Reasons for Drop Out and Non-compliance with Ddr Programmes

Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programmes are widely considered by both scholars and practitioners as keystone operations for building peace after civil war. At its most basic level, the DDR process refers to often internationally led efforts to disarm combatants by documenting their weapons and disposing of them, demobilize them by removing the armed group chain of command, and reintegrate them into wider society through programs aimed at empowering them economically, providing psychological assistance counselling and reconciling them with their communities. The explicit aim of DDR is to avoid future rearmament and achieve lasting peace. As the proverb goes, however, The road to hell is paved with good intentions, and failed DDR programmes can lead to a renewal of hostilities and the creation of a conflict trap, especially when they fail to attract enough combatants or have a high dropout or noncompliance rates.

This essay will examine reasons for drop out and non-compliance with DDR programmes regarding the UN led Afghanistan New Beginnings Programme (ANBP) taking place between 2003 and 2006. It looks at how these factors emerged at the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration stages. It concludes that while the wider context of the conflict in Afghanistan was conducive to failure, issues with the planning and implementation of the ANBP contributed to combatants failing to follow through with DDR policies.

Background

The ANBP took place under the joint auspices of the United Nations Aid Mission in Afghanistan and the United Nations Development Programme, following the 2001 Bonn Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions. The lead donor, Japan, consulted on decision-making with the United States, The United Kingdom, and Canada (Chrobrok, 2005, p. 23). The ANBP mainly targeted Afghan Militia Forces (AMF), which had fought against the Taliban, and associated militias. A separate DDR program was held simultaneously under the auspices of UNICEF, targeting underaged combatants.

From the very beginning, the programme faced several difficulties. First, it had to operate not in a post-conflict setting, but alongside an ongoing civil war. Second, it was plagued by in-fighting and a lack of coordination between donors, international organizations, militias and the Afghan government (Chrobrok, 2005, p. 35). An important issue was the lack of coordination between entities responsible for tightly related processes such as DDR, Security Sector Reform, Governance and Counter-Narcotics. Resistance to the DDR process by high level militia commanders and corruption also led to a host of problems, as many misappropriated disarmament and reintegration packages meant for rank and file combatants, and registered ‘phoney’ combatants to elicit more funds.

Most authors agree that the ANBP had a very low success rate in terms of combatant and ex-combatant engagement. Little monitoring and evaluation was conducted. Therefore, it is difficult to estimate exactly how many combatants dropped out at various stages of the programme. However, Rossi and Guistozzi, and Zyck estimate through qualitative analysis that a substantial number of combatants dropped out of the DDR process at various stages or failed to comply with their directives. For instance: turning it out of service weapons, or only one of their many weapons, or acquiring new weapons after ‘disarming’, and failing to demobilize while declaring themselves demobilized or selling off equipment provided through reintegration grants.

Disarmament

While the disarmament programme of the ANBP was successful when it came to accounting for and disposing of heavy weaponry (Gossman, 2009, p. 5), it was far less so when it came small arms. Of all weapons registered in the hands of militias, only 56% were returned and disposed of. Of which, most consisted of either old and unserviceable weapons, or cheap Pakistani imitation copies.

Non-compliance at the disarmament stage can somewhat be blamed on the wider context in Afghanistan. The country, traditionally, holds a “strong gun culture” (Muggah & O’Donnell, 2015, p. 7), whereas even non-combatants have access to firearms and use them for to protect their farms, livestock and property. Furthermore, the Afghani borders with Iran and Pakistan are exceptionally porous, meaning there was ample opportunity for combatants to acquire cheap weapons to submit to Disarmament programmes or to quickly replace any weapons disposed of. Ex-combatants were also demotivated to disarm as cash rewards for weapons were either never granted or were misappropriated by commanders.

Further adding to the motivations for non-compliance, an important security dilemma existed for ex-combatants formally enrolled in the ANBP. Many rival militias were not targeted by the program and remained armed. Security Sector Reform lagged behind established targets and Afghanistan had no effective police or army during this time period, as such it was up to ex-combatants to ensure their own personal security.

Mistrust was also an important factor in non-compliance with the disarmament process since “a number of political leaders tried to bolster their position by spreading the word that the entire agreement was designed to allow foreign forces to disarm the mujahidin and then put them on trial” (Gossman, 2009, p. 13). Ethnic tensions played a role as well. Tajik Affiliated Militias suspected the DDR programme was biased in favour of the Pashtun and were, consequently, fearful of disarming. While Uzbek affiliated militias, in the northeast of Afghanistan, feared disarming on suspicions that the programme was biased in favour of Tajiks.

Demobilization

By and large, the demobilization efforts of the ANBP failed to cut the social links between combatants and commanders. Many militias which were officially demobilized remained in practice, causing multiple security incidents. At the level of high command, non-compliance resulted from a lack of enforcement of demobilization incentives. For instance, many parties managed to circumvent the Political Parties Law, which barred from elections parties associated with militias, with the aim of driving them to demobilize. Moreover, a blind eye was turned to the illegal militias maintained by several commanders granted political posts.

In many cases, reintegration packages reinforced the pre-DDR chain of command rather than weakening it. Literacy courses and vocational training would be hosted in the residences of former high commanders, and business activities would be supported by their patronage and illegal smuggling networks.

Financial demobilization incentives offered for high level commanders were adequate, with Dennys (2005, p. 2) describing them as being even more generous than necessary, as most of them had already enough economic and social capital to ensure successful economic survival. Low and mid-level commanders were not the subjects of the same generous policies, as they were offered the same packages offered to common combatants. This led to lowered incentives for demobilisation, as not only would these mid-level commanders face economic disadvantage by demobilizing and disengaging from their militias, they would also face a loss of social status and prestige. Many former combatants interviewed by Zyck (2009, p. 122) reported perceived loss of prestige, dignity and respect as an obstacle to demobilization.

At the level of the rank and file, issues with the planned reintegration packages also hampered demobilization efforts. In certain areas, the long wait times between the disarmament and reintegration phases of the DDR programme led many soldiers to remain close to their militia leaders or forgo demobilization all together. Post-disarmament, combatants were given two months’ worth of food aid, while they had to wait for up to six months for their reintegration process, this led them to seek financial assistance through former commanders or support themselves through criminal enterprises (Dennys, 2005, p. 5).

Reintegration

The United States Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction states plainly that “None of the post-2001 reintegration programs succeeded in enabling any significant number of ex-combatants to re-join civil society” (SIGAR, 2019, p. 3). The context of Afghanistan, with its decades long, still ongoing conflict, weak state and economy, natural resource issues, ethnic tensions, illicit drug production, porous borders, and governance problems presents multiple pervasive issues concerning reintegration. While the best planned and best managed DDR programme would have struggled to successfully reintegrate ex-combatants socially and economically, the ANBP was neither.

The program’s reintegration packages failed to consider the specificities of both the ex-combatants and the communities they were to be integrated in. It did not provide for psychological or social reintegration assistance, but rather focused solely on economic measures. When it came to implementing those economic measures, combatants were reduced to a limited number of base characteristics (i.e. age and literacy) and seen as a homogenous group ( Zyck, 2009, p. 114), and many complained of being forced into programs they were not personally suited for (Rossi et Guistozzi, 2006, p. 11).

Some of the earliest problems with the reintegration programme were the long, unequal waiting times ranging from 35 days in some areas to six months in others, leading to frustrated combatants rearming or turning to illegal activities to support themselves (Rossi et Guistozzi, 2006, p. 10). The relatively meagre reintegration packages also suffered from the rival opportunity to engage in poppy cultivation and the opium trade, especially when taking into account the lack of coordination between DDR and Counter narcotics operations. For ex-combatants, those activities presented far more lucrative opportunities. And for those granted little land, equipment and/or training through their reintegration packages, the hardy poppy plant proved a better return on investment than the wheat they were supposed to grow. As opium poppies are not only more valuable financially, they do not require the same extensive irrigation infrastructure, and are easier to transport to markets.

Issues with the reintegration packages were further compounded by a lack of feasibility studies concerning the local economies the combatants were to be reintegrated in. For example, a vocational training programme produced 15 tailors for a single village, far more than the local demand could sustain. In areas where the reintegration package involved livestock, particularly goats, too many residents of the same area would be given goats but no training on animal husbandry, nor assistance and training on how to care for them. The goats also required other associated costs in terms of feed and veterinary care, which were unaffordable for the ex-combatants. The large influx ended up disadvantaging both combatants and other farmers, as goat prices plummeted and many died without proper care. It also led to competition over water and grazing land with established farmers, alienating ex-combatants form the very communities they were supposed to reintegrate into.

Conclusion

This essay has reviewed the reasons for drop out and non-compliance with DDR measures taken in the framework of the Afghanistan New Beginnings Programme. While the wider context of the conflict in Afghanistan presented difficulties at each stage of the process, namely through weak governance structures, the absence of a peace accord, and a weakened economy. Poor planning and implementation of the ANBP programme and its lack of adaptability to the circumstances of individual combatants, and their communities, contributed to the high non-compliance rates with DDR measures. It is also worth noting that all other DDR programmes taking place in Afghanistan since 2001, namely the UNICEF Demobilization and Reintegration Programme for Child Combatants, the Disarmament of Illegal Armed Group Programme and the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme all faced similar criticisms.

A central problem pervasive throughout the various initiatives undertaken in Afghanistan is that successful DDR cannot be undertaken in a vacuum. Rather, it is an integral part in a complex network of state building and peace building programmes. Tragically, in the context of Afghanistan, various related processes central to successful disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, such as transitional justice, security sector reform, governance reform and economic development, have all faced significant challenges.