Descartes’ Aims in The Meditations

In "The Meditations," René Descartes sets out to establish a firm foundation for scientific knowledge and defend rationalism by demonstrating that the true source of knowledge resides in the mind rather than the senses. To achieve this, he subjects all sensory-derived knowledge to rigorous doubt. He reflects on his childhood, where he accepted numerous falsehoods, subsequently constructing a 'whole edifice' of beliefs that are now highly questionable. Descartes argues that such misconceptions are natural outcomes of relying on sensory experiences. He cites examples, such as optical illusions, to illustrate the fallibility of the senses, arguing that we must dismiss such unreliable information. This approach places the onus on individuals to evaluate the trustworthiness of their knowledge, which raises a counterargument: the reliability of sensory data could potentially be enhanced through corroboration with others, rather than outright rejection.

To lay a solid groundwork for knowledge, Descartes feels compelled to cast doubt on all existing beliefs, employing two thought experiments. He asserts that we cannot doubt what we perceive clearly and in favorable conditions, equating such doubt with madness. He dismisses the possibility of being mad to strengthen his argument. To challenge even these seemingly certain perceptions, Descartes introduces the dream argument, contending that dreams can deceive us into believing we perceive things clearly when we do not. Critics argue that this argument is asymmetric; just because we may doubt our awareness in dreams does not imply we cannot ascertain our wakefulness when awake.

Challenging A Priori Knowledge

Descartes does not limit his skepticism to a posteriori knowledge; he also questions the validity of mathematics and a priori knowledge. He posits the existence of an omnipotent being capable of deceiving us about even our mathematical truths. Rejecting the notion of a deceiving God, whom he defines as 'good,' Descartes instead proposes the existence of an omnipotent evil demon. However, the concept of 'deception' relies on the assumption that we are not perpetually deceived. Thus, the evil demon could not consistently deceive us about a priori knowledge, as total deception would negate the very concept of deception. Consequently, Descartes appears to falter in his attempt to doubt all a priori knowledge.

Through his skeptical arguments, Descartes claims to have dismantled all previous opinions, enabling him to rebuild a solid foundation for knowledge. However, this assertion reveals a fundamental inconsistency; he continues to assume the validity of foundationalism and the possibility of discovering a knowledge base, which may not exist. Moreover, he fails to question the reliability of logic, memory, and language—all tools he employs throughout "The Meditations," indicating that his doubt is not truly 'universal.' Alternatively, one might argue that Descartes' method is overly stringent. By insisting that all knowledge must meet the certainty of mathematics while dismissing all sensory data, Descartes may set the threshold for knowledge unreasonably high.

The Quest for Certainty

Following his first meditation, Descartes' greatest challenge is to confront the evil demon. He grapples with his own existence through this hypothesis, claiming that he discovers a piece of indubitable knowledge that will serve as the foundation for all other truths. He argues that the evil demon cannot cause him to think he exists when he does not. Therefore, when he contemplates his own existence, he cannot be nothing. The famous "Cogito, ergo sum" (I think, therefore I am) emerges as central to Descartes' strategy, providing a reliable starting point for further truths. This assertion offers not only certainty about our ideas but also a substantive existential truth that arises from thought alone, rather than empirical observation.

However, the Cogito faces criticism for relying on a suppressed premise: the assertion that 'all thinking things exist.' This premise is debatable, as it is not evident that the existence of thoughts necessitates the existence of a thinker. Philosopher David Hume argued that we have no justification for this assumption, while Buddhist teachings maintain that the 'self' is impermanent. An alternative phrasing could be, 'there is thinking occurring; therefore, there are thoughts,' which avoids the leap to affirming the existence of a thinker. Furthermore, Descartes seems to diverge from rationalism, as the statement 'thinking things exist' appears to be an a posteriori observation, casting doubt on the Cogito's ability to substantiate the existence of a self.

In response to this critique, some argue that the Cogito is an analytic truth, with the notion of my present existence embedded within the concept of thinking, similar to how 'female fox' is encapsulated in 'vixen.' However, if the Cogito were genuinely analytic, it would not yield substantial conclusions about the world and could not serve as a foundation for knowledge, as analytic statements pertain to concepts rather than reality. Additionally, philosophers like Kant and Russell contend that existence is not a property that can be ascribed to things but rather a condition necessary for possessing properties. This is exemplified by fictional characters, who can be said to have thoughts, indicating that non-existent thinkers can be discussed while making it impossible to refer to male vixens.

Critiques of the Cogito

Russell further critiques the Cogito as a circular argument, asserting that it presupposes what it seeks to prove by using the term 'I' in an argument aimed at establishing the existence of that very 'I.' Lichtenberg suggests that this 'I' is merely a linguistic convenience, akin to the 'it' in 'it is raining,' and does not actually denote anything. By failing to analyze these fundamental concepts, Descartes' project may be perceived as insufficiently radical, with empiricists arguing that it remains mired in rationalist biases by treating such concepts as innate rather than derived from experience.

Descartes' assertion of having triumphed over the evil demon with the Cogito is also highly questionable. There is no apparent reason why an omnipotent being capable of deceiving him regarding mathematical logic would be unable to mislead him about the reasoning employed in the Cogito. By not applying universal doubt in his first meditation and neglecting to question his own logic, Descartes seems to undermine his objective of establishing a certain and indubitable foundation through the Cogito.

Rebuilding Knowledge

Having ostensibly established his existence through the Cogito, Descartes endeavors to reconstruct knowledge and affirm the existence of entities beyond his consciousness. In Meditation Three, he evaluates the knowledge he has acquired to identify distinguishing features that might assist in recognizing other truths. He asserts that the certainty of the Cogito stems from his 'clear and distinct' understanding of it, positing that other propositions understood clearly and distinctly may also be true. He uses the Cogito as a benchmark against which all other propositions can be measured. Clear and distinct ideas, according to Descartes, are those perceptions so self-evident that they cannot be logically doubted while being held in the mind.

The inductive leap from the Cogito as certain knowledge known clearly and distinctly to the assertion that all clear and distinct knowledge is certain raises immediate concerns. The fact that the Cogito is perceived clearly and distinctly does not guarantee the truth of all similarly perceived concepts. An evil demon could easily mislead us regarding seemingly clear and distinct perceptions. Descartes acknowledges the necessity of dispelling lingering doubts surrounding clear and distinct beliefs. To do so, he employs the Trademark Argument to prove the existence of God, the guarantor of clear and distinct beliefs. The argument can be summarized as follows:

• P1) I have an idea of God.
• P2) In every cause, there must be at least as much reality as in the effect.
• P3) Since I am imperfect, I cannot be the source of this idea of perfection.
• P4) Therefore, whatever caused the idea of perfection must be perfect.
• C) Hence, God exists.

Descartes argues that the existence of this perfect being ensures the truth of clear and distinct ideas, as a perfect being would not deceive him. This appears to allow Descartes to overcome the deceiving creator of Meditation One and establish trust in a priori reasoning. Nonetheless, it could be contended that the benevolence of a perfect God is fundamentally incompatible with deception. An analogy would be that of a loving parent deceiving a child about the existence of the tooth fairy.

The most significant criticism of the Trademark Argument is that Descartes presupposes what he seeks to prove, leading to a circular argument known as the Cartesian Circle. He attempts to use the Trademark Argument to guarantee the truth of clear and distinct ideas while employing many of these very ideas within the argument itself. The existence of God is necessary to ensure the reliability of clear and distinct ideas, but it is these same ideas that allow Descartes to conclude that God exists. Furthermore, even if the truth of clear and distinct ideas could be assured, they would only offer subjective truths to those who conceive them.

Conclusion

In conclusion, while Descartes endeavors to establish a solid foundation for knowledge through his Meditations, his arguments reveal inherent weaknesses and contradictions. His reliance on the Cogito and the subsequent Trademark Argument expose the complexities of proving existence and certainty. Ultimately, Descartes' quest for an indubitable foundation invites further inquiry into the nature of knowledge, existence, and the reliability of our perceptions.

References:

• Descartes, R. (1641). Meditations on First Philosophy.
• Hume, D. (1739). A Treatise of Human Nature.
• Kant, I. (1781). Critique of Pure Reason.
• Russell, B. (1912). The Problems of Philosophy.