The Nature of Ethnic Civil Wars: Case Study of Rwandan Genocide

Wars have distinct ways of eruption and escalation. In many instances, wars are foreseen and expected, while in other times they seem rather abrupt and unexpected. Before the 1990s, the world saw more wars based on ideological stances than ethnic strife. However, since the end of the Cold War, the world has come to witness more wars based on identity or ethnic affiliation and belonging. While wars over ideological differences can be easier to resolve, identity based wars or ethnic civil wars are considered rooted and extremely hard to pacify. To put simply, ideologies are susceptible to change and each group can be accommodated and appeased. However, in ethnic civil wars such is not the case. Therefore, such conflicts become oftentimes unpredictable and very hard to resolve. Hence, the international community has not yet fully been able to find adequate ways in which these ethnic conflicts can be resolved. Ethnic civil wars are very distinctive in their nature. The reasons behind their eruption, the conduct of the war, and their possibility to be resolved have very different dynamics than traditional wars. Taking the Rwandan genocide as a case study, it can be evident how such war, although yet again another war, can be very different than cross-border wars. The peculiarity of the nature of ethnic civil wars are very intriguing. Hence, this leads to the question: What is the nature of ethnic civil wars and what are the possible solutions to resolve the issue? How did Rwanda ‘resolve’ its ethnic problems and how effective was the solution? Ethnic civil wars are different in nature and harder to resolve than traditional wars because ethnicities cannot be changed and are often tied with self identity. Additionally, the conflict is over a piece of already shared land that all parties at stake fight over.

The many entanglements of ethnic civil wars make them very interesting to study. In this paper, I will first discuss, from a theoretical point of view, the nature of civil wars as to why and how they occur as well as factors that make them exceptionally hard conflicts to resolve. Further, I will discuss literature found on possible solutions to resolve ethnic conflicts. To apply theory to real life example, I will use Rwanda as a case study and discuss the outbreak of the conflict and how the ethnic war in Rwanda was resolved. Finally, I will assess how effective was Rwanda’s solution to the conflict.

Ethnic Identity

Ethnic civil wars present one of the hardest conflicts to resolve due to each side’s entrenched identity. While in traditional wars, people can be rallied in one side over the other and often people are susceptible to change sides, in ethnic wars, people are fighting for their identity and who they are. Scholars define ethnicity as “inherent characteristics of individuals or groups that are not subject to change and can be the direct cause of conflict”. New wars scholars argue that societies with ethnic cleavages are more prone to ethnic civil wars can erupt at any point due to ‘ancient hatreds’ between ethnic groups. Kaufmann argues in his article on ethnic civil wars that loyalties of individual are “quite rigid” in ethnic civil wars and people involved can never switch sides. He further states that war deepens and hardens ethnic identities (Kaufmann, 1996). This intensifies the probability of widespread violence as well as elongates duration of the war itself.

The reason ethnic wars escalate rapidly is because locals know people belong to which ethnic groups, where they live, and how they dress and talk. Intermingled population settlement can intensify violence and motivate ethnic cleansing. Hence, it becomes easier to create attacks and fuel more aggressiveness at hatred. Since such wars are identity based, it is hard to mobilize more people than those who actually belong to this ethnicity. However, mobilization of the group is easy because the whole ethnic group is at stake of ethnic cleansing or land conquest. And even those who put little value on their ethnic identity are pressured towards ethnic mobilization (Kaufmann, 1996). Often times, pressure can be penalizing and imposing sanctions on those who do not contribute in the war with their ethnic group. For each ethnic group, using violence against the other is justifiable because there is always the fear of ethnic cleansing. And hence, the idea is that the group who wipes the other first wins. The atrocities of the war make it impossible for political apprehension or negotiations. Hence, ethnic identities make ethnic cooperation widely unattainable.

Territory

Another factor that makes ethnic conflicts exceptional is that the war is fought over the consolidation of power over a certain piece of land. The fight over territory in and of itself creates a security dilemma, where the absence of security during wartime urges ethnic groups to be more violent towards each other and by that increasing the threats of insecurity for both of them. However, for most ethnic groups, they would forgo immediate security for a delayed gratification of territorial acquisition. Territorial acquisition is not just a sign of victory, but also securitization of identity as well as a symbol for their physical survival. “For ethnic group's, territory is invariably tied to the group’s identity”. Accordingly, the ‘homeland’ presents a vital aspect for the group’s security and there is always fear of the ‘other’ who shares the same home. However, the collision happens when both groups realize that in order to ensure their survival, they need to acquire the same piece of land. For this reason, violence is often always extreme because both groups would claim land ownership and their right to protect it.

In ethnic wars, mobilization is easy as the goal is not an abstract idea, it is to claim control over a territory where the people already live and belong to. Hence, in order to ensure their own survival, an ethnic group will try to control territories in which they are geographically concentrated. Nevertheless, violence can exacerbate in societies where there are intermingled population settlements due to offensive opportunities. The proximity between enemies can lead both groups to always be on the offensive as to deter the other side (Weidmann, 2009). Hence, intermingled societies can face harsher atrocities during ethnic conflicts and proximity could increase the chances of ethnic cleansing. As noted by Weidmann, ethnic groups that are fragmented are often less likely to be as violent as opposed to those groups that are clustered together. However, the onset of the war changes the geographic settlements of ethnic groups. Those who can afford to move, will move closer to a cluster of their ethnic group as it represents more safety. This notion further explains why ethnic wars increase in violence as they prolongate. The more ethnic groups are able to be geographically concentrated, the more they are able to be on the offensive (Melander, 2009). Therefore, ethnic conflicts become extremely hard to solve due to geographical proximity of enemies and unwillingness of both side to cooperate.

Solutions

While ethnic civil wars present a very complicated situation, many scholars have attempted to propose solutions in order to prevent conflict or ethnic cleansing. In many instances, the proposed solutions seem rather simplistic, while in others they seem possible. While in many cases, the conflict seems rather intractable, some solutions are still deemed as viable. Literature found propose that there many ways in which ethnic conflicts could end. The most simplistic of which, is negotiating settlements. This solution, although very noble, seems rather unviable when each group is committed to wipe the other. Negotiating as a solution can be beneficial at the beginning of the conflict before it turns into a full fledged war. Weiberg-Salzmann further argues that groups involved in an ethnic conflict are less likely to allow negotiations of peace talks because the demilitarization that follows the negotiations presents a threat to each respective group. Kaufmann proposed in his article that if peaceful negotiations do not work at the local level, peace enforcement could be applied by a third party; suggested the UN. Kaufmann argued that suppression of conflict could be done though sanctions, military aid, or direct military intervention (Kaufmann, 1996).

Other scholars suggest that a better possible solution would be a partition. According to the scholars that support partition, they argue that it decreases the risk of remilitarization and provide a more stable security situation for both parties. Kaufmann in his article, supported the demographic separation of ethnic groups as it “reduces both incentives and opportunity for further combat.” Although demographic separation rightly decreases the possibility of future wars, it seems a bit too utopian. When it comes to real application, this solution is faced with some hardship. Firstly, this solution encourages the splintering of states. Additionally, in societies with intermingled populations, the transfer of groups can be hard and can result in many casualties. Additionally, not everyone would want to move. Those who have strong commitment to where they live, may be reluctant to move. Further, conflict may resume over which group takes which part of the land and where the borders should be drawn. Consequently, this solution although seems very promising in decreasing warfare, may be hard in practice.

Another solution to end the power struggle in ethnic civil wars, could be power sharing. Power sharing, according to scholars, is an interesting solution when partition is not optional. For power sharing to work, as stated by Kaufmann, there must be joint exercise of governmental power, proportional distribution of government funds, and a substantial autonomy on ethnic issues as well as minority power veto. In essence, for power sharing to work, both parties must actively choose to cooperate and commit to avoiding ethnic strife. Likewise, other scholars have agreed that power sharing is feasible solution that benefits all parties involved. “Power-sharing institutions foster a sense of security among former enemies and encourage conditions conducive to a self-enforcing peace”. Hartzell and Hoddie further added that power sharing promotes positive political interactions. In essence, power sharing limits the chances that one group would monopolize power and dominate over the other.

Case Study: Rwanda

Rwanda represents a crucial case study when studying ethnic civil wars. With the excessive conflicts and building hatred between the Tutsis and the Hutus, one can start to grasp the complexity of ethnic civil wars. The wealthy Tutsi the minority for long took power over the Rwandan kingdom. In 1933, the Belgians took Rwanda and introduced ethnic identity cards and made sure most of the jobs and education went to the tutsis (Kuhlman, 2016). In 1959, there was a Hutu revolution which ousted the Belgians and the monarchy. In 1962, Rwanda took its independence from Belgium and the Hutus came to power they began killing the Tutsis forcing hundred thousands to leave the country. In 1990, the Tutsi refugees in Uganda formed a rebel armed group, the Rwandan Patriotic Front, and came back to Rwanda to make war on the Hutu army. There were efforts by organizations and states to bring peace to Rwanda by proposing the Arusha Accords. The agreement called for a ceasefire, disarmament, and a provisional power sharing transitional governme. The peace efforts were looking a bit promising until in April 1994 when the Rwandan president Habyarimana plane was shot down by the Tutsi rebels. Since that incident, hundred days of genocide had begun. In just hundred days, it is estimated that between 800,000 - 100,000 people were killed and the international community was unable to stop the genocide . The killing was so brutal that “the world's largest peacekeeping force has been unable to end the fighting (“Rwanda genocide”, 2014). The war ended when the Rwandan Patriotic front seized the territory and the government collapsed.

The peace talks had stopped during the genocide and the mission was to bring both parties back to the negotiating table to conclude the peace agreement that was previously signed in 1993. In September 1994, a power-sharing government was formed. After taking over Rwanda, the RPF installed an “Enlarged Transitional Government” which was claimed to be according to the Arusha Accords. The new transitional government however, rendered extremist Hutu party as illegal and therefore not part of the power sharing agreement. Yet, the new government included other parties, but they were politically weak. The power sharing government was working with equal representation until 2003 where the RPF won 40 seats in elections . This event puts the case of Rwanda under the test; was the Rwandan case a failure?

For multiple reasons the Arusha peace accords did not bear its awaited fruits. For starters, the agreement called for disarmament and a cease fire, however many people refused to disarm in fear of potential future conflict. In addition to the equal representation that ended in 2003 when the RPF won 40 seats in the national assembly, the constitutional reform did not meet its goals. According to the Peace Accords Matrix, by 2002 constitutional reform only ranked ‘intermediate implementation’. However, the government encouraged the participation of women in politics. Further, inter-ethnic state relations bettered, but did not reach its full goal. After the genocide, the government eliminated all ethnic references from official documents. At the same time, some government policies continued to promote ethnic identification. However, laws banning ethnic identification make it impossible for people to complain publicly about ethnic discrimination. On a brighter side, the refugee resettlement plan was fully implemented. By the end of 2002, according to the UNHCR, around 3 million refugees had returned to Rwanda. Additionally, the government had implemented programs to rebuild the country's infrastructure that would drive the state’s economic wheel.

Conclusion

The Rwandan case sheds a light on how hard fully resolving an ethnic problem is. Even with multiple efforts of peacekeeping and society rebuilding, the country unfortunately still suffered a great deal of setback. While, many Rwandans were able to come back, many people are still on the defensive, just in case anything happens and their security is compromised. Hence, it can be argued that ethnic civil wars are among the hardest conflicts to fully surpass. This is due to the fact that ethnic identity cannot be reconstructed, its importance can be diminished or belittled, but it cannot be erased. Therefore, ethnic cleavages within a society put it a risk of ethnic civil war that even with peaceful agreements will leave negative feedback on the society.

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