Analysis of Legalist School of Thought's Philosophy of Governance

Law is often tied with morals and ethics. However, we often neglect the practical social mechanism it performs in controlling people and consolidating states. Whereas Confucius focused on ‘li’ in connection to ‘ren’, the Legalist School concentrated more on the other side of the spectrum: the practical governing mechanism law provides for rulers. The Legalist school of thought can be described largely in twofold: The Legalist School in relation to history and the philosophical Legalist functions of law.

One large contrast between Legalists and other Chinese philosophies is the view upon history. Confucius thought, as well as many other Chinese philosophies, placed immense gravity on the past. Legitimacy and authority was derived from “ancient ancestors”; teachers of the past were put on a pedestal and presented as epitomes of the philosophy (Fung, 135). For example, in explaining “ren”, Confucius points to Bo Yi and Shu Qi as “the superior men of the olden days” and, in explaining “li”, points to the early Zhou as “a splendid civilization”. However, Legalists were extremely reluctant in glorifying the past, emulating figures of the past, and basing a foundation of thought upon the past values. Han Fei lamented on the limitations of what we can learn from the past. He includes “lack of sufficient understanding of the sage kings’ actions and [their] reasoning” (Harris, 160) and different situational circumstances; even when considering admirable values or actions of the past, those two factors create a large possibility for misinterpretation and misapplication of even the noblest past values. From this stemmed the importance of current context in Legalist thought. Han Fei believed that, as the world changed, guiding philosophies and perceptions of the world must change as well, giving way to philosophies more fitting of the time. Even the Legalist school of thought itself is very reactionary to their then-present circumstances. The philosophy was formed during the Warring States Era where multiple states, such as the Qin and Han, were competing for resources and security. Since there is “no guarantee to being able to control actions of nature or of foreigners” (Moody, 18), a desire for consolidate domestic power is natural. Especially in Han Fei’s life, the most recognized Legalist, Han Fei’s Han was “reluctantly within the sphere of Qin” (Moody, 20) and, during Han Fei’s lifetime, his state was constantly playing sides between the Wei, Qin, and other kingdoms. The desire of strong domestic sovereignty and control is natural, “The circumstances of the time did…generate a desire for greater order” (Moody, 18). Hence, this formed the basis of legalist political and philosophical thought.

The legalist conception of a leader is quite different from modern-day leaders. In present-day democracies, it is generally accepted that leaders have political agendas and are opinionated. Legalist thought expects the exact opposite from leaders. The individual attributes and characteristics of a leader is not a prerequisite to rule; legalist theory maintains that a ruler solely needs authority and law to sustain effective rule with no dependency on the ruler’s individual virtue or talents. Han Fei elaborates with the concept of the ‘Way’: an all-encompassing cosmic order that “provides the pattern and regulations of the universe” (Harris, 157). Han Fei maintains that a ruler should emulate the ‘Way’ and become the political ‘Way’ of his state. The ruler should “take into account the regular patterns of the natural world” (Harris, 157), especially the basic self—serving characteristic of human nature. The ruler should also be distant from commoners and cryptic, much like the ‘Way’. “An aura of mystery and awe” is ideal for a ruler such that his rules are “seen to be inevitable and unalterable” (Harris, 158). Overall, there is a large emphasis on elevating the position’s authority. To do so, the throne’s authority should be built independent of the individual; the throne should have a God-like mystical aurora; the throne should use natural tendencies of the people to consolidate power.

Han Fei delves deeper into how to rule as well. Three main components are discussed: shi, shu, and fa. Shih refers to authority and positional power; shu refers to the art of handling people and the public; fa is the law. While varying factions of Legalist thought valued certain components in priority, Han Fei emphasized how all three components were inter-dependent and vital in strong, efficient rule. Shi is a prerequisite for one to employ shu; without authority, one’s ability to manage people is greatly limited. Both shi and shu are needed for fa to be effective as they make it possible for law to be enforced and have weight in society. In relation to the ‘Way’, or dao, law must be justified by dao as well with understanding of nature and human tendencies. If fa is non-compliant with the natural ‘way’ of the world and constituents cannot naturally comply to fa, fa is unjustified and becomes inefficient. These concepts accumulated to a Legalist ‘infallible’ method of governance as well. Fa, or law, should be based on the lowest common denominator. Rulers should not depend upon the virtue of the people because people are not innately virtuous but self-inclined and ignorant of higher morals. When dealing with state matters, rulers should utilize fa to insure no constituent can do wrong, hence, support for a code of law that primarily discourage and punished socially harmful behavior to strengthen state control. Legalists, in conducting fa, were obsessed in promulgating law with explicit, often excessively harsh, punishments and rewards. Legalists were not interested in changing human nature and value systems, but rather more focused on “chang[ing] the way that people act on their desires” (Harris, 159). Furthermore, shu conducted that rulers take passive positions in law as well and, with shu, dictate appropriate men to needed posts, a Chinese bureaucratic structure. Legalists emphasize the importance of specifying responsibilities of officials, stating how the name of the position should be reflective of the goal it is trying to achieve. The ruler merely concerns himself with results, not bothered by the bureaucratic methods of his peons. A simple, yet strong, punishment & reward system suffices in incentivizing officials to accomplish their goals. And, as according to Legalist theory, if the incentive system drives a stronger punishment that reward, it also deters incompetent applicants from accepting offices. The ruler’s role was, therefore, simple: employ and evaluate. Even evaluation, the ruler only concerned himself with consistency between the result and intended goal.

All in all, the Legalist School introduced a cold philosophy of governance geared towards power consolidation and practicality. The Legalist School arose to meet a desire of the people during the Warring States era, a sentiment mirrored in their belief in governing in accordance to situational circumstances. A Legalist form of governance preferred a distant ruler with a developed aura of authority. Relying upon shu, a legalist leader should be passive in technical affairs, relying upon a bureaucratic system in order to maintain unbiased interest in the majority, like the ‘Way’ or dao, with minimum liability to the throne. With punishment-based system of fa and shu that simultaneously decreases ruler lability and bolsters the “God-like” aura surrounding the position, shi is solidified, strengthening the state once again.