By clicking “Check Writers’ Offers”, you agree to our terms of service and privacy policy. We’ll occasionally send you promo and account related email
No need to pay just yet!
About this sample
About this sample
Words: 446 |
Page: 1|
3 min read
Updated: 16 November, 2024
Words: 446|Page: 1|3 min read
Updated: 16 November, 2024
Kant's project consists in making explicit the limits of human knowledge in general, and this is made explicit in the Transcendental Dialectic section of the Critique of Pure Reason in particular. To make sense of this, we must first consider his project as a whole. Kant distinguishes between two forms of logic: general and transcendental. General logic is concerned with the form of thought in general, without any relation of such thought to any object. In contrast, transcendental logic is concerned with the formal rules of thinking about objects in general. Kant argues that neither the rules provided by general nor transcendental logic can themselves yield any knowledge of objects.
The attempt human reason makes to deduce knowledge of objects from general and transcendental logic is termed by Kant as "dialectical". These dialectical attempts are criticized by Kant in the Transcendental Dialectic section of the Critique (Kant, 1781/1998). Any application of transcendental concepts to things in general and things in themselves is not possible simply because the pure concepts of the understanding can possess knowledge only when applied to the conditions of sensibility (space and time). In other words, any concepts that do not refer to intuition are empty. This is not to say these concepts arise from experience, but rather these pure concepts arise with experience. Even though these pure concepts are not reducible to experience, they are nonetheless bound to it.
Therefore, any attempt to acquire knowledge of objects through pure concepts alone is ruled out by Kant's transcendental epistemology. Implicit in this is the critique of both the early modern empiricists and rationalists. For example, Leibniz attempted to deduce all knowledge about phenomena through pure concepts alone, while Locke, on the other hand, extended the conditions of sensibility to all objects (Guyer, 1987). They did not recognize, according to Kant, that both understanding and sensibility are necessary and irreducible to the other. In the Transcendental Dialectic, Kant expands on this. The “logic of illusion” for Kant is driven by reason itself, which demands knowledge that goes beyond all experience. Kant terms this alleged knowledge “transcendent”, distinguishing it from his use of the term "transcendental". Kant seeks to expose the illusions of transcendent judgments in the Transcendental Dialectic section.
The problem is not merely that we inappropriately apply concepts beyond their capacity, but rather that reason in itself contains the demand for going beyond its limits. This demand, Kant argues, is reason's tendency to take subjective necessity for the unification of thought as objective characteristics of things. By subjective necessity, Kant means the demand for a unity of thought or explanation. Kant expands on this in a detailed manner in the rest of the Dialectic section of the Critique (Allison, 2004). This exploration not only critiques the methodologies of his predecessors but also provides a foundational framework for understanding the boundaries of human cognition.
Kant's examination of the limits of human knowledge, particularly through his critique of dialectical reasoning, offers profound insights into the nature of cognition and the potential pitfalls of extending reason beyond its appropriate bounds. By distinguishing between general and transcendental logic, Kant provides a comprehensive framework that challenges previous philosophical doctrines and sets the stage for future inquiries into the nature of knowledge and reality.
Allison, H. E. (2004). Kant's Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense. Yale University Press.
Guyer, P. (1987). Kant and the Claims of Knowledge. Cambridge University Press.
Kant, I. (1781/1998). Critique of Pure Reason (P. Guyer & A. W. Wood, Trans.). Cambridge University Press.
Browse our vast selection of original essay samples, each expertly formatted and styled