The Conception of God in Descartes and Leibniz

René Descartes and Gottfried Leibniz present distinct conceptions of God that profoundly influence their respective philosophical frameworks. Both thinkers agree on the attributes of God being infinitely powerful, knowledgeable, and benevolent; however, they prioritize these traits differently, leading to divergent implications for their understanding of divine action and moral truth.

Descartes’ Conception of God

For Descartes, the primary attribute of God is power. He asserts that God has the absolute freedom to will anything into existence. In Descartes’ view, “every single moment of my entire existence depends on him.” This perspective underscores the idea that God possesses complete discretion over creation, capable of forming any reality or refraining from creating altogether. As a created being, Descartes acknowledges that he has “no right” to question God’s decisions regarding the universe or his own existence.

While Descartes refrains from questioning God's choices, he emphasizes that these choices are inherently perfect due to God's infinite benevolence. This benevolence is not merely an attribute but is essential to God's perfection. Descartes argues that the imperfections observed in the world contribute to a greater overall perfection, which is beyond human comprehension. He insists that God cannot be a deceiver, as deception would imply a lack of perfection. Although God possesses the power to deceive, he lacks the will to do so, as it would contradict his nature. Descartes posits that “the nature of all goodness and truth is already determined by God,” reinforcing the idea that God’s authority shapes all concepts of morality and truth.

It is crucial for Descartes that God is not a deceiver. If God were to deceive, it would undermine the reliability of human perception and understanding. God’s determination of truth ensures that what individuals perceive as clear and distinct is indeed true. Moreover, God not only defines human beliefs but also establishes truth itself. As noted by philosopher Gary Hatfield, even mathematical truths are “established by God and are entirely dependent on him.” This means that what we consider absolute truths, such as mathematical principles, are contingent upon God’s will. For instance, if God desired, two plus two could equal five. Thus, while God is infinitely knowledgeable and benevolent, the truths he knows are ultimately products of his own decision-making.

This depiction of God raises unsettling questions about the arbitrariness of goodness and truth. If the standards by which we judge our actions are entirely at God's discretion, their significance diminishes. Descartes assures us that God is not a deceiver, but this assurance feels hollow if we acknowledge that God defines the very nature of deceit. Consequently, the concepts of goodness and knowledge become relativized, and the only definitive aspect of God is his omnipotence.

Leibniz’s Alternative Perspective

In contrast, Leibniz seeks to address the concerns raised by Descartes' portrayal of God. He is troubled by the arbitrary nature of goodness and truth that emerges from a conception of God rooted solely in power. Leibniz firmly states, “I am far removed from the opinion of those who maintain that there are no rules of goodness and perfection in the nature of things or in the ideas God has of them.” For Leibniz, the notion that things are good merely because God created them is insufficient; it undermines the divine nature of God himself. He questions, “Why praise him for what he has done if he would be equally praiseworthy in doing the exact opposite?”

Leibniz’s God is characterized as an Intellectualist rather than a Voluntarist. In this framework, God's intellect and benevolence guide his infinite power. Leibniz posits that there are standards of truth and goodness that exist independently of God’s will. He introduces the idea of an infinite array of possible worlds existing within God’s intellect, asserting that God chose to create the best possible world. Certain necessary truths, such as mathematical laws, exist universally across all possible worlds, and God cannot will contradictions. For example, it is impossible for God to create a world where two plus two equals five.

Leibniz further distinguishes between necessary truths, which are universally applicable, and contingent truths, which are specific to each possible world. While contingent truths could differ in alternate realities, necessary truths remain immutable. However, this distinction limits God’s power even over contingent truths. When God chose to create our world, he accepted the truths inherent to it, which means he could not alter those truths post-creation. Leibniz states, “God foresees things as they are and does not change their nature.” Consequently, the existence of these truths is independent of God's will.

Leibniz’s division of truths into necessary and contingent aims to preserve both divine and human freedom. If things could have been otherwise, then neither God nor humans are subject to fate. However, the problem of God’s infinite benevolence complicates this reasoning. Since God is infinitely good, he must choose the best possible world. Leibniz argues that “notions possible in themselves do not depend upon God’s free decrees.” Nevertheless, if God’s benevolence necessitates the creation of our world, the possibility of other worlds becomes questionable. While Leibniz attempts to assert God’s freedom by distinguishing between metaphysical necessity and moral necessity, his reasoning ultimately reveals a contradiction. God’s moral obligation to choose the best world becomes a metaphysical constraint, undermining his infinite power.

Conclusion

In examining the contrasting conceptions of God presented by Descartes and Leibniz, it becomes evident that Leibniz’s depiction is inherently contradictory. A God that is both infinitely powerful and constrained by metaphysical necessity cannot coherently exist. On the other hand, while Descartes’ conception of God is fraught with challenges, it maintains internal consistency. Descartes’ God emerges as more compelling due to his ability to uphold the limitless nature of divinity while encompassing all three attributes—power, knowledge, and benevolence.

Ultimately, if one accepts that God defines existence, it follows that he also determines the essence of goodness and truth. Embracing the concept of an all-powerful God who creates and defines the universe is a significant leap of faith, especially given the unknowable nature of the divine. In this context, it seems inappropriate to impose arbitrary standards upon God. Descartes’ portrayal of God as magnificent, simply for being God, provides a foundation for devotion. In contrast, Leibniz’s efforts to establish objective standards of goodness and truth inadvertently limit God, challenging the traditional understanding of an infinite being. Descartes’ model of God remains more persuasive as it preserves the essential characteristics of divinity intact.

References:

• Hatfield, Gary. "Descartes and the Metaphysics of Truth." In *Philosophy and the Sciences*, edited by Michael R. Matthews, 2009.
• Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. *Monadology*. Translated by Robert Latta, 1898.
• Descartes, René. *Meditations on First Philosophy*. Translated by John Cottingham, 1996.