Prerogative Power: John Locke’s Dangerous Yet Obligatory Concession

John Locke’s theory of the social contract is often interpreted as a framework that promotes individual freedom while limiting authority. At first glance, Locke’s Second Treatise of Government appears to elevate personal liberty above all, suggesting that any authority must yield to the will of the individual. However, a deeper analysis reveals a more intricate theory. Locke’s governance model grapples with the challenge of ensuring that the executive branch operates within the principles of justice and equality, as dictated by the Law of Nature and the social contract. In his tripartite government, which divides power among the legislative, executive, and federative branches, Locke acknowledges that there will inevitably be circumstances that “depend upon unforeseen and uncertain occurrences” that cannot be guided by fixed laws. In such cases, the executive, referred to as ‘the prince,’ is granted the prerogative to act in the interest of the state, provided that such actions serve the common good of the people. This system, grounded in Locke’s belief in the inherent goodness of humanity, paradoxically grants the prince considerable power, raising concerns about potential abuses of authority.

The Nature of Prerogative Power

Locke argues that by entering society, individuals are entitled to protection from the arbitrary will of others and are instead subject to civil laws that are paramount within the community. In specific circumstances “wherein a strict and rigid observation of the laws may do harm,” the prince is empowered to exercise prerogative, provided it aims to preserve the commonwealth. However, Locke expresses concern that citizens may not vigilantly oversee the actions of the executive, leading to the possibility of arbitrary and detrimental uses of power. He notes that the prerogative of the executive “is undoubted prerogative, and never is questioned,” as the populace is often not attentive to such matters. This inattentiveness creates a potential for exploitation, where the executive can act without fear of immediate repercussions.

Citizen Apathy and Its Implications

Locke further illustrates a society in which the populace is not only inattentive but also somewhat oblivious to the injustices occurring around them. He suggests that even when citizens recognize a breach of executive power, they are unlikely to pursue changes, as they may be reluctant to amend established systems they have grown accustomed to. He writes, “the examples of particular injustice, or oppression of here and there an unfortunate man, moves them not.” The majority’s self-preservation instinct often overshadows the need to address individual grievances, leading to a populace that is both indifferent and obstinate. According to Locke, this tendency diminishes the likelihood of citizens recognizing executive misconduct and demanding accountability.

Response to Unjust Actions

Despite his portrayal of the masses as inattentive, Locke posits that egregious violations of executive prerogative will eventually provoke a response. Should a series of harmful actions by the executive become apparent, the populace is likely to react. Locke notes that if a “long train of [executive] actions shows the councils tending that way,” the people will begin to scrutinize the executive’s intentions. The public’s perception of the executive’s actions will influence their response, as they will evaluate whether the actions benefit or harm the community.

Self-Restriction of the Executive

Interestingly, Locke argues that the executive will often self-regulate to avoid crossing the line into tyranny. He asserts that unjust prerogative actions will not continue indefinitely, as the majority will eventually “feel it, and be weary of it.” The executive, being aware of the potential consequences of overreach, will strive to avoid actions that could lead to rebellion or loss of power. Locke’s view suggests that even though the executive holds considerable power, the inherent goodness of the prince will generally guide him to act in the interest of the commonwealth.

Potential for Abuse

While Locke envisions a benevolent executive, he acknowledges that there remains a risk for encroachment on individual liberties. The “wise ruler” will understand the apathy of the citizens and may exploit this by enacting minor infringements on rights without facing immediate backlash. Locke states that “revolutions happen not upon every little mismanagement in public affairs,” indicating that smaller grievances may not provoke significant public outrage. This opens the door for a Machiavellian leader to manipulate the system for personal gain.

The Role of Human Nature

Locke’s assumption of human goodness is crucial for the functioning of his liberal political model. He argues that if the executive’s actions are found to be contrary to the best interests of the people, he will “forfeit the power the people had put into their hands.” This belief contrasts sharply with the views of Thomas Hobbes, who argued that the state of nature is so dire that individuals would be foolish to oppose their ruler. Locke’s framework allows for dissent against an unjust executive, reinforcing the idea that such actions are vital for the preservation of individual liberty.

Conclusion

Locke’s emphasis on human benevolence underpins the rationale for granting substantial prerogative power to the executive. While he recognizes that self-serving individuals exist, he believes that the norm is for people, including the prince, to act with goodwill. However, this reliance on the inherent goodness of humanity raises questions about the potential for tyranny. In Locke’s view, while the masses may be inattentive, the benevolence of the prince will safeguard their liberties. This optimistic perspective on human nature may overlook the vulnerabilities inherent in such a system, leaving the door ajar for the potential abuse of power.

References:

• Locke, John. Second Treatise of Government; Edited with an Introduction by C.B. Macpherson. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1980.