Diplomatic in Word War 2

World War II was a disastrous, a worldwide problem that affected every portion of the earth. After VE day in Europe, the war proceeded for over 3 months, until VJ day in mid-August of 1945. This war in Japan finished a short time after the nuclear besieging of two cities in Japan. Nonetheless, the decision to drop a nuclear bomb on Hiroshima was a diplomatic measure computed to scare the Soviet Union in the post Second World War time, instead of a strictly military measure designed to drive Japan's unequivocal surrender.

The US at the time of the bombing of Hiroshima was driven by Harry S. Truman, who had been pushed into the position of leadership by the passing of Roosevelt. The nuking was almost three months to the day after the annihilation of Germany in Europe. This date is of real significance while considering the connection between the dropping of the bomb and the impact on Russia, because of part of the agreements made at the Yalta Conference (the gathering of the "Big Three" – the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain - to discuss the plans for winning the war) At this meeting, the Soviet Union promised to start helping in the fight in the Pacific Theatre three months after the annihilation of Germany. Around then, there was no acknowledgment of whether a nuclear bomb was even possible and specially to make in time for the use as an offensive device in the war.

The way the date was set up for this nuking, only 2 days before the Red Armed force was to participate in the war, would seem to demonstrate that the US dropped the bomb to end the war without the need of assistance from the Soviets. Japan at the time of the bombarding in Hiroshima was a nation in confusion. The besieging runs of the Allies had destroyed more than 2 million homes, and a great part of the Japanese industry had just been destroyed (Document B). In 1945, James Byrnes knew, "that Japan was essentially defeated and that [the US] could win the war in another six months (Document F)". Both these documents would appear to say that the dropping of a nuclear bomb on the town of Hiroshima was not necessary as a completely military strategy. Japan had been fighting a two-front war against China and the US for three years, and with mine emplacements keeping necessary supplies from arriving (Document B), numerous industries were not ready to make the tools required for the Japanese forces to keep battling. Based on this data, Japan was at that point very nearly thrashing, and it was not necessary to drop the bomb as a strictly military measure. The US didn't need the Soviet Union to need to enter the war in Japan. As indicated by General Eisenhower, the reports transmitting the battleground showed the "imminence of Japan’s collapse," and the United States "ought not to put ourselves in the position of requesting or begging for Soviet aid (Document C)." The US didn't need Russian interest in the war against Japan (Document E).

This was for multiple purposes; one reason was the fear that the Soviets would need to stretch their communist ideas in the zone of China as well as eastern European countries. The US government was "concerned about the spreading of Russian influence in Europe (Document F)" if the Red Armed force went along with US forces in an assault on the terrain of Japan. As Churchill reviewed in 1953, the Russians would not be expected to win the war. This indicates the bomb was used to control the spread of Russian impact in Europe and Asia. The US chose to use the bomb not as a simple military action against Japan, but rather as an apparatus to scare the Soviet Union in the post-WWII period. The planning of the bombing, the state of Japan before the attack and the wish by the US to check Russian impact in Europe all demonstrate that it was not a military strategy, but rather a political tactic.