, the struggle resumed again when "Riyadh pumped money into the Yemeni army and allied tribes. " 27. In Lebanon, there was no impasse in the conflict as well: Hezbollah wasSide win.

However, the emirate brokered conflict management, which lasted until 2010, because of the parties' desire to prevent escalation of the conflict into civil war. However, the dispute was not resolved because the final agreement did not focus on structural transformations but on the redistribution of votes in parliament. Thus, the stalemate, which is detrimental to exchange, is an essential element in resolving the conflict, although it is not part of its administration. B) Reward powerAnother controversial issue in the theory and practice of mediation is the use of reward and coercive force by the facilitator. Here the first is emphasized as Qatar has this only because of its vast wealth. It is one of six types of resources distinguished by John R. B. French and Bertram Ravin, knowledge, reward, coercion, reference, legitimacy, experience, and information. J. Bercovitch vJ. Z. Rubin acknowledges the utility of using rewards if the facilitator has such resources. However, J. H. Barton and M. C. Greenberg notes that even if "external pressure has resulted in a short-term successful agreement [. . . ] the implementation of such agreements has often been problematic and requires greater external pressure and enforcement". 28. If the parties conclude a transaction only because of the expected benefits of the mediator, When the parties end there there is no other reason to maintain the terms of the Convention.

This does not resolve the conflict that needs to change the perception of the conflict and the counterparty, but it can be useful to reduce tension. Qatar has set up a US $ 2 billion joint venture fund with Libya to "neutralize potential Libyan spoilers" of US $ 29 billion to US $ 2 billion for Darfur. Qatar also pledged $ 500 million in reconstruction aid in Saada province. He was the largest investor in southern Lebanon. Provided $ 300 million for reconstruction. In other cases, Doha also used this influence. Thus, country practice shows that reward power can help to successfully mediate conflict but not to resolve long-term conflict. In most cases, violence reappeared after a period of time. C) Absence of follow-up mechanism Most authors agree that Qatar lacks a follow-up mechanism. When tension falls, Doha ends its work. As a result, violence can reappear in the future. It is not the only reason for the failure of the conflict resolution. Violence may not appear again even without follow-up, for example, if the goal of conflict disappears. However, it is more likely that violence is not a real alternative to the parties if there is a follow-up mechanism to the agreement that also reveals interest not only in conflict management but also in its decision. The latter is absent in the country situation as described above. D) Personal mediation without promoting professionals as is S. J. Hansen notes that Qatar's foreign policy is influenced by "rulers, movers, thinkers and masters". The most important of which the first and the second is the first. State governors have "relatively few local restrictions" 31. He leaves a large margin of discretion, a detailed list of princes. It also explains the personalization of the way the country works.

In the cases analyzed in this article, Prince Hamad Bin Khalifa Al-Thani (1995-2013), Prime Minister (2007-2013) and Minister of Foreign Affairs (1992-2013) Hamad bin Jassem bin Jaber bin Mohammed Al Thani, Minister of State Ahmed bin Abdullah al-Mahmoud are responsible individuals and are primarily involved in the mediation process. Dr. . Roberts admits a kind of division of labor. While the Prince acts "at the international level" 32 or at the macro level, the Minister of Foreign Affairs is at the minor or parties level. In Sudan, Mahmud al-Mahmoud's role was important at both levels. This is a positive feature that facilitates conflict management and resolution. For example, in three days of tripartite negotiations, Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim played a key role in creating a collective and friendly atmosphere. . . [. . . ] sporadic tensions when the talks came close to collapse ". It also means high priority for mediation. On the other hand, the absence of formally trained persons in the mediation process reduces the contextual knowledge of the conflict and the availability of an intermediary over a long period of time, which is critical to resolving conflicts that need a lot of time to invest. Some other parties are imagining the conflict, turning deep historical roots, ethnic - racial, and sectarian. The allocation should therefore be maintained, but strengthened by the trained and experienced administrative and diplomatic apparatus, which could devote more resources to conflict resolution. However, to reduce stress that isShort-term process, the latter is not decisive even if it can make the facilitation process easier. ConclusionsThere are many different motives either to be the mediator or parties to the dispute in order to start mediation.

For the State of Qatar, the specific motive is to reduce tension as a kind of conflict management that does not require conflict resolution. More broadly, mediation is only one of Doha's foreign policy strategies, whose main objectives are to secure the Lilliputian system; that is, to solve the security dilemma of a small country and its impact is increasing. Given this context, the success of country mediation can be more objectively understood by comparing outcomes, causes and motivations. The analysis of the country experience in facilitation reveals the validity of the previous conclusion, as well as the conditions necessary for the success of the mediation of the conflict and the reasons why the latter did not become a successful solution to the conflict in the majority of cases. The window of opportunity and consultation with interested second-tier stakeholders as well as the acceptance of the mediator, who must at least be seen as not an enemy by all the adversaries, are critical not only for the success of mediation but also for the mediation itself in many cases.

The participation and cohesion of major belligerents contribute significantly to successful conflict management. Moreover, despite the desire of the parties to change their behavior to nonviolence enough to stop or contain the conflict, the absence of a sense of disorientation from war and its understanding of the latter prevents the possibility of resolving the root causes of the conflict. If the intermediary of the reward power is used, when the promised benefits expire, the contestants may renew their struggle, which is not an indispensable condition but a possible condition. The absence of a follow-up mechanism and the involvement of trained diplomats who have more time, expertise and resources to invest in the facilitation process also reduce the chances of transforming conflict management in the short to long term. the decision. Other conditions can also be vital. However, these are factors that are revealed on the basis of a large country experience as an intermediary.