Principles of Mission Command in Operation Anaconda

Introduction

This study is based on Operation Anaconda, based on the accounts of the former American Central Commander General, Tommy Franks. Precisely, Operation Anaconda aimed at exterminating the severest enemy troops of Al-Qaeda and Taliban, who had penetrated the valley by controlling earlier battles for the last three months in Afghanistan. In order to achieve the target, the US commander formulated a sophisticated and complex battle plan, engaging the 'Hammer and Anvil' attack by the US army and friendly Afghan ground forces, making their way into the valley. This essay is mainly focusing on the effective principles of mission command that led to the success of Operation Anaconda. Apart from that, the essay sheds light on the non-existent principle of mission command in Operation Anaconda that resulted in its failure, often characterizing it as being significant but somewhat inconsequential. There were different types of obstacles that the US Army and Afghan forces had overcome by following the mission command that is demonstrated below.

Principles of Mission Command lead to mission success

Operation Anaconda has been formed under US central commander Tommy Franks who termed this operation to be an “absolute and unqualified success'. Precisely, the friendly Afghan forces proved incompetent in carrying out their pre-conceived march in the valley. Consequently, the US infantry troops had to combat the fierce enemy forces on their own. However, the US soldier achieved success when they called Airstrikes to attack the enemies within the valley. The situations however changed considerably when the US forces carried out tactical or strategic innovations, collaborating with the ground forces to combat the enemies. The airstrikes were more than what people have estimated due to which it was becoming easy for US soldiers to suppress the power of enemies (Crank et al. 2017). Though the original battle plan included a blueprint for merely three days, actual operations lasted for more than 2 weeks, involving intense combat, officially terminated after 17 days. When Operation Anaconda was structured, the US soldiers felt it could fight for three days with light combat. On the 17th day, Operation Anaconda was officially terminated. The Shahikot valley was given control under the US and allied forces of the US. The battle claimed eight US Military personnel, while over fifty individuals had been critically wounded (Kugler, 2007). However, the joint operative ventures and the modern, updated and dynamic information networks deployed by the US military forces channelized the situation in their favor. After the successful outcome, different types of issues arose against the collaboration of the US infantry forces with Afghanistan, associated with the US command structure, the network between the Airstrikes and US soldiers, intelligence network, the US armaments and network-ground coordination.

Therefore, according to the above scenario, it can be assumed that the leaders of Operation Anaconda had been able to apply different types of principles that resulted in the success of this battle (Westberg, 2016). According to the principles of mission command, Operation Anaconda had implemented- mission orders, risk acceptance, competence and mutual trust. These were significant principles of mission command that had been effective, strengthening them to defeat enemies in the field.

Mission orders

During the battle, Afghans and US soldiers had collaborated effectively with each other, eradicating any potential miscommunication. The subordinated groups and individuals, in this respect, had been effectively clarified of the objectives and dynamics of armed conflicts. The mission order is a communication that can be written, signaled or verbal in nature (Kugler, 2007). The mission order had been composed of instruction that helped superior and subordinate to understand their upcoming action against the enemies. The mission order of Afghans and US soldiers was written in a specific manner within the 5-paragraph format. The mission order explicated execution procedures and actionable insights for dealing with practical emergencies and the unpredictable dynamics of the enemy troops. The mission order, in this context, had been incorporated a standardized structure and proposition, eliminating ambiguous implications. It helped the Afghans to coordinate with US soldiers to achieve the goals of Operation Anaconda (Schoolcraft, Klesh & Werne, 2017). The mission order consisted of a particular situation that helped subordinates to take accurate initiatives in the critical consequences of the battlefield.

Mutual trust

According to mission command, Operation Anaconda optimized their confidence between subordinates, commanders, and partners that aligned each other for assigning tasks. The leaders generated basic trust among the subordinates that helped them to develop their confidence between all the soldiers. The ability to understand the tactical actions of subordinates and advising them to take the right path acquires seminal importance in the development of mutual trust (Kotwal et al. 2018). The commander's response activities aimed at gaining trust from associates and subordinate members, reflecting accountability and transparency and authenticity in battle processes. US soldiers and Afghans have had concrete mutual trust with each other that helped them to achieve confidence and synchronization in the battlefield.

Analyzing the principles that led to the failure of the mission

It is true that Afghans and US soldiers collaborated with each other in Operation Anaconda that succeeded in 2002. In this operation, the US soldiers and Afghans group had implemented mission command to achieve their goals. On analyzing the principles, however, it seems that there had been some distinct principles that had not been incorporated in strategic battle operations. The most rudimentary of these are those of disciplined initiatives and the commander`s intent that is undeniably significant in successful battle outcomes.

Disciplined initiatives

Operation Anaconda continued for two weeks. After that, government authority terminated this operation. This operation had killed hundreds and thousands of people with intensive combat. The enemies who were settled in the Shahikot valley had fought in the battle, drawing on experiences and equipment from all over the world. Therefore, the commanders and subordinates who had been involved in the battle had not been able to succeed with proper plans and assumptions. There were unexpected factors that occurred during 14 days (Ncbi.nlm.nih.gov, 2020). Therefore, it can easily be understood that Operation Anaconda lacked critical and encompassing disciplined actions and initiatives for optimized battle outcomes in slaughtering the enemy troops (Raub, 2016).

Commander’s intent

Operation Anaconda had been a battle that could not be comprehended before time. Throughout the battle, all the enemies had executed critical conflict that was becoming difficult for the soldiers to resist. At that moment, US soldiers made the decision to attack them through airstrike, which was the turning point time for both US soldiers and other enemies (Web.mit.edu, 2020). Therefore, it can be understood that the commander's intent could potentially express the constituents for the success of the operation. This procedure, however, was not sufficiently reflected amongst the collaborative affairs of the friendly Afghan forces and the US Infantry troops (Lechner, Küpper & Tannheimer, 2018).

Conclusion

This study is based on Operation Anaconda which succeeded in early March 2002. Operation Anaconda had implemented Principles of Mission command that led to success after fighting for 2 weeks. The basic goal of Operation Anaconda had been to exterminate the root enemy Qaeda and Taliban who entered the valley by winning earlier battles for the last three months in Afghanistan. The enemies of the Taliban and Qaeda were extremely strong with the help of innovative equipment and strength of 1000 officers. When the Afghan group was entering the valley, they gave up due to intensive attacks from the rivals. However, the whole battle had turned on its head when the airstrikes killed a huge number of enemies for 14 days. On 16 March, the operation anaconda was terminated with success. There had been different types of principles in mission command that had been utilized by Afghans groups and US officers. According to the principles of Mission command the operation anaconda had implemented- mission orders, risk acceptance, competence and mutual trust. On the contrary, there are few principles that might be considered as reasons for the failure of this operation, such as disciplined initiatives and the commander's intent.

References

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