The Views of Anthropologists on Cultural Relativism

Cultural relativism is a phrase that can be ambiguous; a few different meanings have been attached to it. The more moderate meaning of the phrase, and the main one used in this essay, is that people’s values and practices must be understood in the context of those people’s culture, rather than that of an outside observer’s culture. Cultural relativism also refers to the related idea of “the urgency of studying and learning from other cultures”, as well as the idea that a culture is not “deranged, or evil” because it is different from the observer’s culture (Rosaldo 2000, 3). In some people’s usage, cultural relativism also refers to the stronger idea that nothing is bad as long as it is part of someone’s culture. This form of cultural relativism has been criticized on the grounds that it leads to ethical relativism, the idea that there is no universal morality. The argument is that, if one cannot judge whether a practice in another culture is good or bad, this implies that no objective standard of good or bad exists.

In his article “Of Headhunters and Soldiers: Separating Cultural and Ethical Relativism”, Renato Rosaldo states that cultural relativism is valuable, but that it should be separated from ethical relativism, which he does not believe in. However, the end of his article seems to express a viewpoint that is itself somewhat ethically relativist. Janice Boddy’s article “Womb as Oasis: The Symbolic Context of Pharaonic Circumcision in Rural Northern Sudan” does not mention cultural relativism by name, but it deals with similar ideas. In the article, Boddy discusses the practice of female genital cutting (FGC) in a village in Northern Sudan, as well as other aspects of the village’s culture. The article takes a relativist approach in that it sympathetically explains FGC and how it makes sense in the context of the culture of the Sudanese group; however, she does acknowledge that some people have legitimate moral concerns about the practice. Comparing these two articles leads to some interesting connections. Boddy’s article, more than Rosaldo’s, effectively exemplifies a combination of cultural relativism and non-relativist ethics.

Throughout much of his article, Rosaldo simply describes the history of anthropologists’ views on cultural relativism. After this, he notes that current anthropologists maintain that cultural and ethical relativism are different, even if certain earlier anthropologists associated them with each other. He says, “I… would regard myself as a cultural relativist; I would not regard myself as an ethical relativist” (2000, 3), and later elaborates by saying that “to understand is not to forgive” (2000, 5). After this, Rosaldo talks about his experience living with a Filipino tribe called the Ilongots. They practiced headhunting, which Rosaldo says he “used to be” horrified by (2000, 5). However, the Ilongots later told him that they had seen American soliders in World War II and had been horrified that “a commanding officer could order his subordinates to move into the line of fire” (2000, 6). Rosaldo realized that the Ilongots’ feelings about this American practice were similar to his feelings about their headhunting, which “really knocked [him] off [his] moral-horror pedestal” (2000, 6). He clarifies that he still “do[es] not think headhunting is a good idea” (2000, 6), although this has a tone more like a casual personal opinion than a serious moral statement. He ends the article with a poem he wrote about an Ilongot companion, who had no problem with headhunting but could not accept soldiers being told to risk their lives.

This is a “dead end” for the article, so to speak; Rosaldo does no further exploration of the morality of either practice. His final statements are simply about how the two cultures have different moral views. This might be a strong ending if the only basis for morality were what people thought of actions. However, there do exist moral theories that allow people to evaluate actions in a more objective way. If Rosaldo is truly an ethical non-relativist, he should find some value in this kind of theory. For example, one common moral theory is consequentialism, in which actions are judged by their consequences. Consequentialism is concerned with “everything the action brings about”, and often includes the view that “the whole point of morality is… to spread happiness and relieve suffering” (Haines 2015). This involves preventing “early deaths, which reduce the amount of life and thus reduce the amount of happiness there will be” (Haines 2015). Under consequentialism, both headhunting and ordering soldiers to risk their lives seem immoral at least to some extent, because they both cause the deaths of people who would have rather stayed alive. (However, one could also argue that the American soldiers’ goal of defeating Imperial Japan was important enough to outweigh the badness of sending some soldiers to their deaths.) Thus it is clearly not impossible to analyze these practices’ morality on their own terms, but Rosaldo does not express much interest in trying to do so. He has apparently concluded that, since both practices seem wrong to the other culture but acceptable in their own culture, nothing impartial can be said about the morality of either one. Basically, Rosaldo’s interpretation of cultural relativism seems to prevent him from considering ethical issues in a non-relativist way. He may not consider himself an ethical relativist, but by ending with the implication that some practices cannot be evaluated by any universal moral standards, he displays an attitude similar to ethical relativism.

Boddy’s article exemplifies cultural relativism; it is entirely about understanding how female genital cutting fits into the larger context of the Sudanese village’s culture. Specifically, she examines how the practice is connected to the villagers’ lifestyle and beliefs about subjects such as female fertility and the womb. Boddy’s discovery that the villagers use “a group of interrelated idioms and metaphors” to conceptualize their lives and community (1982, 689), and that FGC is linked to these metaphors, is very much in the spirit of cultural relativism. Her explanation goes a long way towards “making the strange familiar”, a goal of cultural relativism. While FGC naturally seems strange and perhaps “barbaric” to Westerners who try to imagine it in the context of their own culture, the practice begins to make sense once the reader knows more about the villagers’ belief system. The fact that Boddy wrote the article at all shows that she believes that the culture should be studied, one of the “core notions” of cultural relativism according to Rosaldo (2000, 3). Boddy never implies at all that the village’s culture is bad, and she certainly does not imply that its difference from Western culture makes it bad, even if she does not seem to agree with FGC.

At the beginning of Boddy’s article, she says that “those who are presently committed to [FGC’s] eradication” can only “approach the problem with the sensitivity it demands” by understanding the practice and its significance for Sudanese women (1982, 682). At the end of the article, Boddy notes that “it is ironic that this practice, which emphasizes female fertility at a cultural level, can be so destructive of it physiologically”, and that “[i]n this paradox might well lie the germ of an enlightened approach to the problem (1982, 696). Presumably, her meaning is that if Sudanese people were educated on FGC’s harmful effects on female fertility, they might be convinced to end the practice. This conclusion is quite different from Rosaldo’s, as she seems to believe that moral criticism of a different culture can have a legitimate basis. Although she clearly takes a sympathetic attitude towards the Sudanese culture and its reasons for practicing FGC, she does not say that it is wrong for outsiders to object to the practice. In fact, she appears to be supportive of those who want to end the practice of FGC, as she suggests an idea that is intended to help them do so. This does not mean she is going against cultural relativism, however; as discussed before, she adheres to cultural relativism very well. She simply distinguishes between cultural and ethical relativism, recognizing that to understand a practice in its proper context does not require one to believe that it is a good thing. It is indeed true that, at least from a consequentialist standpoint, FGC raises some moral concerns; it can cause a woman pain, be harmful to her health, and prevent her from enjoying sexual intercourse. By combining this ethical position with a deep understanding of the practice – gained through an investigation that can be called culturally relativist – Boddy ends up with a valuable idea that can be used to address the issue.

Despite Rosaldo’s declaration that he is a cultural but not an ethical relativist, the end of his article seems to treat moral judgement between cultures as something that is merely subjective. It is hard to interpret this as upholding non-relativist ethics. And despite Boddy’s lack of mentions of cultural relativism or ethics, she successfully applies both concepts in her article. Boddy’s approach is good, as cultural relativism (at least in the phrase’s more moderate sense) is a positive force. A practice cannot be truly understood if one does not have a sense of the larger culture it is a part of. Also, when dealing with other cultures, it is important to be sensitive and overcome the natural tendency to judge things through the lens of one’s own culture. However, ethics are also very important, if one wishes to maintain concern for the well-being of the people in the world. Therefore, cultural relativism should be valued, but it should not discourage people from attempting to think about ethics in an impartial and constructive way.