How The Tet Offensive Impacted American Public Opinion About The Vietnam War

In a campaign called the Tet Offensive, the Viet Cong forces, led by General Vo Nguyen Giap would turn the tides of war and impose a relentless attack on the South Vietnamese. The main goals of the North Vietnamese forces in instigating the Tet Offensive was to dispel the ARVN forces and simultaneously start or catalyze discontent which would lead to an uprising against the South Vietnamese government. The second objective was to destroy faith and support of American involvement in the war. Whereas the first objective was completely fulfilled, the second one was not. The attacks did not necessarily spark or dispel the ARVN to lead to an uprising, in fact the Viet Cong forces were spread thin enough that the Americans and South Vietnamese armies were able to counteract and inflict casualties accordingly. However, when the Tet Offensive was reported in the United States media, public sentiment in the United States would begin to change.

“Those bloodshed and devastation wrought by the heavy fighting, along with pessimistic reports, which was brought directly to American living room, stunned every single American who watched it” (Rohn). Along with the realization that the Americans were facing severe casualties, the media, who had originally supported the war would also turn against the support of the war.

Moreover, the anti war protest movement peaked in early 1968 after the Tet Offensive, which sparked the most intense anti war protest to date. One Gallup poll showed that in 1968 46% of people thought that sending US troops to Vietnam was a mistake compared to 32% in 1967, which illustrates the dramatic increase in antiwar sentiment A particular volume of the Pentagon Papers suggests the importance of public opinion in decisions concerning escalation during the Tet Offensive: with the Tet Offensive, General Westmoreland asked Johnson to send him 200,000 more troops on top of the 525,000 already there. Johnson consulted a small group of “action officers” about this. The report said “it will be difficult to convince critics that we are not simply destroying South Vietnam in order to 'save' it and that we genuinely want peace talks. This growing disaffection accompanied, as it certainly will be, by increased defiance of the draft and growing unrest in the cities because of the belief that we are neglecting domestic problems, runs great risks of provoking a domestic crisis of unprecedented proportions.” This was a secret report by political and military experts and therefore is unlikely to have an underlying agenda.

Furthermore the notion that escalation would bring significant unrest is valid; the Tet Offensive made the public question the accuracy of the US government’s claim that it would soon prevail over the Communists, many of the public having previously held an optimistic outlook on the war. The Offensive marked a critical turning point for the war, as Johnson did in fact refuse Westmoreland the troops, and announced on March 31 that he was “taking the first step to de-escalate the conflict”. Three days later Hanoi announced that it was prepared to talk to the Americans, and discussions began in Paris on May 13. Though these talks led nowhere, this was nevertheless a key turning point in the war, where for the first time the US would de escalate the conflict, essentially the beginning of the end of their involvement in Vietnam. The notion that the anti war movement had a significant role in the de escalation and ultimate withdrawal is supported by Lefkowitz, who argues that the movement had a direct impact on policy makers, restraining escalation and accelerating troop withdrawals.

Ultimately, the Tet Offensive, while not fulfilling the main goals of the Viet Cong, definitely left its mark in American support of the war. Once the masses in the United States had no desire to continue the advancement of war, it would be hard to justify the continual presence of them in South Vietnam. This would lead to their eventual withdrawal which would be greatly beneficial for the Viet Cong as they would have to oppose a South Vietnamese army with absolutely no foreign backing.