Political Violence and Severity with The Example of a Case Study of Orange Revolution

Introduction

Political violence is described as violence initiated with the help of a politically motivated agenda by the help of state and non-state actors. Political violence is also defined as the use of force by a group of people having political motivation or political purpose. Political violence is defined as violence perpetrated by the government or the people in order to achieve political goals. It is described as forcefulness and violence used by the state against non-state actors or another state. It comprises of a number of events such as protests, non-violent activities, and critical junctures based on conflict.

This essay seeks to explain the political violence and severity with the example of a case study of revolutions and well-known protests in history such as the Orange Revolution in Ukraine through the lens of the explanation of the ideas and relevant framework as per the case study. It will do this by first explaining the background, history, and reasons of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, and then a detailed analysis will be done explaining theoretical and conceptual framework which will help to understand important points about the revolution.

Orange Revolution Ukraine is a series of protests and political events from the end of November 2004 up till January 2005. In 2004 while during the presidential election, a political revolution occurred claiming impacted by electoral fraud and corruption with the pressure on those people who voted for the opposition party.

History and background

There are Series and events of demonstrations and protests challenging electoral fraud, and voter intimidation in Ukraine with political corruption after the presidential elections which were held in 2004. As per the information and research by Karatnycky, the initiators of this protest endeavored to declare fair and free presidential elections. These objectives were thought to be achieved through strikes, civil resistance, and civil disobedience all over Ukraine.

The lack of political and fraudulent elections with a lack of political and economic reforms caused a mass deployment of people resulting in protests and demonstrations during the revolution. Journalist Georgiy Gongadze allegedly targeted the government for corruption and unethical behavior of the politicians in the Ukraine government. The authorities under the government targeted Gongadze for reporting the corruption that was happening in the country, while people support the case of Gongadze because they felt that the reason authorities under the government targeted Gongadze was so that they could suppress his freedom of speech.

The case of Gongadze resulted in public unrest with the murder and kidnapping of the journalist in September 2000. Moreover, the perception that the Ukrainian authorities were the reason behind the murder and kidnapping of Gongadze, with the lack of reforms based on political and economic concepts caused discontentment of social and political selection in the Post-soviet era. The dissatisfaction of people with their government and authorities gave rise to Viktor Yushchenko who challenged the economic and political reforms with the opportunity to organize a resistive movement able to challenge the elite of social and political society.

As per Kuzio, the Internet was the basis of the orange revolution because it engages the participants in the revolution to be informed about the developments during the protests. There were a series of events taking place at that time. These events were depicted by the help of focus groups, interviews, and revolutions. It also analyses the speeches given by the opposition leaders. The events that took place from November 24 up to December 3 were of great importance. On the basis of the protest negotiation and deadlock that had taken place between the opposition, the present government caused the opposition leader Yanukovych to paralyze the government through nationwide strikes in Ukraine. Similarly, the opposition leader Yanukovych was reluctant to make any kind of concession in favor of the government. Furthermore, the movement of security forces in the capital of Kyiv could have made the situation worse but the warning of secret service and military services all over Ukraine it prevented bloodshed.

On 3rd December the Supreme Court took the decision of re-election between Viktor Yanukovych and Viktor Yushchenko. The court ordered the second round of the election and that should be repeated within three weeks, but President Kuchma and Yanukovych preferred the whole election again. International reaction ranging from the president of the United States of America and Russian Federations has been observed and they agreed that fair and free elections should be held with no interference from other international forces possibly affecting the results of elections.

Conceptual Framework and Theoretical Ideas

The orange revolution was one of a kind event in Ukrainian history, however, the result followed an example of democratic breakthroughs or “electoral revolutions” that had previously occurred in Georgia in 2003, Serbia in 200, and Slovakia in 1998 and Kyrgyzstan in 2005 as some will argue. These cases that I have mentioned all shared several features:

• the catalyst for regime change was a corrupted national election;
• the challengers to the officeholders sent extraconstitutional intends to guarantee that the conventional principles of the political game in the constitution were followed;
• occupants and challengers both professed to have sovereign authority over a similar region;
• these progressive circumstances finished without the enormous use of violence by either the state or the resistance;
• the finish of these constituent insurgencies set off a critical hop in the level of democracy.

Researchers have numerous theories of democratization. Seymour Martin Lipset's thoughts regarding modernization as the driver of democratization despite everything order serious consideration, while other structuralist examinations have concentrated on related yet particular factors, for example, culture, economic imbalance, geology, and resource endowments. Doing battle with these deterministic clarifications of democratization are the actor-centric scholars, who center around the activities and communications of people and elites specifically as the driver of democratization or its nonappearance. The transitologists separate on two issues: regardless of whether cooperation between parts of the old system and the democratic challengers is important for democratic-based change and whether democratization ought to be seen as a game between elites, or if societal and mass actors ought to be included in the analysis.

The Orange Revolution offers affirming proof for the individuals who emphasize conflict as a driver of democratic-based change and the individuals who assign a pivotal role to organized mass activity in squeezing for a democratic rule change. According to this theory, democratization happens not when the appropriation of power is generally equivalent and the two sides are compelled to negotiate, but when societal forces get enough power to either demand the introduction of democracy or shield it against autocratic infringements.

Analysts likewise should check democratic power, including the solidarity of the resistance and the resistance's ability to oppose intimidation or make autocracy expensive, particularly the society's capacity 'to coordinate their reactions to prevent violations of democratic rights.' This framework offers a basic, incredible focal point for examining the Orange Revolution. Ukraine's degrees of economic improvement, proficiency, and urbanization, just as its social proclivities for democratic rule, geographic proximity to Europe, and lack of oil, gas, and precious stones may all have been vital preconditions for the Orange Revolution to happen.

In any case, in the fall of 2004, it was genuine individuals, persuaded by genuine thoughts and empowered by genuine resources, who battled with one another to deliver the Orange Revolution. A move in the appropriation of power between autocratic incumbents and democratic challengers created democratic rule achievement. Those trying to clutch power through antidemocratic implies were more fragile in 2004 compared with prior periods when they had the resources to hold power despite democratic challengers, while the democrats were more grounded in 2004 than in prior periods.

The 2004 presidential political race and endeavors by the ancien regime to falsify its outcomes gave the resistance a significant 'galvanizing event' to facilitate their conduct and show their power. The absence of either this political race date or the regime's endeavor to steal the electoral race would have seriously obstructed the opposition's capacity to show its power or make a solid 'threat of social disorder,' maybe the basic factor in different instances of democratization.

Conclusion

The case study of the Orange revolution defined the concept of political violence that is. Political violence is also defined as the use of force by a group of people having political motivation or political purpose. Political violence is defined as violence perpetrated by the government or the people in order to achieve political goals. The revolution ends up in the order by the Supreme Court to revote. After the orders to revote, the final result explains the clear success of Yushchenko who received almost 52 percent of the vote while Yanukovych received 22 percent of the vote. The Orange inspired by social framework and structure resulted in the victory of Yushchenko. The inauguration was on January 23rd, 2005 and the revolution ends.

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