The Tug-of-war Over The Haram Al-sharif/temple Mount Site

The tug-of-war over the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount site has a long history, echoed throughout both sides’ national discourses and educational curriculums, as well as in cultural relics, media, and political rhetoric (de Vries et al. 2017, p. 189). Before the British invaded Palestine in 1917, the sensitivity of the al-Aqsa mosque site was a factor which was assessed as a consideration (Omar 2017, p. 69). Maintaining Islamic stewardship of the site was of great importance to the Muslims, who had controlled Jerusalem since the end of the Crusades, yet the weight of significance placed upon the site became more apparent in the following years, as Palestinian uprisings occurred in direct correlation with any challenges to the status quo in the area (Omar 2017, pp.69-70). In 1929, the al-Buraq Revolution occurred in reaction to the Jewish attempt to change the access and administration of the Western Wall, reinforcing psychological divisions between Jews and Muslims over the site. After the 1948 war, in which the state of Israel was separated from Gaza (under Egypt) and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem which would be administered by Jordan, whose Waqf security force continues to guard the al-Aqsa mosque (Omar 2017, p. 70). 1967 saw Israel attempt to gain control of the mosque during the Six Day War, but the Supreme Islamic council, formed to represent Muslims in Jerusalem, refused to recognize Israeli authority and was instrumental in preserving the status quo of Jordanian oversight of the site (Omar 2017, pp. 70-71). For Israel, the site is of preeminent religious significance as both the location of the first and second Temples of Bible times, and the prophetic location of the third and final Temple which will usher in the Messiah, or divine saviour, awaited by the Jewish people.

Though Israel has maintained oversight of both East and West Jerusalem uninterruptedly since 1967, there is still a sense that its position is somewhat tenuous and could be overturned. Lee and Maslog’s 2005 exhaustive study of the extent of Peace Journalism in reporting on the conflict in Asia specifies avoidance of demonizing language, non-partisanship, and multi-party orientation as three of the most significant factors to be assessed in content analyses of Peace Journalism (p.320). Among the more obvious indicators of an article’s partisan or nonpartisan stance was the inclusion of details of the significance of sacred sites to both sides rather than only one.

The ostensible absolutism of the incompatibilities between the two visions for the space, both ethno-politically and with regard to the city’s central significance in prophetic religious images of the future, has been strategically leveraged as a mobilizing force for nationalistic groups on both sides seeking dominance (Larkin and Dumper 2012, p.31). The appropriation of certain holy sites as political symbols emblematic of the struggle for national self- determination is not exclusive to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Larkin and Dumper, 2012, pp.31-32). While the groups’ differences may therefore be presented as irreconcilable, and their coexistence side-by-side appear to be untenable, out-ruling a two-state solution, this is not the opinion of all those invested in and living at close proximity to the situation.

As a visible outcome of the strained relations between the communities, on 14 July, 2017, two Druze Israeli police officers were shot dead by three Palestinian gunmen, who were then killed as they tried to escape the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif (Noble Sanctuary) compound in Jerusalem. The incident, which occurred shortly after 7am on a Friday morning, near the Lions’ Gate entrance to the Old City, threatened to spark further tensions between Jews and Muslims in the area, and led to the compound being cleared of visitors. For the first time since 1990, Friday prayers at the al-Aqsa mosque were cancelled, with even Sheikh Muhammad Hussein, grand mufti of Jerusalem, disallowed from entering the mosque (Beaumont, 2017). One of the key details which was left out of many articles assessed in this study was the fact that the police officers were not Jews but Druze, a religious minority in Israel. Instead, many articles framed the violence as being between Jews and Palestinians, tying it into a “religious war” framework. Additionally, Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas spoke directly to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu after the attacks, condemning the attacks and expressing disapproval of "any violence from any party, particularly at holy sites" (Fawcett and Husseini, 2017). The rare conversation between the two leaders underlined fears of potential escalation, and could have been an opportunity to unify the two communities in condemning violence incited by Hamas, against which Israel and Palestine have a joint security protocol (ABC, 2017).

Notably, only one article reported the fact that Israel and the Palestinian Authority have a joint security protocol which strengthens defences against a mutual antagonist, Hamas (ABC, 2017). This has some interesting implications. The majority of the articles framed the conflict in terms of war between two parties, Israel and Palestine, despite the fact that both parties expressly condemned the violence on principle. While Hamas was the only organisation that made statements in support of violence as a recourse, publicly lauding those who murdered Israelis (Times of Israel, 2017), this was only mentioned as a minor note in a small proportion of the articles. As noted by Lynch, “the war focus in war journalism will polarise and escalate, calling for hatred and more violence to avenge and stop ‘them’” (2010, p.16). In the case of the Al-Aqsa incident, some of the violent crimes that occurred in the following week were explicitly linked to the installation of metal detectors at the entrance to the compound, which was consistently framed in media reports as an imposition on the right of free access to the mosque, rather than a security measure. The hyper-politicisation of what would otherwise be a relatively un-noteworthy security measure was leveraged by both sides, with those on the far right calling for Netanyahu to capitalise on the moment to seize control of the area, while Palestinians protested any new security measures and used the event to decry any Israeli involvement in the site’s administration.

There were fears that the attacks of July, 2017 could lead to further violence, and one week after the attacks, these fears were confirmed. Omar al-Abed, a 19-year old Palestinian man from Ramallah, climbed in through the window of a home in the settlements and murdered three civilians who were gathered for a Shabbat dinner, purportedly in reaction to the restricted access to al-Aqsa. President Mahmoud Abbas of the Palestinian Authority announced on the same day that all contact with Israel would be frozen until the metal detectors and extra security were removed (Kershner, 2017).

Religious officials at al-Aqsa also protested the mosque’s closure, and the rare cancellation of Friday prayers on July 14, seeing it as a political move to increase control over the site. "Forbidding the Friday prayer is an unfair procedure," said Sheikh Omar Keswani. "What happened earlier is now being taken advantage of by the Israeli right to impose a new reality in al-Aqsa Mosque." (Fawcett and Husseini, 2017). Jerusalem grand mufti Sheikh Mohammad Ahmed Hussein led open-air prayers in protest near the Lion’s Gate. Omar, his son, stated that after leading the prayers, "Israeli police detained my father in a violent manner and took him to an unknown destination”, later releasing him on $2,800 bail (Fawcett and Husseini, 2017). Despite Netanyahu’s assurances that the closure of the site was a temporary security measure, Jordan's government spokesman Mohammad Al described it as an "attack on the right of Muslims to practise their religious rituals in their holy sites (Fawcett and Husseini, 2017). The different meanings applied to the same action (that is, the temporary closure of the site) highlights the power of framing in creating multiple narratives around a singular event.

Dominant narratives exist on both sides, regarding both the specific conflict in the al-Aqsa compound on July 14, 2017, and regarding the overall conflict. While the dynamics of the conflict in Israel are somewhat unique, given the eschatological implications of the sites in question, there are still lessons that can be extrapolated from the situation and applied to conflict in a wider setting.

Firstly, disentangling various narratives and discourses utilized on both sides from tangible, desired outcomes, in order to clarify underlying interests. The Harvard Approach to conflict resolution differentiates between the “positions” of parties to the conflict (what they say they want) and their “interests” (the underlying reasons why they want certain outcomes), arguing that conflicts are more easily solved when actors focus on interests and develop means of dealing with differences together (Mason and Rychard 2005, p.1).

Secondly, the dyadic, zero-sum framing of the conflict may influence parties to perceive the conflict as a competitive rather than cooperative process. The escalation of conflict is decisively impacted by this interpretation, leading to its solidification into societal beliefs under a Machiavellian framework of “good vs. evil” and “us vs. them” (Kempf, 2012, p. 3). Conflict occurs when there is a relationship between two or more parties or groups in which incompatible needs and goals are present (Lynch and McGoldrick 2005, pp. 34). Different responses are required in order to overcome conflict, including the need to see beyond a war-based win-lose model towards a peace-making win-win scenario (Lynch and McGoldrick 2005, pp. 36-39). Lynch and McGoldrick also argue that, depending on the framing of an event or conflict, actors are more or less likely to volunteer and think of solutions to the issues being highlighted, demonstrating a hope-filled rather than pessimistic view of the possibility of peace (2012, pp. 27, 29). This cognitive effect can have a tangible impact on the reality of building peace, which requires creativity and a certain amount of realistic optimism regarding the possibility of a creative peacemaking solution. Wolfsfeld (1997, p.50), reports that under Prime Minister Rabin, the Israeli government attempted to engage the media as a means of rallying support for the Oslo peace process of 1993. However, continuing access to reporters by adversarial combatants who were given excessive air time obstructed efforts to make the media an instrument of peace (Wolfsfeld, 1997, pp. 67-71).

In the case of the 2017 conflict, the media similarly obstructed peace by focusing on dramatic, battle-style examples of violent conflict. For example, several articles from news sources including the Sydney Morning Herald, The Times of Israel, Al Arabiya and Al Jazeera included photos of dead combatants or in one case even mobile video footage of one of the Palestinian shooters being shot and killed. The influence of the technology-based news format is seen in the “aestheticization of war” (Hackett, 2007, p.83), as engagement is predicated on attention-seeking headlines and eye-catching imagery. This quest for “visual supremacy” (Wolfsfeld, 2003, p.1) is one which peace journalists seek to counteract by exploring the backgrounds and contexts of events, and making transparent the conflict situations being reported on (Shinar, 2007, p.200). As an example, the ABC article which scored highest in the present study included photographs of the new security measures (metal detectors and security cameras), along with a statement from the head of the Israeli defence body for Palestinian civilian affairs, stating “"The only thing we want is to ensure no-one can enter with weapons again and carry out another attack… We're willing to examine alternatives to the metal detectors as long as the solution of alternative ensures the prevention of the next attack." The inclusion of a statement about being open to alternative solutions was an anomaly in the articles studied.

The framing of the conflict in Jerusalem is widely identified as being within a war journalism or ‘drama’ frame (Wolfsfeld, 1997, pp.50, 67). Journalistic framing devices can influence the actions of parties to the conflict by making violence appear a natural next step and reducing the perceived options of responses to violence or conflict. The coverage of conflict in Jerusalem, particularly stemming from contestation of the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif site, has been highly charged and polarizing, focusing exclusively on the conflict arena, the visible effects of violence and an “us vs them”, dyadic mentality which is reinforced by constant juxtaposition of various measures of Palestinian versus Israeli death tolls (see, for example, Lieber & Staff, 2017; Tahhan, 2017; Husseini, 2017). This makes continued violence seem inevitable, and acts as propaganda material inciting people to further violence to balance the injustice, silencing other options for moving forwards peacefully and collapsing the conflict into one of violent action rather than a potential peace-building scenario (Lynch and McGoldrick 2005, p. 37). If the focus of media coverage were to shift towards looking at those affected by the conflict at a relational level rather than simply with the visible effects of violence, this would allow for humanization of other parties to the conflict and open possibilities of peace (Wolfsfeld, 1997). Galtung’s view of structural violence is of relevance here, referring to the notion that people suffer from violence as a result of relational structures, and not only as a result of the use of force (Booth, 2007, p. 170). As the conflict is made increasingly transparent with reference to both historical and socio-economic reasons and background, a practical, forward-looking perspective on the possibility of building peace amongst a plural society may be developed.

On all sides, media outlets propagate and leverage fear-based terror discourses to bolster support for state-level decision making (Shaw et. al, 2011, pp.20-21). One of the main means of doing so is reinforcing political, cultural, and religious distinctions between groups in a pluralistic society. The "political contest model" sees government and political parties’ contest to stimulate support for policies and actions through partisan reporting as endemic to the macro-level effort to gain political control (Wolfsfeld, 1997a, p.29). In this context, the relationship between political parties and the media is at some level mutually dependent, as governments can rely heavily on the media to garner political collateral, and particularly in situations where governments exercise a high level of control over information flows, journalists may rely on officials as sources. This contributes to the elite-orientation of War Journalism, and highlights the importance of Peace Journalism in remediating the use of the media as a tool of government propaganda.

One of the key elements to the political discourse which pervades international reporting on conflict between Israelis and Palestinians is national military alliances (Lynch, 2013, pp.60-61). As the Unites States of America is Australia’s closest military alliance, taking Great Britain’s place, Australia has echoed the States’ support of Israel in a number of contexts. One such context is at the United Nations, where Australia was one of only six states to vote against a General Assembly resolution criticising Israel in 2010 (Lynch, 2013, p.61), and one of two states to vote against a Human Rights Council move to investigate Israel’s use of deadly force towards Gaza protesters in 2018 (SBS, 2018). Of the articles assessed in the present study, five were from Australian news sources and five from a US source (the New York Times). Of the Australian samples, only two adequately fulfilled the criteria of exposing propaganda on both sides, while the New York Times articles fared better, going into greater detail and being less partisan in nature. Interestingly, the articles from Middle Eastern sources Al Jazeera, Al Arabiya, and The Times of Israel scored much worse than their Western counterparts, with only two out of thirteen articles scoring one full point for exposing propaganda. This may be as a result of more highly partisan reporting, with the vast majority of articles from these sources losing half a point on the “Partisan” criteria, as they displayed bias toward one party. Among the more obviously biased articles was one found in the Times of Israel entitled “Hamas, Islamic Jihad Lavish Praise on ‘Heroic’ Temple Mount Shooting” (2017), which stated that “Palestinian social media was rife with accolades for the killers”. This overly emotive, highly contentious generalization implicates “Palestinians” rather than the individuals actually involved in the violence. The psychological tool of aggregating groups to decrease multidimensionality of a conflict is employed to increase the sense of being “for us or against us” by creating in-group/out-group bias, and is typically used in conflict situations to garner support for government actions (Rares, 2012, pp.479-480).

The highly polarizing reporting on the conflict may have contributed to the international pressure on Abbas to take a harder line against any new security measures instituted by the Israeli government, despite the fact that Israel and Palestine have joint security protocols set up as a mutual defence against Hamas. One report included comments from the Turkish President criticising Israel for damaging Jerusalem’s “Islamic character”, to which Israel’s foreign ministry responded with critical reference to Turkey’s oppression of its Kurdish minority (Al Arabiya, 2017). Another article from Saudi-owned Al Arabiya included comments from the United Arab Emirates and Jordanian foreign ministers urging Israel to allow free access to the mosque, alongside claims from anonymous “Muslim leaders” claiming that the installation of metal detectors at the site is Israel’s way of increasing its control of the area (Al Arabiya, 2017). None of the articles mention that metal detectors are also installed at every entrance to the Western Wall, which is in eyesight of the Al Aqsa complex, and only one made the point that securing the area is in the best interests of both the Israeli, Jordanian, and Palestinian communities and leaders.

Analysis of the content of online news media regarding a specific violent incident in the context of the ongoing Palestinian-Israeli conflict makes plain the distinctions between Peace Journalism and War Journalism, displaying the impact of framing and the imposition of meaning onto events and circumstances. Though conflict is often presented in terms of violence or visible outcomes, the underlying causes are multidimensional and dynamic, representing different needs, fears, and interests such as those represented in Figures 2, 3, and 4. By representing conflict in these terms, rather than focusing on the idea of the “other” as the aggressor, peace journalism can have a positive impact on the possibility of a lasting peace in situations of community upheaval or violent conflict. In order for this to be the case, the focus of news media reporting must shift from “winning the battle for world opinion” (Wolfsfeld, 2003, p.1) to “giv[ing] peace a chance” (Kempf, 2012, p. 2) by making visible the paths towards it.