Actions Done Out of Love Are Always Beyond Good and Evil

Critical Analysis of Nietzsche’s Claim: Actions Done out Of Love Are Always beyond Good and Evil Friedrich Nietzsche is one of the renowned German philosophers, cultural critics, and an essayist. Nietzsche’s works on aesthetics, realization, truth, cultural theory, the meaning of existence, language, decency, history, power, and nihilism have resulted to a vast impact on the Western way of life as well as intellectual account. This author once claimed that: “actions were done out of love are always beyond good and evil” and most of his readers have realized that there are several holes in this statement. Therefore, this analytic paper will evaluate Nietzsche’s claim in line with his broad-spectrum teachings in some of his materials. While analyzing Nietzsche’s statement that “What is done for love is beyond good and evil” one should be able to describe what the meaning of Good and Evil is. An action is said to be “good” when it offers the doer or the affected a rewarding result. On the other hand, an evil action leads to an unbeneficial outcome. In others words, an evil act is an antipode of a good one (Degünther 2014). In addition, one ought to understand that a deed is neither bad nor good by itself, but to a certain extent, it is the ending which describes its place in the realm of bad and good.

In one of his books “Beyond Good and Evil”Nietzsche indicts precedent theorists of lacking decisive sagacity and blindly complying with doctrinaire premises in their contemplation of morality.   Particularly, he accuses them of beginning ostentatious metaphysical schemes upon the belief that the man deemed moral is the contrary of the one deemed as wicked, instead of just a different expression of similar crucial inclinations that find more unswerving expression in the wicked person (Nietzsche 2017). Goodness and wickedness as applied by this writer refer to the polar contradictory principles in Christian ethics. Therefore, they are not automatically the precise same as we comprehend these expressions.

Friedrich himself understood that the Christian scheme of ethics was synthetic and had been forced on earth which ahead of its beginning had analyzed things on a more elementary degree of Bad or Good, which, vulgarly, may be comprehended as “that which is favorable to the affluent of man’s life” and “that which is not” (Owen 2014). Therefore, when Nietzsche states “actions done out of love are always beyond good and evil”, he hints that love occurs naturally, it is inherent, instinctive incident. This virtue is devoid of ethical gist, and if at all it had to have, it would definitely fail to comprise Christian principles which view love as probity of compassion and pity. Nietzsche understands sympathy as against the effluent of people’s life, because, again frankly, if people sympathize with the wicked then they lack an inducement to emerge sturdy, and they get wrapped in a Christian ethical structure which lifts up the pathetic and thus seizes back the strong. Hence, this claim shows that love lacks ethical content.

Nietzsche intends to mean that it is ordained and superior to anything else and so it should not be thought out as an ethical structure, but rather an elementary sensation of life. Moreover, it should be noted that Nietzsche’s claim is a stimulating notion. The question we should ask is: what did the novelist mean by good, evil, and love. When it comes to love, Friedrich seems to cut across the board. He says that there exists a certain lunacy in love but that there is always some reason for that madness. Then another time he points out that love is comprehending as well as delighting in the fact that a counterpart or another person acts, experiences, and lives, otherwise than we do.  Furthermore, this writer does not have much of anything affirmative to articulate about feminine or bodily affection, impelling me to assume that the type of “love” he pondered when he claimed that ” actions were done out of love is always beyond good and evil ” perhaps had nothing to do with hunger for sexual activity, but possibly not. This line of thought does make the whole subject matter multifaceted because surely sexual relations can be a deed done out of love. As a result, perhaps even for him, feminine affection and lovemaking as a show of love are likelihoods at least in speculation if not in reality. Regarding iniquity and good, I suppose that as for Nietzsche the bad can be anything which is “life-denying” and the good is anything which is “life-affirming.” Thus, one can argue that all sorts of lexis of love, so to say, are on the table, because both women and sexual acts can be perceived in the light affirmation of life alongside several other categories of affirmation. So, if everything that is “carried out for love” goes ahead of both denial of life and affirmation, then love can be said to be a power that is magnificent to or past life itself and its power, therefore, does not belong to this world. Evidently, what Nietzsche may have implied is that actions of love take people out of the boundaries of principles in this human race.  This could become complicated although since it denotes that there could be no bylaws in existence for love and as well no scheme of impartiality through which we can judge its actions. The insinuation is that even an offense done in the name of love might be tolerated and the executor not judged in accordance with the law, either divine or human. This is something we should all think about.

Additionally, Nietzsche’s claim “actions done out of love are always beyond good and evil” seems to describe a shift in point of reference to “evil and good” that is from an objective to be attained, or a line to traverse, to a manner of life, a system of living towards others that goes beyond mere ethical binaries. The virtue of love comprises more than simply living towards what is said to be good and away from what is viewed as evil. It is not about fulfilling certain predetermined standards, but instead, to paraphrase (Smoley 2008), about survival-superfluousness of life. This reverberates, in a way, (Bankowski’s 2013) examination of the connection between love and law where he sees love as a realization of the bylaw- but this involves a new-fangled correlation to the “law” of “evil and good,” a swing from simple compliance to going over and past, to weighing up life in other provisions than just “good and evil.” Love stops to exemplify the other in requisites of evil or good and hence as well revolutionizes our affiliation to ourselves in a similar manner.  When somebody loves, his or her actions are not simply an outwardly evil or good, but rather something more- one that accomplishes and surpasses and cannot be reduced to the mere binary outsets of conformist (slave) principles.

Maybe an alternative approach to analyze is to contrast it to the discrepancy of perception between appraising something’s aesthetic value versus its functional value. These two are not stringently constrained, but neither are they similar. Certainly, this particular comparison is exclusive due to the fact that love is functional and not just stunning, but I believe that it gets at the characteristic of acting in affection that goes beyond “evil and good.”

Nietzsche’s moral viewpoint is mainly vital in orientation. This novelist hits probity both for its dedication to indefensible explanatory (empirical and metaphysical) claims concerning individual action and for the lethal effect of its characteristic standards and norms on the affluent of the uppermost category of human beings (Friedrich’s “higher men”). From one of his claims, “actions done out of love are always beyond good and evil” it is evident that love is among the strongest sensations an individual can fell/experience. The majority view love as something of great value to people. Somethings like love/those that are treasured by us happen ahead of good and evil. This shows that they are not subject to the probity of ethics. People carry them out without minding about the ethical connotations.