An Argument Against The Standard Interpretation of Descartes' Arguments in The Meditations in Andreea Mihali's Sum Res Volans

In Sum Res Volans: The Centrality of Willing for Descartes, Andreea Mihali challenges the standard interpretation of Descartes’ work. Many commentators interpret Descartes’ arguments in the Meditations to “mean that the essence of the mind is constituted by thoughts as objects of awareness” (Mihali 149). Instead, Mihali argues that “willing is as much part of the essence of the Cartesian meditating mind as awareness” (Mihali 150). Mihali’s interpretation, while it may very well be accurate in that willing is as central to thought as awareness, is nevertheless a dubious interpretation of Descartes’ Meditations. There is substantial doubt that Mihali’s interpretive claim can be made regarding Descartes’ philosophy and his discourse on thoughts and ideas.

Mihali argues that “will is prominent as assent, as focus, and as attention” (Mihali 152) for the pre-doubt and post-doubt ordinary person. The author argues that “the pre and post doubt person has desires that he acts on” (Mihali 152). Moreover, “assent is paramount in such circumstances, for a disengaged attitude is difficult to attain” (Mihali 152). In other words, Mihali argues that the will is active in thought because people, to a however slight degree, direct their thoughts. Willing clearly plays a part in judgement and decision making as peoples’ opinions are often driven and directed by their will. Beyond such complex thoughts however, there seems to be a volitional aspect to brief ideas and images that come to mind. Every time an individual glances at an object or hears a specific sound, there is volitional aspect directing the senses and processing the information one is being exposed to, no matter how brief and fleeting the thought the sensory information triggers may be. Therefore, after recognizing that “for Descartes, we become aware of a thought by directly perceiving its form, what Descartes calls an ‘idea’” (Mihali 153), Mihali argues that “intentionality and awareness are characteristic of all thoughts” (Mihali 153). In this way, the view that willing is central to thought seems quite plausible. However, Mihali fails to clearly demonstrate that this is true within the context of Descartes’ arguments. Furthermore, Descartes’ arguments and distinctions Descartes makes regarding thought seem to disagree with Mihali’s view.

In the third book of the Meditations, Descartes draws a distinction between judgements and momentary thoughts. “Some of these thoughts are like images of things” (Descartes 48) while for “other thoughts that take different forms…I embrace in my thought something more than the likeness of that thing” (Descartes 48). The ‘first tier’ of thought refers to momentary objects of awareness. In other words, he refers to thoughts, such as mental images, that are triggered by sensory information gained ‘by chance’. For example, the mental image that is triggered when seeing a car parked on the street. The ‘second tier’ of thought “are called volitions or affects, while others are called judgments” (Descartes 48). These are the thoughts that come about when an individual chooses to use mental images to form a judgement or opinion, using such ideas in deeper thought processing. For example, if one uses the mental image of the car to develop a judgement or other more complex thought. It appears that Descartes ascribes the will, as a central feature, to the ‘second tier’ of thought while downplaying its importance for the ‘first tier’.

Descartes implication that will does not play a prominent, if any, role in the ‘first tier’ of thought (momentary objects of awareness) may or may not be right. That, however, is not the issue Mihali approached in the thesis. Mihali argues against the standard interpretation of the Meditations. This standard interpretation seems to be in accord with Descartes’ own words. Moreover, if Descartes’ distinctions are accepted as part of the proper interpretation of the Cartesian meditating mind, then Mihali’s interpretive claim that “will is as much a part of the essence of the Cartesian meditating mind as awareness” is false. Again, Mihali may very well be right that, in general, willing is central to thought. However, as an interpretive claim regarding Descartes’ Meditations, Mihali seems to be ignoring distinctions delineated by Descartes’ himself.

In all fairness, Mihali focuses on the centrality of willing as it regards to the ‘second tier’ of thought—judgements and opinions. In this respect, Mihali is correct in asserting that willing plays a prominent role in thought as such ‘second-tier’ thoughts are even referred to as “volitional” (Mihali 153). As a matter of fact, Mihali covers five major concepts that are discussed in detail in the Meditations and in which willing plays a prominent role: “the cogito, clarity and distinctness, the arguments for the existence of God, the arguments for the existence of material things, and the light of nature view as instinct can be seen to depend on the will” (Mihali 150). All of these topics require the will in order for the mind to process and formulate an opinion and judgement of them. However, asserting that willing has a crucial role in judgement and in contemplative thought is not a new nor challenging assertion regarding Descartes’ Meditations. It seems as if Mihali seemingly ignored Descartes’ distinction between momentary objects of awareness and using those objects of awareness to formulate an opinion or a judgement.

Mihali’s overview of the Meditations clearly demonstrates a mastery of many Cartesian concepts and arguments. The paper, however, challenges a well founded interpretive claim regarding Descartes’ Meditations, where a philosophical challenge against Descartes’ work itself may have been more appropriate. Mihali, in challenging the interpretation that solely awareness is central to thought according to Descartes, ignores the distinctions and implications Descartes’ himself makes. The standard interpretation, without making a claim to the accurateness of Descartes’ argument and distinctions themselves, is far more faithful to the text and intended meaning of the Meditations. Willing is certainly a crucial part of the decision-making process and, thereby, the thought making process. It may, very well, be a central feature of all thoughts. Mihali’s assertion that willing is as central to thought as awareness is certainty a convincing and plausible philosophical claim, however, as an interpretive claim regarding Descartes’ work it falls far beneath the mark and remains unsubstantiated.