The Connection Between Dissociative Identity Disorder and Criminal Behavior

Theatment of DID in the Courtroom

In the realm of criminal justice, the treatment of individuals with Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) poses a complex challenge, often leading to diverse approaches within the legal system. Two distinct approaches have been observed. The first involves granting freedom with mandated periodic treatment for individuals found not guilty by reason of insanity due to DID, provided that the personality responsible for the criminal act was not the host personality, the individual's genuine self. In this scenario, experts evaluate the mental state of the involved personality, determining whether they were aware of their actions. The host personality may be deemed criminally insane if the personality in question lacked awareness of their actions during the criminal act, as exemplified by the case of Billy Milligan. The second approach involves imprisonment or involuntary commitment to a mental institution when an individual with DID is found guilty as charged. This outcome occurs when both the host personality and the alternate personalities collaboratively commit a crime, such as in the case of Thomas Lee Bonney, who was convicted of first-degree murder for the fatal shooting of his daughter.

Criminal Justice Responsibility in Cases Involving DID

However, I contend that the current insanity test, which focuses on whether the host personality was aware of or in control during the criminal act, is insufficient. DID represents a unique form of mental disorder, and individuals suffering from it may be unfairly deemed legally insane simply because they lacked consciousness during the commission of a crime, without implying that the host personality is inherently unstable. Courts must establish a distinct standard for applying the insanity defense to DID patients, one that deviates from the conventional criteria. Instead, legal responsibility should be determined based on whether any of the dissociated alter personalities were unaware of or did not participate in the crime. The court's determination should not be divorced from metaphysical questions of personal identity. In such cases, courts are obliged to ascertain which personality committed the crime and assess their responsibility before deliberating on whether punishment is warranted. Therefore, it is imperative to gain a comprehensive understanding of the nature of alter personalities, an understanding that can only be achieved when the patient themselves comprehends their distinct personalities. As previously emphasized, treatment plays a pivotal role in facilitating the safe recollection of traumatic memories, equipping individuals with DID with coping skills, and ultimately merging their disparate personalities into a unified and functional self.

While it is undeniable that there may be a guilty alter personality, the crucial question remains: What about the other innocent alter personalities? In criminal law, an individual's mental state is a critical element in determining their culpability for a crime. To be charged with a specific offense, there must be evidence demonstrating that the individual possessed the requisite mental state when committing the act, such as intentionality, knowledge, recklessness, or negligence. However, in the context of DID, an individual cannot possess an intentional mental state if they lack awareness of their actions. This underscores the dilemma that arises when considering the legal culpability of DID patients. While this approach may result in a guilty person avoiding punishment, the criminal justice system prioritizes the principle of not punishing innocent individuals over penalizing the guilty. This commitment stems from the belief, famously articulated by William Blackstone, that "it is better to let ten guilty people go free than to punish one innocent person." Consequently, the criminal justice system's fundamental commitment to preventing the punishment of innocent individuals necessitates a reluctance to hold individuals with DID fully responsible for their actions. Thus, experts evaluating insanity should meticulously examine all alter personalities, rather than focusing solely on the host personality or the personality in control at the time of the criminal act.

Conclusion

Overall, Dissociative Identity Disorder presents a myriad of challenges that require the collaboration of both the legal and psychiatric fields to develop comprehensive approaches for addressing them. To achieve the goals of justice, societal security, and legal stability, the criminal justice system must aim to punish only those who bear genuine culpability. Simultaneously, it should prioritize providing individuals with DID the necessary treatment to reintegrate their fragmented selves into a single, independent identity, allowing them to regain a sense of wholeness and well-being.