To What Extent The Dunkirk Evacuation Can Be Considered a Humiliation

British popular culture glorifies the evacuation at Dunkirk as a miracle, a moment of national pride, but was this really the case?

The question of whether the evacuation was a miracle is based upon the false assumption that miracles exist in the first place. To a great extent, it was indeed a humiliation. To claim it was a miracle is to deify it; to attribute an element of superstition and attempt to veil the rather shambolic and humiliating circumstances that led to the great escape in the first place. In this essay, the key debate surrounding this issue will be addressed through analysing contemporary views on the evacuation through the lense of primary sources, details of the rather shambolic and humiliating evacuation itself, and the perspective of British popular culture and modern historians.

The contemporary depiction of Dunkirk was propagandised and highly censored. It utilised unifying and emotive headlines as to mask the humiliation. National media, (under strict instruction) wielded clearly propagandised headlines such as ‘335,000 Troops Saved by this Miracle’ and ‘4000 preferred death to surrender’ as a deliberate ploy that played on the ‘spirit of Dunkirk’ to rile-up a nation that was on its knees. Yet, Churchill bluntly described the Battle of France as ‘a colossal military disaster’ and famously reminded the commons that wars are not won by evacuations. However, he also regarded the evacuation as a ‘miracle of deliverance’ , and focus was firmly on the incredible number of troops rescued. Admittedly, when viewed at face value, the evacuation can be seen as close to a ‘miracle’ for this reason and emphasised the ingenuity of the British to pull off this feat in only eight days. Taylor supplements this view, regarding Dunkirk as ‘both a great deliverance and a great disaster’ at the same time, highlighting the difficulty of the debate surrounding how to classify it. A clear appeal was made to the public to stay behind the war effort, as seen through the emphasis on the role played by the ‘little ships’, and stories of everyday people who became heroes. Moreover, after the fall of Belgium and France soon after the evacuation, it became seen as the ‘miracle’ required to ensure that Britain continued to stand alone as a bastion of freedom and civilisation in Europe . Thus, for contemporaries, the evacuation was largely viewed as a miracle purely because of the emotional reaction of returning loved ones from such a terrible situation. The humiliation was subordinated by a sense of national unity; a duty to defend our beaten but unconquered nation from the clutches of tyranny.

Nevertheless, when not blinded by emotion, it is clear that the evacuation was an absolute military humiliation. Again, I refer to Churchill’s address to the Commons that ‘Wars are not won by evacuations’ . The Battle of Dunkirk was shambolic, and the evacuation itself (which seems so miraculous superficially) was fraught with great humiliation. The War Cabinet, for instance, vehemently criticises the French in their reports on the evacuation . It notes the ‘Failure of the French navy to assist in evacuation’, their failure to stick to the agreement of British and French soldiers evacuated on their own ships and the shambolic failure of French High Command to issue orders to evacuate. Such disagreement and tension between the British and French is absent in popular knowledge on the event and added to the shambolic and humiliating nature of the situation. Further, the loss of men and equipment was substantial, and is the very reason it was so humiliating. The Battle of Dunkirk incurred an estimated 61,774 killed or wounded, with the British losing 63,879 vehicles, six destroyers sunk with 23 damaged and 177 aircraft, with the French also incurring significant losses (including 40,000 of the French 1st Army, who bravely enabled the evacuation by holding the line against all odds) These are unprecedented losses. It was a real example of desperate fleeing; surviving at all costs. One only has to see the sheer number of soldiers hoarded onto fishing ships to see the true tragedy and humiliation of the event. However, Rodgers claims that the ‘little ships’ were an example of solidarity, and there is merit to that view. But I must ask: why is one of the worlds greatest militaries having to scramble their troops home on shipping vessels? Surely that is humiliating? Significantly, 243 of the 861 allied ships involved in the operation sunk, which draws attention to the fact that it was no miracle, and to call it such is very disrespectful to the men and women who gave everything to bring their countrymen home. The BEF were unprepared, lacked sufficient logistical support and were taken by surprise at von Runstedt’s aggression. Such a humiliating defeat in France resulted in the need for an evacuation in the first place, which is often forgotten in this debate. Resultantly, Belgium surrendered, France soon followed, and the evacuation was nothing short of a strategic humiliation for the British and was viewed as such by those that witnessed it first-hand. It was in no way a ‘miracle’.

The historiography surrounding the question of whether Dunkirk was humiliating or miraculous is interesting. Portrayal of the evacuation in films tends to be more open about the fact it was an escape, rather than a kind of victory (as contemporary media seemed to portray it) Sommerfield rightly comments on Dunkirk’s iconic place in British popular culture and identity. She argues that only in the fifties did any significant historiographical focus turn to the army’s failure on land, and controversial films such as ‘Dunkirk’ (1958) presented this perspective. The fact that this had been subdued for so long is testament to the significance of the military humiliation aforementioned. However, it could also be due to the significance of the ‘Dunkirk spirit’ and the events’ place in historical memory. Indeed, Connelly argues that popular understanding of Dunkirk as about ‘heroes and a miracle’ is too entrenched in British psyche to be debunked, and thus the significance of the escape is still evident today. So, Sommerfield concludes that whilst troops at Dunkirk were ‘routed and humiliated’, the evacuation (and the significance of the ‘Dunkirk spirit’) ensured that we would eventually recover . Such a recovery was significant, with the subsequent Battle of Britain being a key turning point in the war, and thus it may be said that the humiliation resulted in eventual victory. However, these are the after-effects of the evacuation, not the evacuation itself. I refrain, the great escape was only made necessary because of humiliation. The national unity generated was again because of humiliation, veiled behind the pretense of a ‘miraculous escape’.

In conclusion, it is evident that to a great extent, the evacuation was a humiliation and not a ‘miracle’.