The Socio-cultural Challenges of Female Discrimination

In Tamil Nadu, one of India’s southernmost states, “children” are practically non-existent. Rather than listing their children as one group, mothers in Tamil Nadu separate their offspring into two categories: boy-children and girl-children, in that order (Perwez 89). This division is instinctive, occurring naturally in the space between any question about children and any complementary response. These divisions do, however, more accurately reflect the conditions of society in Tamil Nadu and in India as a whole; the differences between “boy-children” and “girl-children” go beyond how they are referred to, extending to their value in society and their consequent futures. For instance, only men have the honor of performing funeral rites for their parents, making sons a seemingly necessary part of every family (Perwez 90). Meanwhile, girls come with mostly costs, raised only to be given away to another family, with a hefty dowry to be paid as well (Stackhouse). These customs have led to a devaluing of female life in Indian culture, consistent with practices in other societies. For example, in “The Story of an Hour,” Kate Chopin details the reactions of a woman to news of her husband’s death. In the short story, the main character, Mrs. Mallard, mourns the loss of her husband but also rejoices, interpreting her husband’s death as a source of new release and freedom (Chopin 2). This joy at finally being free, indicates that male influence can be largely restrictive to women, dominating their lives and opinions, as women are expected to dutifully serve their husbands. While “The Story of an Hour” has a European setting, its theme still rings true for several Indian women, who are similarly restricted by their own husbands. As a result, female life in India is devalued by the considerable control husbands may hold over their female spouses, leading to a gradually growing desire to have sons or, oftentimes, only sons. This preference for male children has led to a prevalence of female feticide, in which women undergo operations to selectively abort female children (Kaushal, et al. 185). Consequently, this has also contributed to a declining female-to-male ratio (FMR) in India, which for children zero to six years of age is 914 females for every 1000 males in 2011 (Kaushal, et al. 183). Of course, the Indian government has not stood idly by as the female population has decreased, passing an amendment to their abortion law, known as the Preconception and Prenatal Diagnostic Techniques Act (PCPNDT), in 2003, outlawing the disclosure of fetal sex in an attempt to curb abortions targeted at female children. While this amendment clearly was meant to better the lives of women in India, the ability of families to discriminate against children after birth and the ineffectiveness of the amendment in punishing violators, particularly doctors and families seeking sex-selective abortion, indicates that this law, whatever its intentions, should be repealed and replaced with more effectively enforced legislation.

Families: Foundations, Corrupted and Damaging

The PCPNDT amendment, while addressing the sex-selective abortion issue, fails to tackle with the underlying mentalities that motivate this problem, rendering it ineffective at actually ending the problem. One of these mentalities affects attitudes about raising female children. For instance, according to Maya Unnithan-Kumar, an affiliate at the University of Sussex who has published several papers on women’s reproductive health, many Indian families worry about their ability to secure a stable reproductive future for their daughters through a successful marriage (156). At the same time, prospective mothers worry about harassment their daughters could face in their future marriage (Kaushal, et al. 185). These worries indicate that female offspring are an inherent source of worry for Indian couples, motivating people to eliminate this uncertainty through female-selective abortion (FSA). Therefore, the PCPNDT Act’s measures, concentrating on prenatal violence against women, not social violence after birth, cannot address the issues that motivate FSA to stop the issue.

Meanwhile, no ethical barrier in Indian culture exists to obstruct such mechanisms, as Indians, who traditionally distinguish blood as the medium of relatedness, give this critical substance male origin, making male bloodlines the most valued (Unnithan-Kumar 156). The potency of this rationale and its ability to motivate action is shown by the tendency of many men to leave their wives if they cannot produce male children (Perwez 90). This type of rationale, when so potent, places families’ faith in male children alone, devaluing the presence of female children. As a result, FSA becomes more enticing than the prospect of raising a female child, who not only absorbs resources that could be used to nourish bloodline-continuing male children but also creates additional expense when they must be married off. At the same time, according to John Stuart Mill in his book Utilitarianism, when something is desired in itself, it becomes part of one’s happiness, rendering people unhappy when they cannot attain their desires (25). Consequently, when Indian families crave having sons and consider sons a necessary component of their happiness, having daughters instead brings them unhappiness, so they consider FSA the most preferable alternative. Since these ideas occur at a sociocultural level, their effect on the female population cannot be properly mediated by the PCPNDT amendment, which focuses on restricting access, not eliminating the desire for access.

Ideas about proper contraception and family planning also motivate FSA but cannot be properly regulated by the current PCPNDT legislation. For instance, among Indian women, abortion is viewed as the most desirable type of contraception, referred to as safai, which translates to “cleaning” (Unnithan-Kumar 158). This description of abortion indicates that it is widely regarded as a positive way to address reproductive issues, further indicating that ethical barriers no longer impede FSA in India, as abortion, the vehicle of FSA, is itself widely encouraged. Since sons are widely coveted, many couples are likely motivated to try again and again to conceive a male child. However, since families do not want to support female children, this vision can contribute to increased FSA, as couples aim for all the benefits of having a son while circumventing all the costs of raising female children (as well as the time that could be used to conceive again). Consequently, mentalities about proper family composition also impact the prevalence of FSA, but, as these mentalities once again stem from larger-scale social practices, they cannot be properly addressed by the PCPNDT Act with its limited scope.

Since the PCPNDT amendment is ineffective at regulating the mindsets that motivate FSA, these mindsets are able to motivate discrimination against female children even when FSA is avoided, further increasing the ineffectiveness of the act. For instance, a common alternative to FSA is the “stopping rule,” in which “couples may selectively use contraception, [continuing] to have children until a desired number of boys are born” (Nandi 467). If parents continue to have children until they have a set number of boys, it is likely that girls will, on average, have more siblings than boys, since, after having girls, parents will continue to have more children, whereas, after having boys, they may stop. This reduces the amount of resources available to every female child. Meanwhile, female birth rates are lower in high income households, which have more access to FSA techniques, so female children have a higher probability of being born into families with low incomes (Nandi 475). This results in female children having less resources that must be shared with more people. Luojia Hu and Analıa Schlosser, research fellows at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago and Tel Aviv University, respectively, demonstrated the effects this has on female mortality, illustrating that “a 1 SD increase in [male-to-female ratio (MFR)] (0.07 points) is associated with a 4 percentage point reduction in the proportion of girls who are underweight” (1247), as parents in areas with high MFR are more likely to have girls only if they want female children, consequently providing more resources to female children (1255). This demonstrates that rising rates of female birth (the opposite of increasing MFR) parallel increases in female underweightness and malnutrition as parents feel disinclined to feed unwanted female children, hurting outcomes. As a result, by targeting FSA rather than the mindset behind FSA, the PCPNDT Act’s efforts to increase FMR (decreasing MFR) merely result in more parents who choose to discriminate against unwanted female children. In short, the legislation is exacerbating the problem, not ending it.

Facilitators: No Middle Ground in Punishment

While failing to properly address the FSA crisis in theory, in practice the PCPNDT amendment also fails to effectively punish the parties involved in FSA, parents and doctors. Firstly, the ineffectiveness of the act is demonstrated by its negative effects on FMR (from 927 to 914) (Tabaie 1). Since PCPNDT Act implementation began in 2003, allowing the act a full eight years to impact FMR, it clearly failed to address the issue to achieve its goal of increasing FMR, in fact decreasing it. This demonstrates that the act has been ineffective in managing the problem. This is further demonstrated by the number of arrests and convictions made under the legislation, as, as of 2015, only 143 people were punished for conducting sex determination tests, with only 65 dooctors receiving suspension of their licenses (“Key Facts”). These figures amount to only about one punishment per month and less than one suspension every two months in relation to PCPNDT violations. Meanwhile, 2010 estimates of FSA from 1995 to 2005 place the death toll due to PCPNDT violations per year at 480,000 (Luojia and Schlosser 1230). These high numbers, alongside the low rate of punishment, demonstrate that PCPNDT enforcement fails to keep pace with the large death toll (likely increased over recent years, considering the FMR trend), as for every person enforcement apprehends, at least thirty-nine escape repercussions. Such inefficiency indicates that the act itself is ineffective at creating a framework to effectively punish offenders and correct issues.

Meanwhile, when the act does impose consequences, the severity of punishment clashes with the severity of the crime, discouraging doctors from providing reproductive services in view of the law. For instance, the Indian Medical Association (IMA) and the Indian Radiological and Imaging Association (IRIA) insist that the law focuses on minor errors, including simple clerical errors in forms, not wearing aprons, and not having a handbook of the law on hand, too much (Sharma). Since these errors are used by government officials to seize ultrasound machines, focus on such minor errors interferes with doctors’ ability to make a living and provide services, as machines are often not returned until the case is tried two to three years later, denying several practitioners the ability to continue working, even though most cases (seventy to eighty percent) find the doctor innocent (Rana). As a result, by denying doctors the ability to easily perform their roles, the act in fact reduces the number of registered practitioners who can assist women with reproductive services. Consequently, couples increasingly go to unregistered places where FSA is more common. Considering that unsafe abortion caused over 8.4 percent of maternal mortality in India in 2012 (Sjöström, et al. 1), such scarcity in properly trained practicioners could escalate maternal mortality and female death rates, the exact opposite of the PCPNDT Act’s aim. As a result, the act remains ineffective in administering adequate and effective punishment even when it punishes doctors who break the law, leading it to be ineffective in curbing FSA.

Alongside its ineffective punishment of doctors, the PCPNDT Act also fails to punish parents in ways that affect FSA. For instance, according to the District Magistrate and Appropriate Authority for the PCPNDT Act in Gwalior, Madhya Pradesh, a parent’s first time offense under the act can warrant a fine of up to 50,000 rupees. Meanwhile, based on the Economic Times’ calculations, it takes 5,470,000 rupees to raise a child, not including the additional costs of raising a female child specifically, like dowry and coming-of-age parties. When the PCPNDT fine pales in comparison to the total cost of raising a child, parents who adamantly resist having female children cannot be adequately discouraged by such fines, especially when the chances of actually getting caught and having to pay the fine are relatively low. As a result, while the act’s punishment of doctors is often too severe, its punishment of parents, the parties who first seek FSA and continue to discriminate against female children, falls short. Clearly, more effective legislation, legislation that actually discourages FSA, is needed.

Values: Changing Them to Save Them

Opponents of repealing the PCPNDT Act appeal to its rhetoric, the supposed golden ray of hope it provides to mothers and daughters in India. While this claim appeals to the emotional and ethical inclination to protect female children in India, it is clearly not supported by the data. Even as the law has been implemented, the FMR has decreased (Tabaie 1), and malnutrition in female children has increased where FMR has (Hu and Schlosser 1247). The law is exacerbating the problem, not ending it; it is time for a change, for a law that will focus on the reasons behind FSA and sex discrimination, rather than just one link in a long chain of discrimination. Empowering girls and mothers, not reducing access to valuable reproductive services, should be key. By creating programs that encourage valuing female children, India can make more progress defeating FSA than it could with the PCPNDT legislation. The PCPNDT Act, with its vain promises, provides a ray of hope for women who hope to become valued, but a new, different law, encouraging reforms at the societal level, can promise a world where India’s people discover new ways to respond to and encourage female children, would be its own shining sun.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the prevalence of female feticide in India, particularly in states like Tamil Nadu, is deeply rooted in societal attitudes and norms that prioritize male children over female ones. The existing legal framework, embodied in the Preconception and Prenatal Diagnostic Techniques Act (PCPNDT) of 2003, has proven ineffective in addressing the underlying issues that drive families to resort to sex-selective abortion. The act primarily focuses on prenatal violence against women, overlooking the social violence that occurs after birth.

Works Cited

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