God's Silence and The Problem of Evil

One of the recurring themes in Shusaku's Silence is the philosophical problem about the existence of an all-good, all-knowing, and all-powerful God and the existence of evil. The problem in relation to the novel can be formulated thus: If there is a good God, how come He allows His innocent and devoted people to suffer?

A usual analysis of this problem is that an all-good, all-powerful, and all-knowing God is not compatible with the existence of evil. For supposing such God exists and created everything, there must be no evil existing in the first place for it is in direct contradiction to His goodness. But supposing that both God and evil exist, then either of the following is the case, each in response to His attributes, that is:

• God is not all-knowing enough to foresee the evil that befalls on His creature. For if He comes to know their suffering, He will be affected by it and will alleviate their suffering.
• God is not all-powerful enough to save His creation from evil, despite His goodness and knowledge of the matter.
• God is not good after all. He already knew that some evil befalls on His creature but was not affected by it and act immediately despite having the power to do so.

From the preceding implications, one cannot retain both the existence of God and evil without affront on God's attributes. And if one still insists on upholding both the existence of God and evil, then either he's logically inconsistent in his claim or simply that such God, given the reality of evil, simply does not exist.

Shusaku's Silence, through its Japanese-Christian martyrs, has an answer to all those affronts on God's attributes, and this answer is based on their claim of life after death or as they call it: Heaven. Heaven, as believed by those characters, is a place where their soul can go after death. In Heaven, there is no evil or suffering, all is bliss. With this claim of Heaven, the three essential attributes of God: all-knowing, all-good, and all-powerful, can be retained despite the existence of evil, that is:

• God is all-knowing for He created Heaven out of His awareness that some evil may befall on His creatures, and there in Heaven, those creatures' souls will take refuge in eternal bliss without evil.
• God is not powerless in front of the evil that befalls on His creatures because He created Heaven where those creatures can take refuge after their death.
• God is good because He created Heaven which He will not do if He is purely evil.

Having Heaven as an answer, it seems like God's response to the evil befalling on His creature is rather delayed. Why God waited or remain 'silent' until the last moment of his suffering creature? Supposing that all-goodness implies the capacity of being merciful, why not God's mercy as quick in response, as with the merciful among men, to attend and alleviate the sufferings of His creatures? Although the reward of Heaven is rather delayed, Christianity can balance this with their claim of the existence of Hell, which is a place entirely contrary to Heaven in that there, evil people are condemned for eternal torment and suffering. But this still leaves us to wonder, why not God throw evil people immediately to Hell? Why still wait for those evil people's time to die and remain silent while those evil people committing evil deeds? If man's justice system is supposed to be swift in principle, why not God's justice seems to be slow, even imperceptible, given that He has all the power to operate swiftly unlike man's justice system which is mired with inefficiencies or corruption along the way?

To answer the preceding difficulties, John Hick's appeal to Iranian theodicy may be of help. Hick's Irenaean solution to God and the evil problem can be demonstrated thus:

1. Man is born in the world an imperfect.
2. Man is given by God the chance to participate in His perfection only if he chooses to.
3. Man possesses rationality, moral judgment, and moral choice; and both are necessary if he chooses to participate with God's perfection.
4. There are evil in the world caused either by man (moral evil) or by nature (natural evil).
5. The world, together with the evil caused by nature or man, is a place wherein man can cultivate himself to participate with God's perfection.
6. God cannot intervene in the world, even this be in response to alleviate the evil that befalls on man, for otherwise, He defeated the crucial purpose of the world which is being a cultivating ground for man.
7. Therefore, God and evil can co-exist, with evil (moral or natural) serving as an eventual condition in the world while man is cultivating himself to participate with God's perfection.

With Hick's Irenaean argument, the earlier difficulties can be addressed by saying that although God seems to be silent both in the face of his suffering creatures and their evil-doer, this is out of respect for the important function of the world being a cultivating ground for men working on their perfection. And it will be absurd for God to constantly intervene whenever a slight sense of evil befalls on his creature, say man; given that God provided man the essential attributes necessary for attaining perfection and that God is all-knowing to be uncertain of His creation. As to the charge of mercy not leading to immediate action: given the purpose of perfection God bestowed on man and the world's essential function for its attainment; God's mercy and its corresponding action through giving man the chance to lift himself from imperfection, is not frantic but rather deliberate, befitting then His omniscient nature. And finally, the charge of a slow, even imperceptible, justice can be answered that God wants us all to participate with His perfection. In this situation, it seems like God offers men a win-win situation and that's all up to man's choice whether to join God with His perfection or not.

Hick's Irenaean argument seems to be a plausible solution for making both God's and evil's existence compatible; and with this understanding, the suffering of the Christian martyrs in Shusaku's Silence is not without meaning. However, the argument rests on some key premises which I would examine and comment upon. These key premises are the existence of God, man's destiny towards perfection, the world's function for its attainment, and its condition.

The existence of God. It is still disputable whether or not God existed. Although some arguments purport to prove God's existence, among the popular are Aquinas' cosmological argument, Anselm's ontological argument, or Paley's design argument; but all of them, as Kant pointed out, is based on the assumption that man's mind can reliably comprehend and reason about things transcendental such as God. But as Kant would subsequently show, man's mind can only reliably comprehend and reason about things in experience, and beyond that man's mind is no longer fit to judge and reason; therefore, according to Kant, it's beyond man to certainly know God's existence. Compare to the popular arguments about God's existence I found Kant's critical argument to be more appealing, for unlike the popular argument for the existence of God, they seem to give this empty feeling save only by their logical presentation. With the popular arguments of God's existence, I find it more revealing having found out the ant's face over a high-resolution camera than finding out God's existence by pure reasoning alone, which is ironic as ant's face is trivial compare to God's existence. Adding also to the appeal of Kant's argument is that it doesn't attack anyone whose belief in God is based on faith and I'm more inclined to such position.

Man's God-given chance towards perfection and the world's function for man to attain it. Hick's Irenaean argument claims that God gave man the chance for perfection which he can take if he chooses to. Certainly, this claim strikes the problem of evil at the heart by asserting that evil does exist and that man's suffering from it is not meaningless. However, doubt can still be asked: whether there is a God Who then gave such a chance? If Kant's insight about the uncertainty of establishing or knowing God's existence is true, then there's no way for us to know the answer to the question. But regardless of the reality of God's existence and His actual bestowing of such chance, it's more appealing to live the world with the aim of perfection in mind than without. And whether or not we can continue working on our perfection after we die is again a transcendental question of immortality which if we follow Kant, we better no pursue.

The condition of man's perfection. Regardless of the reality of God and His bestowing of man the chance to perfection, the purpose of perfecting ourselves is an attractive prospect, shifting then our focus from the evils of the world towards our attainment of perfection. However, promising this may sound, but the purpose of perfection cannot be without some problem. Hick's Irenaean argument doesn't make an explicit description as to the condition of man's perfection, but given the Christian origin of the argument, it can be assumed that the condition for man's perfection is based on the Christian's teaching. Now, other teachings aside from Christianity purports man's spiritual betterment, if perfection is not a suitable term. And despite all these teachings' emphasis on the spiritual, they still significantly differ in their details or contents, they may even contradict each other. So, with this problematic state, it remains to be seen whether among the teachings is the correct condition for perfection, or perhaps a synthesis of the teaching is called for.

From the examination of the key premises of Hick's Irenaean argument, it can be said that although the argument plausibly addressed the co-existence of God and evil, it is still based on controversial premises such as God's real existence, man's purpose of perfection and its condition. But even if Kant is correct in arguing that we can't certainly know God's existence much more the reality of His bestowing on man a purpose of perfection, retaining still the purpose of perfection is more reasonable than having without one in life. Certainly, we are still left with the problem of the condition of perfection but the landscape of the over-all issue changes from the reactive questioning of the existence of evil, towards a proactive one of accepting the evils in the world and settling on a way to bettering ourselves.