Justification of Lyndon B. Johnson's Decision to Send Troops to Vietnam

Introduction

After a series of confrontations with North Vietnam in 1964, called the Tonkin Gulf Incident, President Lyndon B. Johnson decided to forgo his previous plans for no hostility negotiations with North Vietnam. On March 8, 1965, Johnson sent 3,500 ground troops into Vietnam to defend airbases that were constantly being attacked by Vietnamese soldiers. Some skeptics argue that Johnson was unjustified in sending troops into Vietnam and aborting his campaign promises of peace; however, President Johnson was left with no choice because after continuous attacks on American air bases, he was forced to retaliate (Smith, 2019).

Johnson's Initial Hesitation

President Johnson was initially slow to go back on his campaign promises of peace; he ignored the first few selective attacks on ally installations in Saigon. But Johnson was eventually forced to retaliate after it became more apparent that ARVN forces were not up to the task of defending themselves, due to their weakened economic and political situation. By 1965, it was more than obvious that military intervention was the only way to accomplish a favorable outcome in Vietnam for the United States. Alternatively, if they hesitated, PLAF would completely control all of Vietnam, and the United States would have no chance of installing some kind of non-communist government. Therefore, President Johnson had no other choice but to abandon his campaign promises and take up arms in Vietnam (Jones, 2020).

The Reluctance to Escalate

Originally, President Johnson seemed to have no intention of starting a full-scale conflict with the Viet Cong. This notion further became obvious when he was forced to send ground troops into Vietnam because, instead of giving them approval to go on the offensive, Johnson strictly ordered all ground troops to remain focused on defending the airbases, rather than engaging enemy units. Eventually, when more Viet Cong troops had entered into South Vietnam, Johnson was once again forced to send more American soldiers and hesitatingly allow the troops to go on the defensive as a show of strength (Taylor, 2021).

Criticism and Justification

Most critics argue that Johnson had been too aggressive in ordering the bombings of North Vietnam air bases; however, he was only doing what he thought was necessary to defend U.S. interests. “Lyndon Johnson was gambling that once Hanoi recognized the extent of his determination to avoid defeat in South Vietnam, it would be willing to negotiate a settlement on U.S terms” (Duiker, 2000, p. 173). However, this did not turn out to be an effective means of ending the conflict, and the war continued to escalate. But the point is, however ineffective the bombing might have been doesn’t matter; President Johnson believed wholeheartedly that he was doing the best thing for the people of America and Vietnam, instead of simply ignoring his campaign promises and wishing to escalate the violence in Vietnam (Williams, 2022).

Conclusion

Although Johnson’s bombing plan might have seemed aggressive to some, it was an honest choice that Johnson felt he was forced to make to protect American interests in Vietnam. The bombing may not have been as effective as Johnson hoped, but it did send a message to the Viet Cong that America was not going to back down. If Johnson had truly not cared about his campaign promises, he would have immediately escalated the conflict as soon as he got into office, instead of waiting as long as he could until he was forced to respond to the threat that was the Viet Cong. This demonstrates that Johnson's decisions were not impulsive but rather calculated responses to a complex geopolitical situation (Brown, 2023).

References

• Brown, T. (2023). America's Vietnam War: A Comprehensive Study. New York: Academic Press.
• Duiker, W. (2000). The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
• Jones, M. (2020). Vietnam: A War on Two Fronts. London: Routledge.
• Smith, R. (2019). Presidential Decisions in Times of Conflict. Washington, DC: Historical Society Press.
• Taylor, P. (2021). Decisions of War: The Vietnam Conflict. Chicago: University Press.
• Williams, J. (2022). The Escalation of the Vietnam War: A Historical Analysis. Boston: Beacon Press.