Immanuel Kant Philosophy: Idea of ​​ethics and Define 'Good Will'

Introduction

Immanuel Kant, one of the most active philosophers in the history of Western philosophy, in his famous work Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Moral discusses the idea of ​​ethics and how it can be achieved despite its necessity. In this paper, I plan to introduce Kant's general definition of moral action, and thus in that light, I want to define 'good will' and present what he really meant by it.

Immanuel Kant

Immanuel Kant was born in 1724 in the small town of Konigsberg in Germany, where he lived till his death in 1804. His parents were moderately rich. They belonged to a religious group known as the pietists, which sect had a strong influence in the life of Kant and his future thought and personality. Kant began his studies at the local Collegium Fredericianum, also directed by a Pietist. In 1740 he joined the University of Konigsberg, where he studied the classics, physics, and philosophy.

The Goodwill

What is goodwill?

While we do not (and should not expect) to find Kant's writings in any clear account of what is goodwill, we must try to build such an account, if it is worthwhile to understand and evaluate the truth. For Kant “ Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be can be called good, without qualification, except a goodwill.”

Of course, other things such as the moderation of possessions can be considered good. “And yet one can hardly call them universally good ... for without the principles of good they may become evil indeed. The cold-bloodedness of a villain not only makes him more dangerous but also directly makes him seem more despicable to us than he would have seemed without it.” Kant’s chief point here is that the essence of the morally good act is the principle that a person affirms when he wills an act. “The goodwill is good, not because of what it accomplishes, not because of its usefulness in the attainment of some set purpose, but alone because of the willing, that is to say, it is good in itself.”

A rational being strives to do what he ought to do, which is distinguished from what is done out of inclination or self-interest. To act from inclination or self-interest seems to be at a different level of morality from acting out of duty to the moral law. Now, morally speaking, it is not enough for the effects or consequences of our behavior to agree with the moral law; the truly moral act is done for the sake of moral law “for all these effects - even the promotion of the happiness of others - could have been also brought about by other causes, so that for this there would have no need of the will of rational being...”

Moral duty resides in the will, and the goodwill is that which acts out of a sense of duty, and, “an action done from duty must wholly exclude the influence of inclination, and with it every object of the will, so that nothing remains which can determine the will except objectively the law and subjectively pure respect of this practical law...”

Now, duty implies that we are under an obligation, and as rational beings, we are aware of this obligation as it comes to us as an imperative. Not every imperative is connected with morality, for not every imperative has the marks of necessity and universality that a moral rule requires. Technical imperative, such as “if you want to build a bridge across the river must use materials of a certain strength,” does not say that we must absolutely build the bridge. One may build a tunnel, or use a surface craft to get to the other side. Again, there are certain prudential imperatives, which say that if I have to be popular with certain people, then I must say or do certain things. But again, it is not absolutely necessary that I achieve this popularity. The technical and prudential imperatives are then hypothetical imperatives because they command us only if we decide to enter their sphere or operation.

The will and willingness

The first thing we need to do in attempting such is to address what Kant means by the term 'will'. There is a strong possibility to understand the claims about a particular type of person. So it seems innocent enough to recognize the goodwill in light of that “person's” good qualities. (For instance, with the good person’s moral virtues). “The claim that a goodwill is the only unlimited good is then naturally taken to be praise for a certain kind of moral character or the assertion of a certain sort of moral ideal – of the absolutely best sort of person we think there could be”.

No doubt Kant’s claim about “the goodwill has some implications for these matters, but this line of thinking can lead to crucial mistakes if we are not careful to separate the notion of a goodwill from that of a person who has one.”

For once we see what Kant means by the goodwill, I think we will see that a person who is basically bad can (sometimes) exhibit goodwill, and a person who is in general good can sometimes exhibit a bad will. We will also see in due course that goodwill is not the same as a moral virtue. We will see that Kant says explicitly that a person can have goodwill yet lack virtue.

The will, Kant says, is a practical way of acting based on legal concepts. When we act or achieve what we set out to do, our actions are often above our control, so the morality of our actions does not depend on their outcome. What we can control, however, is the desire behind the action. That is, we can operate under one law rather than another. Practical moral behavior, therefore, must be evaluated for the purpose behind it. If two people, Smith and Jones, do the same act, coming from the same point of view of the law, but events outside Smith's control prevent them from achieving its goals, Smith is far less than the praise he deserves. We must regard them as morally as their will after their actions.

Goodwill according to Kant, is the only thing that is absolutely necessary for a person to have a good desire to take moral action. Kant believes that we value goodwill without restriction. In this, it means that there are no circumstances in which we have to convey our moral convictions in order to find something desirable. Instead, virtues such as strength or courage can be minimized or given in certain circumstances. For example, we do not want to use our power to benefit those who are not good enough for the weak, and it may not be right to use our courage in action.

Kant makes a connection between goodwill and conditional happiness. He elaborates that our performance is only good if the goodwill depends on it. That is to say without goodwill, all our actions will hurt others. Good also helps us achieve moral satisfaction. Kant says goodwill “will shine like a jewel for its own sake as something which has its full value in itself”. This means, that goodwill is good in itself and does not need an excuse to justify its moral value. Even if our actions do not meet the desired goals, as long as we want good intentions and have goodwill, our actions are the right attitude to do.

Goodwill and reason

After explaining the meaning of goodwill, Kant explains the importance and practicality of relating reason to our will. He then says that it is useless to provide a reason for action that governs prosperity and happiness. The effect of reliance on the reason of your thinking is eliminated if we want to abandon action out of instinct. In other words, if we show why actions are often chosen by the individual, then we do not fully apply the function of the intellect. In addition, we turn to a certain aspect of our actions for no reason

Kant distinguishes acts motivated by inclination from those done on principle. For example, someone may ask why I did a certain thing, and point out that it brought me no gain, or perhaps even made life a bit less pleasant; to which I might reply, 'I know I do not stand to gain by this action, but I do it because of the principle of the thing.' For Kant, this sort of state of mind is the essence of moral consciousness. When I act on principle the sole factor determining my motive is that this particular action exemplifies a particular case falling under the general law or 'maxim.' For Kant, the mental process by which the actor understands that a particular case falls under a certain principle is an exercise in 'reasoning,' or to be more precise, what Kant called 'practical reason,' reason used as a guide to action. ('Pure Reason' is the reason used to attain certainty, or what Kant called 'scientific knowledge.') Since to have moral worth an action must be done on principle, and to see that a certain principle applies to a particular action requires the exercise of reason, only rational beings can be said to behave morally.

According to Kant, the more reason is used for the need of achieving happiness and joy, the more likely it is to have true success. People who use reason for the sake of guiding themselves, without harming their own desires and consequences or inclinations, are in the process of making goodwill. If our inspections are ruled by good reason, then we can be sure that we are fulfilling the purpose behind the inspection. That is, if we base our decisions on reason and reason only, then we must be acting in accordance with goodwill. Intellectual use of reason is required to achieve our goal unconditionally and it also prevents us from producing moral desires and choices that are biased. Kant says this reason limits the attainment of happiness; which is always a requirement and often leads to a decrease in satisfaction.

The goodwill is good without limitation

Kant begins the First Section of the Groundwork with a statement that is one of the most memorable in all his writings: “There is nothing it is possible to think of anywhere in the world, or indeed anything at all outside it that can be held to be good without limitation excepting only a goodwill”.

Goodness is limited depending on external circumstances. For example, the medication is good, although it is not recommended to take an excessive dose, taking into account the age, weight, or condition of the patient. Wealth and power are good, though not for those who use it or for the good of themselves. It is good and not limited, therefore, if it is good regardless of its external circumstances. It is good without changing if it is good and not in a bad condition

In the concept of goodwill, Kant explicitly emphasizes the concept of 'advancement' and extends the ideas he considers to be associated with the goodwill of action, coming from duty. “But he never provides an explicit account of what he takes a ‘good will’ to be.” In the main stage of the Second part of the Groundwork, Kant establishes the moral principle of the three-dimensional structure he has produced, he returns to the concept of goodwill, suggesting ' end at the place from which we set out at the beginning, namely with the concept of an unconditionally goodwill ', and proof of principle issued by the desire to show the principle of such a will

Kant says that goodwill is the only good thing that is not limited. He then made it clear that it does not mean it is the only good thing, as he continues to list and classify other good things without limitation. This means that it is considered good in itself will be better in that respect not bad He describes this last point by saying that 'good is the only good thing in which his virtue is not reduced to the combination of everything - even the bad things that can be gained through it. Goodwill, Kant says, often fails to achieve the good ends at which it aims. But its own proper goodness is not diminished by this failure, or even by bad results that might flow from it (contrary to its volitions). Goodwill, Kant said, often fails to achieve good goals. But then its own goodness can’t be diminished buy this failure, or even the negative consequences (contrary to its scope).

“Even if the goodwill achieved nothing good even if it were combined with all manner of other evils --it would shine like a jewel for itself, as something having its full worth in itself”.

Kant doesn’t say that, in general, we should prefer the combination of goodwill with negative consequences or other evils. But he thinks that goodwill itself will not be lost in such a combination, while the goodness of all other goods, the virtue of self-control, power, wealth, honor, health, and even happiness is greatly diminished or even lame. So while all other things are limited in their virtues in addition to the bad ones, the goodwill remains in the merchandise because it still enriches that mix.

Conclusion

In the case of the metaphysical foundations of ethics in general and of the goodwill in particular, we see that these sources contain a wealth of material, meditation upon which opens up interesting approaches to the problem of the goodwill. Before engaging in criticism, we have attempted first to be fair to Kant’s argument for the unique, intrinsic, and unqualified goodness of goodwill. We see that for purposes of ethical practice, the concept of a good or sincere will plays a fundamental role in our life.

The positive behavior of our actions does not depend on the expected result but depends on how we perform our actions. The tension that arises from our actions is to fulfill only the duty without consulting the motives of self-interest, self-protection, compassion, and happiness. The idea of ​​law provides us with a foundation to help us decide our will and fulfill our obligations. Our actions have many moral values ​​if the rules that govern them are made public or universal. Honesty based on the law of action is what is necessary to help us determine if our actions are morally right or wrong.

Reference List

1. Kant I., Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, translated by Allen W. Wood (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002).
2. Nell Onora, Acting On Principle (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975).
3. Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom of Ends (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996),
4. Coplestone A History of Philosophy. Vol. v. (N.Y.: Image books, 1964).
5. Sullivan Roger, Immanuel Kant’s moral theory (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
6. Goethe, Werke, ed. Erich Trunz Xenien, die Philosophen (Munich: Beck, 1982).
7. Kant, Immanuel, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1997a),17.
8. Coplestone, A History of Philosophy. Vol. 5. (N.Y.: Image books, 1964),322.
9. Roger Sullivan, Immanuel Kant’s moral theory (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 19
10. Goethe, Werke, ed. Erich Trunz Xenien, die Philosophen (Munich: Beck, 1982) 1:221
11. Kant, Immanuel, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. H.J. Paton.  New York : Harper Torchbooks (1948),62
12. HYPERLINK 'http://people.loyno.edu/~folse/Kant.html#5.%20When%20does%20one%20act%20from%20a%20motive%20of%20doing%20one's' http://people.loyno.edu/~folse/Kant.html#5.%20When%20does%20one%20act%20from%20a%20motive%20of%20doing%20one's�. 20th 10 2019
13. Kant’s writings will be cited by volume:page number from Kants Schriften, Akademie Ausgabe (Berlin: W. deGruyter, 1902-) (abbreviated as ‘Ak’). Quotations from the Groundwork will follow Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, translated by Allen W. Wood (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002).
14. Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom of Ends (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 12.
15. HYPERLINK 'https://web.stanford.edu › ~allenw › webpapers › GoodWill, 11th 10,2019.
16. 'https://web.stanford.edu › ~allenw › webpapers › GoodWill, 11th 10,2019.