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About this sample
About this sample
Words: 510 |
Page: 1|
3 min read
Published: Apr 11, 2019
Words: 510|Page: 1|3 min read
Published: Apr 11, 2019
Qatar's decision to turn into an active policy after 2011 has seriously damaged its status as a mediator. Regional doubts soon spread over Doha's actions.
The constant rumors of Qatari participation in the Islamist takeover of northern Mali in 2012 have proved to be skeptical. A military coup was overthrown in March 2012 by Mali's government, after which the rebels seized northern Mali and declared an independent state. The rebels were from the Tuareg ethnic group and many fought for Gaddafi in the Libyan armed forces in 2011. The rebels, who launched the MNLA, gained strength and in late March took over the three largest cities in northern Mali. However, splits between the National Liberation Movement of Azawad and the Armed Islamic Group Ansar al-Din weakened the insurgency and resulted in the loss of control of the region to supporters of religion and other fundamentalist organization, the Unity and Jihad Movement in West Africa. With the deterioration of the situation in northern Mali throughout 2012, attention has begun to focus on the activities of a small team of the Qatari Red Crescent.
Their activities were not noticeable. One team member indicated that they had simply gone to Gao city in rebel-held territory "to assess the humanitarian needs of the area in terms of access to water and electricity". 59 The Qatar Red Crescent was the only humanitarian organization granted by Islamist separatists access to the north, and doubts about the group's work were soon met with greater concern about Qatar's policy of supporting armed Islamic groups in Libya and Syria. The most persistent and persistent criticism of the state of Qatar came in northern Mali from Algeria, whose relations with Qatar have deteriorated sharply since 2011, and France, where the departure of Nicolas Sarkozy from power suddenly cooled in relations under the leadership of his successor, François Hollande. One of the French allegations indicates that the Qatari Special Forces are training the rebels associated with the Deen supporters, recalling their role in strengthening the Abdelhakim Belhadj Brigades in Tripoli. This information was said to have originated in a report issued by the French Directorate of Military Intelligence, although no supporting evidence was provided.
The assumption that Qatar was associated with the Deen supporters was widespread. In an article in the CNN Global Public Square published by Fareed Zakaria in August 2012, "Debtors supported by Qatar are believed to be debtors" without going into further details. 61 after the launch of French-led military operations against Islamist insurgents in Qatar. In northern Mali in January 2013, and then attacked the leader of the ruling Socialist Party in France, Harlem Desire, Qatar "a form of indulgence," adding: There is an uncooperative attitude and can be considered a form of tolerance towards the terrorist groups that occupied northern Mali. This position coming from Qatar is not natural. We need clarification of the policy of Qatar, which has always denied any role in financing terrorist groups. At the diplomatic level, Qatar must adopt a stronger and stronger stance towards these groups that threaten the security of the Sahel.
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