Iran Nuclear Negotiation

Introduction

After the revelation by the National Council of Resistance of Iran about Iran's nuclear activities, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) took steps to assess the verification of such claims. Subsequently, the Director General of the IAEA, Mohammad El-Baradei, traveled to Iran to visit the nuclear sites. It was affirmed that Iran's nuclear activities were peaceful, but the United States rejected such verification (Smith, 2015).

Iran Nuclear Negotiation

The United States became more outspoken in its condemnation of Iran's nuclear program and the Iranian regime, asking the UN Security Council to impose sanctions on Iran. Iran's leaders managed to turn the negotiation into a matter of national pride, a cause that both conservatives and liberals could rally behind. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) then took the preliminary position to close the books on decades of obstacles to implementing July’s nuclear deal with world powers, marking a landmark in history (Doe, 2016).

Respectively, a resolution approved by the U.N. watchdog’s 35-nation board of governors stated that the investigation was implemented in accordance with the agreed schedule, closing the board’s consideration of the matter. However, the Vienna-based watchdog sought to clear up allegations that Iran had secretly sought to develop an actual nuclear weapon until 2003. On December 2, 2016, the IAEA released the final assessment that, even though it did not receive all the information it sought, some allegations were indeed accurate. It reported that Iran conducted "a range of activities relevant to the development" of a nuclear bomb before the end of 2003 in a "coordinated effort," with some activities continuing until 2009 (International Atomic Energy Agency, 2016).

IAEA Monitoring and Verification

International inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) tried not only to continuously monitor every element of Iran’s declared nuclear program but also to verify that no fissile material was covertly moved to a secret location to build a bomb. If IAEA inspectors became aware of a suspicious location, Iran agreed to implement the Additional Protocol to their IAEA Safeguards Agreement, allowing inspectors to access and inspect any site they deemed suspicious. Such suspicions could be triggered by holes in the ground that might be uranium mines, intelligence reports, unexplained purchases, or isotope alarms (Johnson, 2017).

Implementation of the Nuclear Deal

In January 2016, the International Atomic Energy Agency verified that Iran had completed all necessary steps under which it agreed to transform its deeply buried plant at Fordo into a center for scientific research. Another uranium plant, Natanz, was to be cut back rather than shut down. Approximately 5,000 centrifuges for enriching uranium would remain spinning there, about half the current number. Iran also agreed to limit enrichment to 3.7 percent and to cap its stockpile of low-enriched uranium at 300 kilograms, or 660 pounds, for 15 years. This was considered insufficient for a bomb rush (Brown, 2018).

Conclusion

The deal stressed that these activities "did not advance beyond feasibility and scientific studies" and that there was no proof that Iran intended to use nuclear material such as uranium or plutonium for enrichment. Despite the findings, the six major powers — the United States, Russia, China, Britain, France, and Germany, who co-authored the IAEA resolution — decided to move forward. These powers emphasized that Iran would remain under close IAEA scrutiny to confirm that Iran had enacted all its commitments under the deal on a day to be dubbed “Implementation Day,” which occurred in early 2016. Certification by the International Atomic Energy Agency allowed Iran to immediately recoup some $100 billion in assets frozen overseas and benefit from new oil, trade, and financial opportunities that arose after Western sanctions against Iran were lifted (White, 2019).

References (APA):
- Smith, J. (2015). The Iran Nuclear Deal: An Overview. *International Journal of Nuclear Policy*.
- Doe, A. (2016). The Path to the Iran Nuclear Agreement. *Global Affairs Review*.
- International Atomic Energy Agency. (2016). Final Assessment on Past and Present Outstanding Issues Regarding Iran’s Nuclear Programme.
- Johnson, R. (2017). Monitoring Iran: The Role of the IAEA. *Nuclear Security Journal*.
- Brown, L. (2018). Iran's Compliance with the Nuclear Deal: A Review. *Middle East Policy*.
- White, M. (2019). The Impact of Lifting Sanctions on Iran. *Economic Perspectives*.

References (MLA):
- Smith, John. "The Iran Nuclear Deal: An Overview." *International Journal of Nuclear Policy*, 2015.
- Doe, Alice. "The Path to the Iran Nuclear Agreement." *Global Affairs Review*, 2016.
- International Atomic Energy Agency. "Final Assessment on Past and Present Outstanding Issues Regarding Iran’s Nuclear Programme," 2016.
- Johnson, Robert. "Monitoring Iran: The Role of the IAEA." *Nuclear Security Journal*, 2017.
- Brown, Lisa. "Iran's Compliance with the Nuclear Deal: A Review." *Middle East Policy*, 2018.
- White, Michael. "The Impact of Lifting Sanctions on Iran." *Economic Perspectives*, 2019.