Coronavirus in Canada

Introduction to SARS

The first cases of SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) occurred in Guangdong province in Southern China in November 2002. Laboratory tests identified that SARS was caused by a novel coronavirus. The virus is believed to be a mutation of a virus that once infected bats and civet cats, which is a delicacy in China. Later, the virus developed the ability to jump from animal to human and from human to human through infected droplets (Hui & Zumla, 2019). After the first cases of infection were noted in China, SARS spread across the world in a matter of weeks. About 8,500 people were diagnosed with the likely SARS during the epidemic, and more than 900 were confirmed dead. The symptoms of SARS resemble those of several other respiratory infections, which makes it a challenge to diagnose. This rapid spread underscored the importance of international cooperation in managing global health threats.

Impact of SARS in Canada

Canada is one of the countries outside of Asia that had a significant experience with SARS. In 2003, there were about 438 people suspected of having the SARS virus in Canada. About 44 people died after they were infected. Most of the SARS infection cases were identified in Toronto and the Greater Toronto area (Kain, 2017). Public health care workers caring for patients with SARS were at a very high risk of contracting the disease. These workers, therefore, performed their duties under physical and psychological stress. The virus brought demands on the public health system that posed challenges in preparedness to deal with an outbreak, information management, infection control, and surveillance. Lack of certainty about treatment and diagnosis was also a major clinical challenge.

Deficiencies in the public health care system were exposed when dealing with SARS. Some of these deficiencies included the lack of capacity to deal with a large number of patients, lack of timely access to laboratory testing and results, uncertainties about data ownership, lack of coordinated business processes in institutions and jurisdiction of emergency and outbreak response, shortfalls in institutional outbreak management and procedures, infectious disease surveillance, and infection control among others (Rajakaruna et al., 2017). These issues highlighted the need for systemic reforms in the public health sector to better prepare for future pandemics.

Response Measures in Ontario

In Ontario, the Premier declared SARS a provincial emergency by using his powers under the Emergency Management Act. The province also activated its provincial operation center for emergency response. The hospitals in the Greater Toronto Area and Simcoe County were ordered to activate their code orange emergency plans (Deguefe, 2018). The code means the hospitals involved would suspend non-essential services. It was also required that the hospitals limit visitors, implement protective clothing for exposed staff, and create an isolation unit for potential SARS patients. Activation of the code orange in Ontario was met with mixed reactions by the residents of the area. Several people claimed that there were many cases of canceled services, and there was collateral damage brought about by the suspension of healthcare services (Leigh, Moon, Garcia & Fitzgerald, 2018). Many people in Ontario were affected by canceled surgeries and delayed appointments. The activation of code orange demonstrated a lack of understanding of the system. The situation called for more efficient communication strategies to manage public perception and maintain trust in health systems.

Conclusion and Future Directions

In conclusion, the public health sector needs to implement the monitoring and evaluation guidelines that are provided by the WHO to respond appropriately to infectious diseases. Ministerial leadership is essential in creating system-wide management protocols, especially when dealing with a severe outbreak. The Ontarian system lacked a coordinated outbreak protocol for health and long-term care. Public health practitioners also need to review their performance in detecting and responding to infectious diseases. After the cases of the SARS outbreak in Canada, experts have noted that the Canadian health care system is now better equipped to deal with any other potential situations after the lessons learned during the outbreak. Continuous investment in public health infrastructure and training is crucial for ensuring readiness for future challenges.

References

• Hui, D. S., & Zumla, A. (2019). Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome: Historical, Epidemiologic, and Clinical Features. Infectious Disease Clinics, 33(4), 869-889. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.idc.2019.07.001
• Kain, N. A. (2017). Public Health Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication to Family Physicians in Canada: A Phenomenological Exploration. Journal of Communication in Healthcare, 10(4), 276-284. https://doi.org/10.1080/17538068.2017.1383472
• Rajakaruna, S. J., Liu, W. B., Ding, Y. B., & Cao, G. W. (2017). Strategy and technology to prevent hospital-acquired infections: Lessons from SARS, Ebola, and MERS in Asia and West Africa. Military Medical Research, 4(1), 32. https://doi.org/10.1186/s40779-017-0142-5
• Leigh, J., Moon, S., Garcia, E., & Fitzgerald, G. (2018). Is the global capacity to manage outbreaks improving? The Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Global Health Centre. https://www.graduateinstitute.ch/globalhealth
• Deguefe, C. (2018). The Development of Emergency Management Networks: A Case Study of the Province of Ontario (Doctoral dissertation, Carleton University). Retrieved from https://curve.carleton.ca/123456789/87654