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About this sample
About this sample
Words: 599 |
Page: 1|
3 min read
Published: Nov 8, 2019
Words: 599|Page: 1|3 min read
Published: Nov 8, 2019
Syria pushed the uprising in Syria into Qatar's second intervention in the Arab Spring. However, the world of difference separates the cases of Libya and Syria as two disparate points in successive regional turmoil. While the regime of Gaddafi was diplomatically and politically isolated (and physically) away from the main regional actors, Syria was at the heart of geopolitics in the Middle East. Syria's multicultural fabric and sectarian balance are mixed with tribal cross-regional ties and political alliances to ensure there is no civil unrest that began in March 2011 within the country's borders. Syria has become a battleground for proxy wars waged with increasing intensity and ferocity by groups linked to both sides of the Sunni-Shiite regional divide.
In this series of deadly and interrelated conflicts, we were supposed to assume that any one country might hope to influence, let alone control, developments on the ground. However, whether by chance or design, or just because Doha emerged from its apparent success in helping to remove Gaddafi from power after two and thirty-two years of Libya's rule, this is exactly what the Qatari leadership tried to do in late 2011 and throughout 2012 The League of Arab States - more commonly known for its ineffectiveness because of its critical volatility - has taken the lead in early peacemaking initiatives.
One of the reasons for the Arab League's greater affirmation during this formative period is that Qatar has been holding its rotating presidency for an unprecedented second term in 2011-2012 after the postponement of the February 2011 summit and a decision to restore the presidency to Doha. The sudden turn of events has led Qatar to play an organized role in the Arab response to the massacre in Syria over the term of the second Doha presidency until the spring of 2012. However, Syria does not comment on the Arab League's imposition of political and economic sanctions in November 2011 nor send an observer mission.
From the League of Arab States to Syria in January 2012 successfully stop the spiral of escalating violence. With the Arab League floundering, Prince Hamad became the first Arab leader to publicly support the deployment of foreign forces in Syria to try to stem the bloodshed, and told CBS News in 60 minutes in January 2012 that "such a situation would stop ..." Strong, resilient Qatar and the catalyst in the crisis failed to produce immediate or far-reaching impact, as happened in Libya the previous year. This is in part due to the emerging rivalries between the regional actors supported by the forces in Syria, as well as the lack of consensus within the Arab League itself on the next steps.
The inaugural meeting of the Group of Friends of Syria, an international coalition held in February 2012, ended in chaos, as the Saudi delegation came out in protest at the inability to agree on a common position. After this failure, the fragile unity united the Arab League. This ineffectiveness was a blow to the Arab League and Qatar, given Doha's very clear commitment to keeping the problem under Arab control during its leadership.
As a result, the Arab League summit in Baghdad in 2012 was characterized by tension, division, and the subsequent weak position on Syria, where he appealed to Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki to non-interference. Qatar has made it clear that countries such as Iraq and Lebanon have failed to act decisively and have begun to take a tougher stance in dealing with Syria. They have publicly appealed to the international community to support and arm the opposition to the Syrian government.
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