Public Diplomacy in Addressing Anti-chinese Sentiments in Indonesia

Indonesia – and the people – almost never be in distant relationship with China. China and Indonesia had built their diplomatic relations since 1950 and got to suspend the ties for 25 years following the 1965’s coup attempt, until the relations were then restored in July 1990. As of today, the close ties between China and Indonesia are apparent from both countries’ active cooperation; seen from China being Indonesia’s second largest direct investor, the growing interest in infrastructure and manufacturing cooperation, until the maritime partnership.

Though the bilateral cooperation has progressed and been expanding in various fields, the close relations between China and Indonesia are not – and should be – only seen within the boundary of “strategic partnership agreement” but rather also in the other aspects that engage the wide-ranged civil societies. Chinese diaspora had entered Indonesia even in the pre-independence Indonesia and been involved in trade activities, economic, social and political issues, and since then the Indonesians had built perceptions towards Chinese. When Indonesians talk about “Chinese”, it can refer to Indonesian citizens with Chinese ethnicity or blood (Chinese Indonesians), and/or the native Chinese. Either way, the ethnic Chinese people stands as the human representative of China before the Indonesian public, and that means just how important Indonesians perceptions toward (ethnic) Chinese are for the two countries and the people.

Indonesian Sentiments Over Chinese

Prior to the May 1998 riots and the ever-strong anti-Chinese sentiments in Indonesia, Chinese Indonesians experienced identity crisis in which despite the efforts to identify themselves as Indonesians, they obviously could not escape their “Chineseness”. Indeed, the event has born deep-rooted insecurity out of the legacy of years of discrimination and sentiments. Not only that the riots brought great threats to the Chinese Indonesians but also to China in bigger picture. The 1998’s unexpected and powerful student political protests in mainland China towards the government showed the world about the Chinese protesters’ conscience that their kin were under dire violence and then urged the government to take some initiatives – just by the time China started to shed its traditional isolationism.

Today, even though Chinese Indonesians remain to be a minority – account for 3% of total population, there have been many turning points, especially as were initiated by the Former President Abdurrahman Wahid who revoked a law forbidding Chinese cultural performances and the use of Chinese names. Yet sentiments have not fully discharged from Indonesians. In the recent heating issue over Basuki Tjahaja Purnama – or so called Ahok, the matter over the ethnic Chinese minority who is running for Jakarta’s gubernatorial election has caught plight amongst Chinese Indonesians. Even though Basuki’s ethnicity is not the most important factor, the drama triggered anti-Chinese sentiments in Indonesia nevertheless.

Chants to “kill Ahok” and “crush the Chinese” took into appearance during the gubernatorial rally, showing just how palpable the anti-Chinese sentiments were. As matter of fact, case like public assault occurred as what happened to a Chinese Indonesian named Andrew Budikusuma who got shouted by several youths, “Ahok… you are Ahok” as well as experienced some physical bullying, which was then said to bring all signs of being a racially motivated act. The case indicates that anti-Chinese sentiments remains embedded in Indonesia and once again, Indonesia, the politics, pluralism and toleration are on test, and Chinese (be it Chinese Indonesians or native Chinese) are not exempt from the caution.

David McRae, a senior researcher at Asia Institute at the University of Melbourne in Australia said that anti-Chinese sentiment in Indonesia is nothing new undeniably, yet the degree to which the mainstream has been drawn into this politics (Ahok’s case) is new in democratic Indonesia, of which might affect the long-term perception of (ethnic) Chinese in Indonesia. The way this sentiment directly affects China is pretty notable.

One remarkable case is the fake news about China that got out of control. Indonesia’s misinformation problem aligned with anti-Chinese sentiments ensued several fake news, and one of them was the widely spread news saying that Beijing was using “biological weapons” to purposely destabilize the Indonesian economy. Given that Indonesia are amongst the most active social media users in the world, misinformation is able to quickly spread. Such kind of fake news case indeed could hurt Jakarta’s diplomatic engagement with Beijing, generating anxiety and fear to both states.

Not to mention that the anti-Chinese sentiments that might have contributed to the fear of the Chinese investors. As reported by Liky Sutikno, director of the Indonesian Chambers of Commerce and Industry for China, the Chinese investors viewed Indonesia as too risk, especially relative to the intolerance. As though the direct apparent loss goes to Indonesia, the condition resembles how impactful the sentiment could be for the two countries, the relations, and the people (especially Chinese people and/or diaspora in Indonesia).

The Significance of China’s Public Diplomacy in Indonesia

Public diplomacy has been defined as the means with which a country communicates with overseas publics in order to inform and influence for the purpose of promoting the national interest and advancing foreign policy goals. Truly, public diplomacy is of importance for states especially prior to today’s condition of networked world. With the emerging information age and “death of distance”, there is this trend of lessening power of the government yet the growing importance of roles that non-state actors, including civil societies, hold. The current globalized world has “brought in the people” into the diplomacy practices, and that being said, the success of diplomacy today does not merely lie on the bilateral agreements from states and the officials, but the wide publics – global publics are now part of creating diplomacy, not merely consuming it.

In addressing the anti-Chinese sentiments in Indonesia, it is very important to highlight the complex role of public (both Indonesian and Chinese society) to the sentiments. Along with the recovery of Indonesia-China relations, Indonesia has been trying to eradicate the ethnic sentiment by mainstreaming the presence of Chinese (be it people or cultures) amongst the society, starting from allowing the teaching of Chinese language at school (President B.J. Habibie era) until permission for Chinese to assert their cultural and religious identity (President Abdurrahman Wahid). What it did is allowing the public to understand each other’s values and tolerating them. It resembles the consciousness that the acceptance and good relations between Indonesia-China is not solely and exclusively between the governments but also the people.

As also concluded from the sixth Indonesia-China bilateral relations seminar conducted by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs (CPIFA) in Jakarta, Indonesia and China are fully aware of the importance of public diplomacy by agreeing upon the condition where education and tourism are the foundations of people-to-people relations. As further discussed, people-to-people relations through student exchanges and tourism play a key role in clearing up misunderstandings that often fan up the anti-Chinese sentiment in Indonesia. In addition, as much important as the public’s roles in diplomacy, students are indeed important bridges between China and Indonesia.

In a public lecture at Universitas Indonesia, Deputy Prime Minister of China, Y. M. Madam Liu Yandong also supported the above explanation by delivering several points in regards to strengthen the exchange between societies, to manage the friendship between China –Indonesia. One of the cooperation mechanism lies on deepening the exchange between societies to encourage citizen of the two countries to know each other. And one of the actual implementation is seen from educational sector. As though Indonesia and China have had cooperation in the educational, social and cultural fields, seen from scholarships and exchange programs between the two countries, it is noted that lack of funding is still of obstacles, hence private corporations might as well provide scholarship funds for students studying abroad.

Nevertheless, I think it is also important for the two countries to realize that people-to-people diplomacy should not only end on the education, tourism and culture area. Today is the era of blurring borders, flattening hierarchies, and heightened ambiguity due to the globalization and especially advancement of information and communication technology – which is why there have been grounding revolutions in diplomacy practices. That being said, the government should keep adapting to the changes, and having acknowledged the power of information technology including social media – and Indonesia is amongst the most social media users in the world, not to mention about the fake news over China that spread through social media –, I think the both countries might as well utilize the transformation of the recent growing information technology as an active tool of diplomacy.

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