Understanding The Semiotics: The System of Signs as a Means of Communication

In this essay I will be evaluating whether or not semiotics can be considered ‘a science’ of sign systems. Semiotics are a relatively new science, and are essentially the close analysis of any sign system found in an established society. When semiotics are applied to a twenty-first century society, the addition of technology changes the meaning of the word ‘semiotics’ slightly, as it is impossible not to factor in to any argument various distinctions between human behaviour and intellect with relation to mechanical systems. These similarities between machines and the human mind are strongly related to semiotic sign systems created by humans. I believe the notion that language can be studied in a scientific fashion, rather than a historical one to be a valid argument; a good example of this can be found in A Course in General Linguistics when Saussure states that semiotics are found by establishing a field of enquiry and studying synchronically in the style of a science as opposed to diachronically[1]. Also, due to the natural properties of language, semiotics may be used as a model of the outside world surrounding human society, physical occurrences waiting upon a scientific explanation. This reduces the differences and similarities that are encountered when dealing with sign systems, for example the aforementioned technological and human intellectual differences, to be little more than a statement of a formalised language. Complex systems of semiotics could perhaps be regarded as purely aesthetic systems found in art forms rather than something particularly scientific.

It is important to note that as intellectual creatures, humans are able to comprehend and use language to speak about things without the help of sign systems; Pierce states that all manner of things can be turned “into themselves” and signs in particular can be transformed into a medium between the world and the human mind.[2] In contrast, something that is regularly perceived as a sign can be misused just as easily, for example interpreting the Holy Bible as a symbolically sacred object, and then using that same object to hit somebody on the head and kill them. The presence of science in this side of semiotic theory is not very strong, for objects are not in the slightest bit permanent in their meaning; the signified will bear greater or lesser significance to different types of people. Whilst a great number of external factors have to be considered when we are determining a sign, there is no corresponding relation in semiotics between the physical object and the sign; semiotics does not allow for the issues of what does or does not exist beyond physical signs. Something that could be considered as a negative sign due to a lack of definitive existence does not fit into the spectrum of semiotics. If semiotics were a science, these non-signs would perhaps be disregarded, as everything belongs to an object, which essentially means that there are no specific objects at all.

Approaching language through Immanentism brings semiotics rather closer to science. Yuri Lotman states that in Immanentism, language is considered as a self-governing thing that is pinned together by a ‘highly organised integrity’. [3] Lotman implies that it is the scientific structure of language that generates the meaning of signs, and that relations between linguistic levels are understood to be immanent, essentially something that can exist without any scientific procedure to prove its existence to human society. This idea that a scientist or analyst could only explain what was already present in the language itself is also shown clearly in classic notions of Structuralism. As Structuralism is closely linked to ideas surrounding science as an exact thing, it moves away from the relevance of human consciousness. The main principles of structuralism are that any structures underlying a text are entirely objective and do not exist in the conscious mind; they are universal patterns that determine societal order and are close to language itself, meaning that they can be studied using linguistic methods of analysis such as semiotics. Paul Ricouer states that the main aim of structuralism is to place distance in a personal investigation of a text, to allow for great objectivity ‘in the structure of an institution’. He also states that a structural thought ‘turns out to be a thought which does not think’.[4] This understanding of scientific, logical and structural analysis is essentially a personal experience substituted by a replacement thought that is removed from itself through the subjectivity of signs and codes.

Science has required an element of conscious study of a language in order to progress over the centuries, and the lack of the serious study of scientific language has limited its progression. It is significant to note that a similar pattern can be observed in mathematics, where mathematic logic linked with semiological research revealed the pairing to be a resolution for cybernetic issues, whilst other sciences like linguistics are only just now approaching the link between logical information and semiotic analysis. Language in its natural state will always be a base-level interpretation of scientific language, but perhaps not a science itself. Unlike other sciences, semiotics is based on forms reflecting physical objects, with an aim to transform these forms into something where all elements are present in both the form and the model.

Another significant discrepancy to note in term of semiotics as a science can be found in the problems arising from sign systems formed in pre-reality within a culture, shown in the analysis of semiosis. It is possible to identify this pre-reality with nature as opposed to culture; cultural acts have been comprehended as a dialogue between a culture and its own pre-reality, a never-ending interaction with itself. The problem arising here with semiotics as a science is the lack of placement of signs that are caught up in an analytical framework, and are lost in signification. The attention of the supposedly scientific analyst will always shift to the boundaries of culture. Therefore, instead of dealing primarily with scientific interpretation of a natural language, the analyst focuses more on cultural experiences. The handling of the unconscious as a cultural experience is highly objective, meaning that in trying to scientifically analyse the culturally unconscious, only the objectifications are observed.

It is also feasible that semiotics can be viewed as a psychological state rather than a science. As basic concepts of semiotics are indefinable around some mathematical concepts, for example a set point or number, a sign cannot be considered an initial scientific concept because it is not without complication; instead, it is an idea consisting of at least some relation to the name and the idea. An initial concept of signs is often interpreted not as a primary object of a science but rather as a sign situation; this situation occurs when a sign is understood by someone, and perceived in its own duality. I would argue that, in light of this, it is possible to view semiotics as little more than a means of self-expression from an individual’s own, specific state of mind rather than a science. Reality can be viewed as self-existent and beyond bounds of duality, meaning that semiotics are a creation of an unconscious mind that is distanced from reality.

It is important to consider the philosophical roots of semiotics, in particular Positivism: a denial of all things metaphysical and an acceptance of easily observable facts, a lack of rationalism in that everything must be documented through investigation rather than merely observed, and the setting up of subjectivity as an opposition to scientific knowledge. Peirce, in his critical essay ‘Questions concerning certain faculties’, states that we as humans have no ability for introspection or intuition; all our knowledge stems from previous knowledge and hypothetical reasoning deciphered from the analysis of external objects. Peirce’s entire theory is built around the fact that humans are unable to think without signs.[5] This theory was rediscovered by the more logical Positivists, and works for the basis of both Structuralism and semiotics, underpinned by Saussure’s insistence on the arbitrary nature of the sign. The notion that semiotics could be regarded as a science is a somewhat flawed one in this respect as, with its ethics of scientific objectivity, semiotics remains within the bounds of its implicit premises in a view of the world’s science. To say that the pretensions of semiotics is a universal foundation in the laws of Western science would remove quality by sheer quantity, losing an ability for clear interpretation and replacing with immediately convincing positive knowledge.

My final line of enquiry into whether or semiotics can be regarded a science is the ideas surrounding Intertextualism, where analytic attention is transferred to the relationship between texts. The various elements constituting a text are essentially borrowed from other texts, and it is often claimed that the whole world is a text in itself. The difference between a science and semiotics here is that the main interest lies not in immanent structure but in references; no scientific exploration could allow for the relations between elements within a text. The consequence of this logical development is the creation of signs that refer only to other signs, sometimes referred to as non-referential signs which are a substitute reality. It is also important to note that intertextual analysis merges the boundaries of any specific text, creating a semantic void. Unlike Structuralism, this textual practice is described in terms of the possibility to escape the power of language rather than in terms of a formed science. As intertextualism is based on an understanding of culture as a selection of meaning understood in the context of information, the process of achieving a scientific linguistic similarity such as paraphrasing is only able to conclude about identity found in compared texts. These ideas do not echo that of a true science, as knowledge is stated as flowing into new knowledge, parts which transform into new knowledge and literary texts. The problem of understanding a text scientifically does not correspond with the ideology of Intertextualism, as a reconstruction of an understanding of a text is impossible. There is no room in this analysis for personal interpretation, as seen in the Structuralist approach, as scientific thought is always objectified in sign systems; the entitlement to personal interpretation is revealed to belong only to established sciences.