The Platonic Conception of Human Nature

The Platonic Conception of human nature which Descartes follows, do not look upon man as a unity in being. [1] According to platonic views man is not really one thing but he is of two things. He has a mind and a body and they are not interconnected to each other. Both body and soul are not joined to each other in the unity of existence. I did some research into the Thomistic epistemology and I found it fascinating as in how Aquinas rejects the notion of mind body dualism which Wilhelmsen uses to build his arguments. All though I am on the same contrary as Whilhelmsen in agreeing to Thomistic view of Monism I understood that, Aquinas does not approach the issues managed in this cutting edge philosophical sub-discipline regarding their relevance in settling the "mind-body issue."

No such issue existed in Aquinas' day, and for him the critical refinement was regardless not among mind and body, but instead among soul and body. Indeed, even that is conceivably deceptive, in any case, for Aquinas does not mean by "soul" what many so called contemporary philosophers tend to mean by it, i.e. an irrelevant substance of the sort insisted by Descartes. However the way Descartes explains the mind-body dualism is completely misguiding. As the author quotes in his book about the ship and helmsman example and how the notion of unity is separated between mind and body is fallible. The ship could exists without helmsman and the helmsman could remain the same without a ship. [2] As explained by Wilhelmsen, definitely mind and body are considered as a unit and are not two separate things. In spite of the fact that there are a few discussions among Christians on Anthropological dualism, most Christian scholars have a tendency to acknowledge a Thomistic dualism

As I was reading along I embarked on to a new journey in finding our whether dualism of man. As I was reading along I embarked on to a new journey in finding our whether Thomas Aquinas approach can be called dualistic. In spite of the fact that there are a few discussions among Christians on Anthropological dualism, most Christian scholars have a tendency to acknowledge a Thomistic dualism of man, where is a mix of both the material and insignificant substance and that the two substances are similarly present in man. Such a view is in opposition to a cartesian perspective of man, which instructs that ,an is for the most part irrelevant and that the physicality of man is very nearly a reconsideration to what comprises man. [3]

Wilhelmsen was very clear in rejecting the mind-body dualism and idolizing the notion of monistic view that soul-body are the same and are a single unit. In saying so not only he rejected the dualistic nature of human thinking but also materialistic nature as well.Aquinas rather takes what is currently called "purposefulness" to be the unmistakable element of the psyche, and the one that it is on a basic level difficult to clarify in materialistic terms. In the meantime, he doesn't consider purposefulness in a remarkable manner contemporary scholars do. Besides, while he isn't a realist, he is certifiably not a Cartesian dualist either, his view being in a few regards a center position between these choices. It is clear that Aquinas rejects the Cartesian or Platonic kind of dualism.

On the other hand, Aquinas seems clearly in the dualist camp somewhere since he thinks that there is an immaterial and subsistent constituent of the subject of cognitive function. [4] Specifically, Aquinas holds that the human keenness is insignificant and that since it is, the human spirit of which it is a power survives the passing of the body.[3] Lee, Patrick and George, Robert. “Contemporary Ethics and politics” University Press, 2009. Stump, Eleonore, “Aquinas (Arguments of the Philosophers” University Press, 2003, Pg no 212. What's more, that is all that anyone could need to make him a dualist as "dualism" is for the most part seen today. To most by far of contemporary savants, to state "Aquinas thinks the spirit is unimportant and survives the passing of the body, however he isn't a dualist" sounds similar to stating "Aquinas trusted the presence of God can be illustrated, but he is not a theist.”

The inconvenience is that the expression "dualism" simply doesn't have these solely Platonic and Cartesian ramifications in contemporary rationality. Numerous advanced dualists are "property dualists," who hold unequivocally that people are material things and to be sure creatures of a specific kind, yet creatures who happen to have irrelevant properties not withstanding material ones. No doubt (and as the above statement from my Wilhelmesen’s book demonstrates) I would not characterize Aquinas as a "property dualist" either, to a limited extent since it isn't right to portray him as holding that considerations and such seem to be "properties" of a material substance. In any case, the presence of property dualism as a situation inside the wide dualist camp by and by represents the point that "dualism" as it is seen today basically does not infer the possibility that a man's body isn't fundamental to him.