How Changing Religious Climate Helped to End The Witch Craze

‘Historians have disagreed about the reasons for the end of the witch craze’. To what extent to was the changing religious climate responsible for the end of the witch craze?

Introduction to history and context

The witch craze was a widespread phenomenon throughout Europe, spanning the late 15th to the early 18th century which resulted in thousands of people, mainly women, being accused, tried, and executed for witchcraft. Such intense persecution of witches had never occurred before this period, and has not done since, thus making these couple of centuries unique in the history of witchcraft. This has led many historians to look at the context of this period in order to try and find out what it was about this era that allowed the witch craze to hold such a grip on societies throughout Europe. It was a time of social upheaval, religious conflict, and scientific development as Europe emerged from frequent plagues, famines, and wars which ravaged it during the Middle Ages. There is a general consensus amongst most historians that the witch craze declined in the early 18th century. However, the question of why the witch craze came to an end is one of many ongoing controversies surrounding the witch craze. Amongst other factors, the changing religious climate, urbanization, and judicial scepticism have been suggested by historians as reasons for the decline of the witch craze.

James Sharpe, H. C. Erik Midelfort and Owen Davies all present different reasons for the decline of the witch craze. Both Sharpe and Midelfort take a ‘from above’ approach to the decline of witch trials, arguing that it was the elite who put a stop to the witch craze, whereas Davies adopts a ‘from below’ approach to the decline, focusing on community structures and the lower classes.

Sharpe argues that the emergence of rational Christianity in England caused increased scepticism towards witchcraft. He suggests that scepticism was more common among the elite and educated classes, and that because there was still a considerable amount of religious enthusiasm and belief in witchcraft in the lower classes at this time, social snobbery accentuated the scepticism of the elite. Thus he presents the changing religious climate, combined with social relations as the main reason for the decline of the witch craze.

Midelfort describes the witch craze as an outbreak of large scale persecution in Germany, characterized by chain reaction trials. This was when one suspect accused of witchcraft was forced under torture to give names of other witches with whom they had communed, leading to the arrest of these people too. As they would also be forced to give names of other witches, this led to a huge amount of witchcraft trials, which had all stemmed from just one initial witchcraft accusation. He suggests that the decline of the witch craze was caused by judicial scepticism, which was sparked primarily by the involvement of children in the witch trials, but also caused by the changing attitudes towards torture and evidence.

In contrast, Davies looks at how urbanization made the mostly agriculturally based witchcraft beliefs less relevant in London, an urban environment, leading to a decline in witchcraft accusations. He also suggests how the urban environment led to social instability, and writes that ‘witchcraft accusations may, in fact, be indicative of social stability’, implying that social instability caused a decline in witchcraft accusations, showing how urbanization led to the decline of the witch craze.

Overall, Sharpe presents the most compelling argument because he presents the strongest reason for increased scepticism amongst the elite towards witchcraft accusations, which could affect the lower classes through the judicial systems.

The cause of the decline of the witch craze is still a greatly disputed area of history, and many reasons have been suggested. All three historians present different reasons for the decline of the witch craze. The changing religious climate, judicial scepticism, and urbanization are just three of the many arguments that can all be justified as causes for the decline of the witch craze and supported with evidence.

The first argument, popular with theologians, suggests that the changing religious climate can be seen as responsible for the decline of the witch craze because it introduced scepticism about the reality of witchcraft into the elite. In the late 17th century, religious enthusiasm amongst the elite was waning, and ‘most educated people felt religion should be as free as possible of ‘enthusiasm’, while if spiritual forces did work on the physical it was through the emotions or the soul rather than exterior forces’. This is evident because religious conflict declined throughout Europe in the second half of the 17th century. The Thirty Years War between Catholic and Protestant countries ended in 1648, and the Restoration in England in 1660 brought more religious tolerance, showing a decline of religious zeal and hegemony. Furthermore, the Royal Society was founded in 1660, and encouraged the growth of natural science and philosophy. Members such as Isaac Newton attempted to reconcile scientific discoveries to their faith, leading to a Christianity which was based more on science, making it more rational. As a more rational Christianity emerged, the belief that God was omnipotent, and that Satan had very little power over the physical world was becoming more widespread amongst the elite. They were also influenced by the mechanical philosophy developed by the philosopher Thomas Hobbes in the 17th century, which undermined the authority of spirits or devils by suggesting that there were fundamental natural laws which could explain events that seemed supernatural. This undermined the belief that the devil was attacking humans through witches, meaning that educated, rational believers were less likely to initiate witch hunts, or support them. This would have had a significant impact on the overall decline of all witchcraft trials, even those among the lower classes, because the elite controlled the judicial systems, where witches were tried, revealing why several historians have argued that the changing religious climate was responsible for the decline of the witch craze.

Other historians have taken a functional approach, and argued that judicial scepticism led to the decline of the witch craze. This was due to ‘a growing reluctance to use torture as an instrument of judicial interrogation’, meaning that testimonies about witchcraft obtained under torture were no longer seen as so reliable. As it was these testimonies being used as evidence to convict other witches that allowed chain-reaction witch trials to take a hold, it meant that far fewer trials took place, and the ones that did were prevented from developing into chain-reactions trials. In addition, there was also a growing scepticism in the judicial systems about valid evidence. For example, ‘judges became increasingly reluctant to allow evidence of the Devil’s mark to be admitted’, and other influential judicial figures such as lawyers and theologians also began to question the reliability of the evidence being used. However, as the elite controlled the judicial systems, it suggests that judicial scepticism relied on the scepticism of the elite, which was caused by the emergence of rational Christianity, meaning that it was fundamentally the changing religious climate which caused the decline of the witch craze.

However, some historians, particularly Marxist historians and those who take a ‘from below’ approach, have looked at how urbanization can be considered responsible for the decline of the witch craze. This is because it created ‘less close-knit, more individualistic, ill-defined communities’, making potential accusers of witchcraft feel less able to voice their suspicions because they were unsure of how the community around them would react. In addition, as witch reputations were ‘generated and sustained through the long-term accumulation of supposed maleficent acts, held in the collective memory of the community’, it meant that the increasingly mobile urban environment was less conducive to witch hunting, because ‘witches’ had less chance of gaining a reputation. Furthermore, there was a greater ‘intensity of the urban government, compared with that of rural communities. Even the smallest burghs had a council that supervised the inhabitants closely’. This means that once the judicial systems became sceptical of witchcraft accusations, it would have had a more profound impact on urban areas where there was a tighter judicial system, compared to rural areas. As judicial scepticism reflects the scepticism of the elite, caused by the emergence of rational Christianity, it once again suggests that the changing religious climate was fundamentally responsible for the decline of the witch craze.

Interpretations in depth

Sharpe, Davies, and Midelfort all explore the witch craze in depth as they present different arguments for its decline.

Sharpe argues that the changing religious climate in England led to the decline of the witch craze, as the emergence of rational Christianity increasingly discredited belief in witchcraft amongst the elite. This was because ‘the power of Satan was downgraded and a belief in the majesty and sovereignty of God emphasized. The misfortunes allegedly caused by witchcraft were wrongly attributed: they were more properly the outcome of divine providence’, leading believers holding this view to ‘seek the explanation of their own sinfulness’ rather than blame others for misfortunes through witchcraft accusations. Sharpe also suggests that most clerical intellectuals believed that the age of miracles was past, meaning that ‘the notion that the devil’s agents could perform mira would be difficult to sustain’. This led to the decline of witch trials because it meant that the elite were less likely to make witchcraft accusations, or support them within their communities.

Also, Sharpe suggests that the emergence of rational Christianity created a sceptical clergy, He takes the example of John Gaule, who did not accept the ‘observations, traditions, opinions, affectations, professions, proverbs, occupations and conversations of the vulgar concerning witchcraft’. As the clergy were often consulted in cases of suspected witchcraft, the emergence of a clergy who were sceptical about witchcraft accusations could have had led to a reduction in the number of witchcraft trials in a community. Sharpe describes Gaule as ‘typical of that stratum of minor clerical controversists who flourished at the time’, suggesting that scepticism among the country clergy was widespread, which means that this group could have had a significant impact on the decline of the witch craze.

Sharpe argues that although ‘the old ‘enthusiastic’ attitude to religious experience was losing its hold on theologians and philosophers, it continued to be current among the population at large’, suggesting that the rejection of religious enthusiasm was fundamentally happening in just the upper classes. He writes that ‘for the educated, belief in witchcraft, like acceptance of the reality of wonders, faith-healing and the experience of religiously or demonically inspired possession, could be rejected on intellectual grounds. But the knowledge that acceptance of such matters was still current among the lower orders meant that intellectual positions were heavily reinforced by social prejudice’, suggesting that social snobbery helped scepticism of the witch craze to take a firmer grip on the upper classes, and so was also an important contribution to the decline of the witch craze.

In summary, Sharpe presents the emergence of rational Christianity, incorporating the rejection of religious enthusiasm, and the belief that the age of miracula was past, as the key cause for the decline of the witch craze.

Davies argues that the witch craze declined due to the divorce between urban and rural communities. He focuses on urbanization in London, and the formation of new social structures there. He suggests that the ‘intimacy of neighbourly relations and primary networks which fostered witchcraft accusations may not have been able to develop in this environment to the same extent as it had once done in early modern London, or as they continued to do in rural areas’. This meant that potential accusers of witchcraft were less likely to voice their suspicions as accusations, because they were unsure ‘as to how the people around would react to his or her claims’, suggesting that the usual response to misfortune of making an accusation was suppressed due to social insecurity in urban communities. In addition, he argues that as ‘the reputation of a witch was usually generated and sustained through the long-term accumulation of supposed maleficent acts, held in the collective memory of the community’, the increased mobility of an urban community, creating less close communal relations, would have led to a decline in witchcraft accusations, because it would have made it much harder for the reputation of a witch to develop. This accounts for the decline of witchcraft trials in which the witchcraft accusations were based on the reputation of a witch built up by various deeds of maleficium. However, some witchcraft accusations were made without the witch having gained a reputation, such as the chain-reaction trials Midelfort describes, the most famous example of these being the Salem witch trials. Therefore, the instability caused by urbanization cannot be considered responsible for the decline of all witchcraft trials.

Also, Davies argues that the weakening in communal ties helped belief in witchcraft to wane. He explains how it may have disrupted a vital pathway, especially in the urban environment where ‘the collective memory of the community is neither so broad nor so deep’ for beliefs to be passed down to future generations, because ‘stories concerning witches and witchcraft, were primarily, though not exclusively, perpetuated through oral transmission, particularly within the family group’. Along with this, he argues that the urban setting made belief in witchcraft less relevant, and explains this by saying how ‘witchcraft accusations often stemmed from the inexplicable illness and death of livestock, or from problems associated with the processing of agricultural products.’, meaning that in the urban environment, potential accusers of witchcraft were not able to use traditional agricultural misfortunes as bases for their accusations, which may have led to a decline in witchcraft accusations. However, this cannot explain the overall decline of the witch craze, because ‘it is certainly not the case that witchcraft beliefs and practises had vanished or significantly dwindled before or even shortly after the cessation of witch-trials’.

Overall, Davies presents urbanization as the overall reason for the decline of the witch craze, because the social functioning of urban communities became less conducive to the formation of witchcraft accusations, and witchcraft beliefs declined in the urban setting.

In contrast, Midelfort argues that the decline of the witch craze was caused by judicial scepticism in his study of Germany. He writes that ‘throughout the centuries of the witch-hunt these locally inspired and often controlled sorcery trials continued to be common. They usually ended as abruptly as they had begun, with the execution or banishment of one or two witches… But the true panic did not remain rooted in these rural concerns and did not rest content with the extermination of one or two geriatric outcasts’. He suggests that although the scepticism of the elite ‘may help explain why even the small, local trials withered away in the eighteenth century’, it cannot be considered fundamentally responsible for the decline of the witch craze because ‘by then the large, chain reaction trials had been dead for a generation or more’. He proposes that the decline of these trials ‘is that during the seventeenth century they came increasingly to involve children’ which suggests that the involvement of children in large chain reaction trials was responsible for judicial scepticism, because it made local officials realize that the ‘testimony of minors was simply not credible’, making them more sceptical towards witchcraft accusations. However, judicial systems must have already been sceptical to some extent about the witchcraft accusations in order to question the children and find out whether their testimonies were true, suggesting that the involvement of children in the trials cannot be considered the fundamental reason why judicial systems initially became sceptical.

Midelfort then looks at the impact of changing attitudes towards evidence and torture on judicial scepticism about witchcraft accusations. He writes that the territories of the Holy Roman Empire became ‘much more cautious in the use of torture than they had been’. This was significant because it meant that the confessions of accused witches gained under torture were no longer considered to be valid evidence upon which a condemnation of them, or other witches they may accuse, could be based. This made it far more difficult to convict a person of witchcraft, and made it practically impossible for large, chain reaction witchcraft trials to continue. He suggests that the increasing caution about the use of torture was influenced by critical writing about witchcraft, when he states that ‘critics of witchcraft trials, from Johann Weyer in the sixteenth century to Friedrich von Spee in the seventeenth, had long maintained that tortured evidence was equally unreliable’, showing that criticism from learned elites could have led judicial systems to dismiss evidence obtained from torture. However, the learned elites who wrote criticism of witchcraft trials became critical of witchcraft themselves due to the emergence of rational Christianity, suggesting that it was fundamentally the changing religious climate which was responsible for the decline of the witch craze, because it was responsible for increased judicial scepticism, particularly where evidence obtained under torture was used.

Overall, Midelfort argues that judicial scepticism, which was caused by changing attitudes to torture and evidence, and the involvement of children in the trials, led to the decline of the witch craze.

Explain the differences you have identified

The different conclusions reached by these historians about the decline of the witch craze are due to a variety of reasons. One reason why the interpretations differ is the choice to focus on one place. Sharpe’s, Midelfort’s, and Davies’ interpretations are all weakened due to the fact that they look at the witch craze in just one country rather than the whole of Europe.

Midelfort focuses on Germany in his argument that judicial scepticism brought the witch craze to a halt. Germany had an inquisitorial judicial system, but other countries in Europe, such as England, had an adversarial system. As an adversarial system had a defence and a prosecution to convince a jury whether or not the accused was guilty, judicial scepticism could still have had an impact on the verdict of the judge and jury, but perhaps less so than in an inquisitorial system, where the judge and jury are not subject to base their verdict on the arguments of the prosecution and defence, meaning that if they themselves were sceptical, they could more easily dismiss an accusation of witchcraft. This makes Midelfort’s interpretation slightly weaker for European countries with adversarial systems, but it still holds some weight.

In contrast, Owen Davies bases his interpretation on his case study of London. Urbanization was occurring in several countries in Europe, meaning that Davies’ interpretation could be applied to all European urban centres. However, witchcraft trials were still taking place in rural areas, suggesting that Davies’ interpretation is limited because it does not explain why witchcraft accusations declined in rural areas. In addition, his argument is undermined by the fact that in Germany, urbanization occurred from around the early 19th century, approximately a century later than it did in England, by which time the witch craze in Germany had already declined, showing that urbanization cannot really be considered responsible for the decline of the witch craze in Germany. Overall, by focusing on the city of London, Davies’ interpretation is different to Sharpe’s and Midelfort’s, who both look at a whole country, because he is looking at the significant changes between a city and the countryside and their effect on the witch craze, rather than the general political, social, and religious situation of a whole country.

Sharpe also focuses on England when he looks at why the witch craze declined. However, his interpretation is stronger because he looks at the whole country rather than just London, which allows him to reconstruct the overall religious, political, social, and economic environment of 17th and 18th century England more accurately. Also, his argument about the emergence of rational Christianity could be applied to most European countries, because the Enlightenment was leading to more rational beliefs throughout the whole of Europe. This makes his argument convincing in regard to the decline of the European witch craze, and helps explain why his argument is more applicable to Europe than the other interpretations, which makes it stand out.

Furthermore, the sources which each historian used is also fundamental in explaining the different interpretations they have come up with. Davies uses the Surrey Assize records. As the Assize courts only dealt with the most serious cases, they cannot be representative of all witchcraft trials, particularly those in which the witchcraft accusation was dismissed and not taken seriously by the local authorities, explaining why Davies’ argument omits an exploration of a sceptical elite or judiciary, in contrast to Midelfort’s and Sharpe’s. Furthermore he would have asked different questions about the Assize records, in comparison to the questions historians might have asked of local court records. This would have given him different information about witchcraft trials, perhaps leading him to believe that witchcraft trials declined in urban areas because there were less records of witchcraft trials in urban Surrey Assize records, yet this was probably because only the most serious cases were taken to the Assize courts. In addition, many 17th and 18th Century records have been lost or damaged over time, and some trials may not have been recorded at all. This limits Davies’ interpretation, because gaps in the evidence mean he cannot back his theory up absolutely. However, the case studies he uses from these records strengthen his argument as they allow him to make accurate inferences about the development of the nature of witchcraft accusations in urban areas.

Midelfort encounters the same problem when he uses German court records of witchcraft executions, relying upon evidence which is not indisputable. However, he does use other evidence, such as legislation, case studies, and contemporary writing to convincingly show that the judicial systems were becoming sceptical towards witchcraft accusations. This explains why his argument is different, because it draws on a variety of different sources, giving different explanations for judicial scepticism, which makes it multicausal, rather than the other two arguments which are monocausal.

Sharpe supports his interpretation with a number of case studies. This makes his argument stronger because they are indisputable evidence upon which he can base his conclusions. He uses contemporary writing such as the diary of Elizabeth Livingstone to gain an insight into the contemporary religious beliefs, and looks actions of various religious figures, such as the minister John Glanvill to demonstrate that new religious attitudes which were sceptical towards witchcraft were widespread. Although this evidence is inevitably from the upper, literate classes of society, giving Sharpe a more limited scope, he uses it to gain an insight into the religious beliefs of the elite, as well as their attitudes towards the lower classes. This allows him to make inferences about the religious situation in the lower classes, which strengthens his argument, and explains why his view stands out, as it addresses the fundamental reason why the elite became sceptical, because the case studies allowed him to see the witchcraft accusations through the eyes of the contemporary elite, who revealed their religiously based scepticism through their writing.

Another reason the historians have come up with different interpretations is that they all look at different types of witch trials. Midelfort limits his argument because he considers the witch craze to consist solely of chain reaction trials, which gives his interpretation a narrower focus, making his argument less convincing for the decline of the European witch craze. Davies’ view is different because he also limits his argument by narrowing his focus mainly onto the lower classes. This makes his argument less convincing as the lower classes had no system through which they could put a stop to the witch trials occurring in the upper classes, meaning that it cannot explain why the overall witch craze declined.

Sharpe focuses mainly on the elite and upper classes of society, but he looks at the changing religious climate both in the upper classes and the lower classes of society, which gives his argument a broader focus, making it stronger for the overall decline of the witch craze. Furthermore, his argument can explain why witchcraft accusations declined in urban areas, because people living in the urban environment came into more contact with new ideas and beliefs, such as rational Christianity, which circulated mainly in the cities rather than in the country.

Conclusion

To conclude, Midelfort’s argument that judicial scepticism led to the decline of the witch craze is quite limited because it does not convincingly explain why the judicial systems became sceptical. Although it shows that the witch craze was halted through judicial scepticism, the changing religious climate can be held fundamentally responsible for judicial scepticism, meaning that Midelfort’s argument has not addressed the underlying cause of judicial scepticism, which makes his argument less convincing. Furthermore, Midelfort narrowly defines the witch craze as consisting of only chain-reaction trials, meaning that he does not look at the decline of all witch trials, which limits his argument.

Davies’ argument that decline of the witch craze was due to urbanization is stronger because it does show how urbanization could have led to the decline of the witch craze, and he uses case studies to show the clear link between urbanization and the decline of the witch craze. However, it is still limited for my enquiry about the decline of the European witch craze because it is not valid for some European countries where urbanization occurred after the witch craze had already declined. This means that urbanization can be considered only a contributing factor to the witch craze rather than the fundamental one.

Sharpe’s argument that the changing religious climate caused the decline of the witch craze is the most convincing because he explains why the elite became sceptical about witchcraft, which led to scepticism in the judicial systems which they controlled. This shows how the elite were able to put a stop to the decline of the witch craze, making Sharpe’s argument stronger than Midelfort’s and Davies’ because it explains both why and how the witch craze declined. Furthermore, by basing his argument mainly upon indisputable evidence, he is able to draw accurate conclusions about the relationship between the decline of the witch craze and the changing religious climate.