The number of research works on physical layer security has increased over the last few years. This number is certainly to continue growing with the coming into view of (without having one central area of command) networks and the use/military service of 5G and beyond wireless communication systems. What distinguishes physical layer security compared to other high layers (related to secret computer codes) ways of doing things is that it uses (for selfish reasons) randomness and the ups and downs of the wireless channel to (accomplish or gain with effort) security at an reduced complex difficulty.
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'Physical Layer Security'
Information theoretic security dates back to 1949 when Shannon introduced his pioneer work on calculates/codes systems. Shannon's work thinks about/believes the secure transmission of private information when a random secret key is shared between the legal/real and true parties, and an (allowing something to happen without reacting or trying to stop it) person who secretly listens to conversations is intercepting the communication. After few years, Wayner's model, called a wiretap channel, takes advantage of the channels' mistakes and flaws to secure a transmission at the physical layer without the need of a shared secret key. Since then, studies of the wiretap channels have hugely finding a new research field and extended to more general communication systems; such as in the area of broadcast channels, fading channels, multiuser networks, and many other wireless communication models.
In detail, securing fading channels from possible wiretapping attacks is of extremely important interest, especially relating to/about the never-before-seen growth of wireless communication computer programs and devices. The sad and immediate behaviour of the fading model is that it takes advantage of the randomness of the channel gain ups and downs to secure the transmission against possible people who secretly listen to conversations, at the physical layer itself. As a result, even if the person who secretly listens to conversations has a better average signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) than the legal/real and true receiver, physical layer security can still be over fading channels without needing/ordering the sharing of a secret key. The generalize term to recognize the inexperienced/low quality of fading the channels, the unavoidable knowledge of the channel state information (CSI) is must needed.
Basically, the goal of physical-layer security is to (make something as small as possible/treat something important as unimportant) the amount of private information that can be received/be gotten by the illegal users according to their received signals. To (accomplish or gain with effort) secure communications over wireless channels, physical layer security explores time-changing/different properties of the fading channel, smartly designs the channel code, and processes the transmitted signals, instead of depending on. Basically, the goal of physical-layer security is to (make something as small as possible/treat something important as unimportant) the amount of private information that can be received/be gotten by the illegal users according to their received signals.
To (accomplish or gain with effort) secure communications over wireless channels, physical layer security explores time-changing/different properties of the fading channel, smartly designs the channel code, and processes the transmitted signals, instead of depending on. Most works in this area depend on the perfect knowledge of both the legal/real and true receiver and person who secretly listens to conversations channels at the transmitter to enable secure (translating/putting into secret code) and advanced signaling. However, the idea (you think is true) of Channel State Information (CSI) is not realistic.
In practical pictures/situations, many reasons can cause mistakes and flaws in the CSI at the communication nodes, such as following ones:
No (reactions or responses to something/helpful returned information) from the people who secretly listen to conversations. When the person who secretly listens to conversations is an allowing something to happen without reacting or trying to stop it, its CSI or even location is very hard to be received/be gotten at the legal/real and true transmitter. So, when the people who secretly listen to conversations are evil and cruel users, they are not willing to provide their channel information to the legal/real and true party.
Partial CSI (reactions or responses to something/helpful returned information) from the receivers. The receivers sometimes can only provide partial CSI (reactions or responses to something/helpful returned information) to the transmitter, e.g., limited-rate (reactions or responses to something/helpful returned information), channel direction (reactions or responses to something/helpful returned information), and signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) (reactions or responses to something/helpful returned information). (not totally pure/not totally correct) (reactions or responses to something/helpful returned information) left between the transmitter and receivers.
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When the (reactions or responses to something/helpful returned information) links are not error-free or delay-less, noise part is added into the (reactions or responses to something/helpful returned information) information, or the CSI received/got at the transmitter is on outdated version of the actual CSI.
