Analysis of The Financial Impact of The New Pilot Training System in The U.s Air Force

The United States Air Force attempted to save money by implementing a new flight training system designed to better identify pilot candidates; by better identifying candidates earlier in the process, money would be saved by cutting non-performing candidates and therefore cost the Air Force less money by reducing training time and resources. This new flight training system was the T-3A Firefly, but instead of achieving its stated goals, it cost the government 40 million dollars, numerous man hours, reputation, and the lives of 6 personal. This project may have been saved if proper risk management had been implemented.

The first question that should have been asked is: “Is it necessary to upgrade to this type of trainer?” as most pilots do not fly the highly maneuverable fighter/attack craft that this type of trainer was designed for. While the General’s sentiment is understandable, training at an appropriate level may be more cost efficient. Next, the Firefly was dubbed to have a slew of problems, including: brake effectiveness, climbing ability, and cruising speed; however, the Air Force applauded the machine for its handling and stability and decided to choose the Firefly over the competition. The issues were known at the time, and instead of accounting for them, and perhaps having fixes in place before purchase, the Air Force had to attempt to fix the problems as they came along. The fixes, in turn, actually caused many more problems with the trainer, as one piece of equipment had major effects on all other pieces of equipment and was a major technical risk that should have been discovered sooner.

While the original Firefly was a Commercial off the Shelf (COTS) product, the add-ons made it much less similar than its original product and should have been in the testing phase longer. Additionally, the Air Force allowed the contractor to conduct most of the testing on its own product; this is an external risk that should have been nullified by assigning their own people to oversee the testing. Further testing was cut short due to late delivery, but the trainer was still put into the pipeline, where officials discovered it could not handle spins (one of the major purposes for purchasing the Firefly) when a student and instructor were killed.

The Air Force should have looked at its goals of the plane, and the plane itself as one project, where parts affect one another and everything must fit together nicely. Risk identification, assessment of risks, and responding to risk assessments should have been completed before the initial purpose, that way only risk monitoring would need to occur after implementing the system.

I do believe the reasons for failure could have been avoided, at least in part, by following the four stages of risk management planning. Risks should have had a proper plan on who is managing them in what areas, how to track risks throughout the project, and contingency plans. It seems there was no clear strategy at the beginning of the project, as the Air Force bought a COTS plane, but then upgraded it without thinking out the consequences, yet still tested it as a solely COTS product.