Responding to Subtle Sexism: a Research

Instances of sexism occur on a daily basis across settings. In organizations, sexism has implications at all levels of the workforce. Negative consequences of sexism span from harming individuals (Jones et al., 2016) to costing organizations (Prime & Moss-Racusin, 2009). Research has established common reactions to overt displays of sexism are a mix of behavioral and attitudinal responses. Instances of overt sexism are visible and obvious displays of unfair treatment (Benokraitis & Feagin, 1986). Such apparent displays of inequality frequently generate more hostility in individuals than non-overt displays (Barreto & Ellemers, 2005) and plausibly a sense of disapproval in observers. Relying on the deontic justice framework (Folger, 1998, 2001), third party observers who witness overt sexism would respond in a predictable manner. The observer will experience moral outrage and the obvious inequality and subsequently engage in punitive behaviors towards the instigator. However, in today’s world, sexism has moved from overt to subtle, where displays of unfair treatment are more insidious and difficult to perceive (Benokraitis & Feagin, 1986; Jones et al., 2016; Swim & Cohen, 1997). In situations with subtle sexism, third party reactions to injustice can be more variable. In this paper, I consider what happens to individuals’ reactions when an instance of subtle sexism occurs in the workplace. Drawing from deontic justice, I argue that in witnessing subtle sexism, a third party observer will experience moral outrage if and only if they have high justice sensitivity. Further, I argue that people will be more likely to act on their moral injustice if they are an ally, in which case they will be more likely to engage in the use of supportive behaviors to help an individual because of the self-identification with the label ally, despite the presence of organizational identities.

Explicit consequences of overt discrimination within organizations have been documented such as diminished employee attitudes and less organizational commitment (King, Hebl, George, & Matusik, 2010; Gifford, 2009). Additionally, negative impacts of subtle discrimination have been identified as having reduced psychological health (Lim & Cortina, 2005) and worse work related outcomes (Gifford, 2009; Stewart, King, Botsford, Gilrane, Hylton, & Jones, 2010). Both overt and subtle sexism have known negative impacts to individuals and organizations. Further, research has shown that events that happen to one’s group, but not to oneself directly, can still have consequences for a minority group member (Tilcsik and Marquis, 2013; Leigh and Melwani, 2019). Applying this logic to sexism within organizations, minority individuals can be equally impacted by subtle sexism displayed to someone else as they can be to subtle sexism against themselves, thereby increasing the number of people potentially impacted. While negative impacts of subtle sexism are known, little is known about how third-parties respond to it at work compared to responses to overt sexism. I will explore this topic in the remainder of my proposal.

My research proposal unfolds as follows. I begin by reviewing deontic justice, the theoretical framework I will be drawing from. In the next section, I outline key variables in my model and show how the model can be used to expand current understanding of third party responses to subtle sexism at work. In addition, I explore moderating variables including justice sensitivity and allyship. In the third section, I propose an empirical methodology to evaluate my research question. In addition to using the key lens of deontic justice, I will highlight an under researched area of allies at work and suggest possible limitations of my methodology.

This proposal contributes to the literature in two ways. First, I add to the paucity of research on male allies in the workplace. Second, my question and subsequent hypotheses leverage deontic theory as a basis for framing the mechanisms behind this phenomenon. Doing so allows me to integrate relevant information from different bodies of literature to explain why there may be differences in responses to overt and subtle sexism.

Prior Research

There are different ideas as to why people care about injustice to others. One perspective is that of self-interest (Skarlicki, O’Reilly, & Kulik, 2015). In support of this position are several theories such as Lind and Tyler’s (1988) the relational model of justice that argues caring about mistreatment of others is linked to perceptions of social standing. Another viewpoint that aligns with the self-interest logic is the instrumental model of justice that implies people are motivated to protect their own interests when they observe a cost to unjust incidents (Skarlicki, O’Reilly, & Kulik, 2015).

Another possible explanation is the moral one where people act because of obligation to the right way of doing things (Skarlicki, O’Reilly, & Kulik, 2015). Morality and justice, although the two constructs may seem intuitively related, were not studied together until the early 2000’s because they originate from different bodies of literature; ethics are rooted in philosophy and justice comes from the discipline of social psychology (Colquitt and Zipay, 2015). Morality and justice are most connected within deonance theory. Deonance theory holds that people are duty bound in some situations (Folger & Glerum, 2015). Coming from the word Greek word deon, meaning morality focused on what is right and wrong (“Deon,” The Free Dictionary), deonance theory centers on the idea that people ascribe to rules of right and wrong that govern their decision beyond the consequences of potential actions. For people who subscribe to deonance theory, the ends are more important than the means (Skarlicki, O’Reilly, & Kulik, 2015) and people feel fair treatment is a debt we owe others (Folger & Glerum, 2015). Deontic theorist believe upholding morals stems from evolutionary urges that compel people to experience emotional reactions to events when those events violate moral mores of social conduct (Skarlicki, O’Reilly, & Kulik, 2015). The hallmark of a deonance perspective is what “should” be. In this framework, people who break rules “should” be punished (Folger, 2001). People feel duty bound to be fair and hold others accountable believing they also had a duty to be fair (Folger & Glerum, 2015). Deonance theory has been applied within the field of management in situations of third party injustice, known as deontic justice (Beugre, 2012).

The deontic responses includes a range of possible emotions such as anger, outrage, hostility, and resentment (Folger, 1998, 2001; Folger & Butz, 2004; Folger, Cropanzano, & Goldman, 2005; Folger & Skarlicki, 2005) that are all within the category of negative and reactive emotions in the circumplex model of affect (Russell, 1980). As such, these emotions are more action-oriented than others (Russell, 1980). Moral emotions are tied to the experience of injustice in that they are born from concern of others interest (Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007). Further, moral emotions are “hot” emotions that are personal in nature (e.g., Mikula, Semin, & Krahé, 1987). Deontic responses to unfairness tend to be automatic and evolutionally adaptive (e.g., Folger & Cropanzano, 2010; Folger, Cropanzano, & Goldman, 2005).

This can be true even for bystanders of such an injustice. Deontic justice differs from other forms of justice in that it allows someone to experience frustration even if they themselves are personally unaffected by a situation (Skarlicki, O’Reilly, & Kulik, 2015). Further, under the deontic lens, one can be outraged even if no relationship exists with the victim (Skarlicki, O’Reilly, & Kulik, 2015). In fact, people who express judgement about unfair treatment of others can sometimes do so at personal cost, such as whistleblowers who receive substantial backlash and public criticism (Rehg, Miceli, Near, & Van Scotter, 2008). This is known as the deontic effect, people attempt to punish the wrongdoer even when it is negative to them to do so (Turillo et al., 2002).

A common outcome in the deontic justice response is that of punishing behaviors (Beugre, 2012). This is in part due to the fact the evolutionary nature of the deontic response; it triggers and automatic response that is not always rational (Folger, Cropanzano, & Goldman, 2005). The hot emotions triggered after witnessing the event drive behavior to restore justice (Folger & Skarlicki, 2008). As such, the deontic response often prompts organizational retaliatory behaviors (ORB) (Haidt, 2003).

Applying this framework of deontic justice (e.g., Cropanzano, Goldman, & Folger, 2003; Folger & Skarlicki, 2008), consider a situation in which overt sexism occurs at work. Overt sexism is unequal treatment that is “readily apparent, visible, and observable, and can be easily documented” (Benokraitis & Feagin, 1986, p. 30). In this situation, when someone witnesses an obvious (or overt) instance of sexism take place, the sexist event triggers the deontic process regardless of the setting in which it occurs. In this case, sexism elicits an automatic responses because it violates the general sensibility that people ought to be treated fairly. Thus, witnessing overt sexism will trigger the deontic response because it is clear a social norm of equality has been violated. As a result, the witness will begin to feel moral outrage or moral anger. This is the next step in the deontic response. Experiencing moral outrage then leads to punishing behaviors, such as ORB.

Applying the deontic framework, the following model (Figure 1) illustrates the process as applied to overt sexism. Moral outrage mediates the relationship between witnessing overt sexism and engaging in punishing behaviors.

Now, this paper turns to consider what happens when we consider subtle sexism. How does a situation involving subtle (less obvious) sexism change the third party response in the workplace?

Subtle Sexism

Subtle sexism was identified in in the mid-1980s, yet despite numerous gains in equality, subtle sexism persists in modern society (Basford, Offermann, & Behrend, 2014; Benokraitis & Feagin, 1986). Subtle sexism differs from overt sexism in that it is specifically unequal treatment that is seen as regular behavior, frequently exhibited interpersonally (Hebl et al., 2002; Swim & Cohen, 1997). It can be displayed through nonverbal as well as in verbal exchanges in social interactions (Hebl et al., 2002). As outlined earlier, subtle sexism is less obvious and visible than overt sexism, such that it is harder to identify (Hebl et al., 2002; King, et al., 2011) and harder to react against because of its vague intentions. Other terms used to study subtle discrimination include microagressions (Sue, Bucceri, Lin, Nadal, & Torino, 2009), incivility (Cortina, 2008), everyday racism (Essed, 1995), everyday sexism (Swim, Hyers, Cohen, & Ferguson, 2001), and benevolent sexism (Glick & Fiske, 1997).

Research has demonstrated that subtle sexism is still just as detrimental to individuals as overt sexism (Cortina, 2008; Jones, et al., 2016). Researchers in several settings have found that reactions to overt discrimination are easier to process because individuals can more easily make a negative attribution to the individual who expressed the discrimination (Salvatore & Shelton, 2007). The ambiguity involved in subtle sexism can also heighten the experience of subtle discrimination such that possible reactions feel limited by the lack of objective certainty the event occurred at all (Jones et al., 2016). Additionally, acts of subtle sexism occur more frequently than overt sexism, increasing the overall negative effects (Van Laer & Janssens, 2011).

Numerous negative workplace outcomes of subtle sexism are known by scholars. Researchers found that women display worse performance when discrimination is expressed subtly, instead of overtly (Singletary, 2009). Further, subtle sexism has been shown to reduce workplace engagement in female police officers (Tougas, Rinfret, Beaton, & de la Sablonniere, 2005). Subtle sexism has also been shown to limit an individual’s self-efficacy and worsen relationships with managers (Gifford, 2009). Clearly, negative impacts have major consequences for employees and organizations alike.

Apply the deontic framework discussed in the previous section to subtle sexism, I propose the following model (Figure 2). Key differences between the model for subtle sexism and overt sexism exist. I argue that justice sensitivity moderates the relationship between subtle sexism and moral outrage and that being an ally moderates the relationship between moral outrage and engaging in supportive ally behaviors. In what follows, I explore those differences in depth.

Justice Sensitivity

Justice sensitivity is a trait-like characteristic that predicts people’s ability to perceive injustice and respond to it (Baumert & Schmitt, 2016). Specifically, justice sensitivity can be defined as the degree to which people notice and are impacted by issues of justice and fair treatment (Colquitt & Greenberg, 2003). People high in observer sensitivity are more aware of injustice related language (Baumert, Gollwitzer, Stauback & Schmitt, 2011) and tend to punish others even when they pay a personal financial cost (Fetchenhauer & Huang, 2004; Lotz, Baumert, Schlösser, Gresser, & Fetchenhauer, 2011). People who are high in justice sensitivity often display greater bystander support (Rothmund, Baumert, and Zinkernagel, 2014; Lotz, et al., 2011) and altruistic punishment (Lotz et al., 2011). Ultimately, people with high observer sensitivity are more likely to have stronger expressions of emotional and behavioral reactions to perceived unfair treatment of others, reflecting a legitimate concern for justice maintenance (Baumert, Rothmund, Thomas, Gollwitzer, & Schmitt, 2013).

Hypothesis 1: Justice Sensitivity moderates the relationship between overt sexism and moral outrage, such that only people high in justice sensitivity will experience moral outrage. For individuals low in justice sensitivity, they will experience something more akin to moral complacency.

Moral Outrage

As noted in the previous section, moral outrage is a sentiment of anger after someone has violated a moral principle (Batson et al., 2007). This type of anger is elicited by observing third-party injustice (Thomas, McGarty, & Mavor, 2009). Moral outrage can stem from concern for others (Lerner, 2003; Miller & Ratner, 1996; Montada, 1998) or from self-serving motives (Rothschild & Keefer, 2017; Rothschild, Landau, Molina, Branscombe & Sullivan, 2013). This is likely due to differences in justice sensitivity (Baumert, et al., 2013).

A key predictor of moral outrage as a response to a moral violation is whether people a) attribute responsibility for the injustice to a specific individual and b) want to restore justice by punishing the violator (Beugre, 2012). In a situation of overt sexism, the transgressor is easily identifiable because the display of sexism was easily visible. By nature, subtle sexism is more abstract and less easy to identity. This is true whether subtle sexism is displayed non verbally or through social exchange.

Hypothesis 2: Therefore, I hypothesize that people will be morally outraged only if they can identify a perpetrator of subtle sexism.

Ally

Research on allies in the workforce is quite limited. Allyship has been studied in numerous popular publications; however, very few studies extend allyship to organizations. By focusing on male allies, I begin the process of filling a large gap within the field of management.

An ally can be defined as an individual who “aligns with a disadvantaged group by recognizing the need for further progress in the fight for equal rights,” (Drury & Kaiser, 2014) even when that individual is not present (Center for Women and Business, 2017). While a majority of research has focused on allies as majority group members (Cheng et al., 2018), recently Sawyer and Valrio (2018) have made a case that there are instances where minority members can be allies for one another. Further, to be an ally, one must first be aware of discrimination against groups with certain demographic characteristics (Drury & Kaiser, 2014). For example, to be an ally, men have to recognize sexism exists. Allies can confront acts of sexism, but must first perceive acts of sexism (Ashburn-Nardo, Morris, and Goodwin, 2008). However, it is not necessary that people label themselves as an ally, as some people do not recognize themselves as such but have undertaken a supportive behavior (Sawyer & Valerio, 2018).

Allies are extremely important in the advancement of equality and have been instrumental in drawing attention to the need for male allies at work (Cheng et al., 2018) and can help be a key part of creating gender-inclusive environments (DuBow & Ashcraft, 2016). Allies are powerful because they possess social power as members of the dominant social group, in addition to filling the top positions and having much of the organizational power too (Sawyer & Valerio, 2018; Sherf et al., 2017). People often consider one of the benefits of having an ally is that it helps the individual who experienced injustice; however, its impact is larger than that. It costs men less than women to speak out against instances of sexism (Drury & Kaiser, 2014). Further, male ally feedback is typically perceived as more legitimate (Czopp & Monteith, 2003).

One major difficulty in the quest for male allies is that men are generally less likely than women to perceive sexism (Drury & Kaiser, 2014; for examples see Swim, et al., 2001; Rodin, Price, Bryson, and Sanchez, 1990; and Blumenthal, 1998). This is true of both individual forms of sexism and institutionalized forms of sexism (for an example, see Blodorn, O’Brien, and Kordys, 2012). To be an ally in the first place, one must perceive that sexism has occurred. This is made difficult by the fact that most sexism is covert, not overt. This relates closely to the previous concept of justice sensitivity. To be an effective ally likely to take action, one must be high in justice sensitivity as previously outlined.

Conclusion

This proposed model diverges from the response to overt sexism model in two key ways. First, being an ally will lead to a different outcome. Instead of punishing behaviors, it will lead to supportive behaviors, discussed in more detail in the following section. The other difference is the moderating variable of being an ally. Identifying as an ally adds a layer of self-interest to the situation. If someone has identified themself, privately or publically, as an ally, they are now inclined to take actions that resonate with that identity regardless of the setting they are in. As such, someone who identifies as an ally will be more likely to take the final step into action as opposed to individuals who are high in justice sensitivity, but do not identify with the label of ally.