Political Relations Between Qatar & Libia

However, neither Qatar nor the United Arab Emirates coordinated their military assistance to the Libyan opposition, and indeed supported the various rebel brigades on the ground. This has complicated the task of unifying the anti-Gaddafi movement from its early stage and contributed to the subsequent fragmentation of the movement after it came to power in October 2011. It also laid the seeds for rivalry between politicians and security supported by Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. Networks that would break out in the summer of 2014. It seems that Qatar's policy of trying to identify and ultimately support winners in conflicts (who were always Islamic groups) has borne fruit in August 2011.

In fact, the Maroon and the White Flag Qatar flew alongside the flag of free Libya over the ruins of the Gaddafi complex - a symbolic and revealing moment. However, with the revolutionary ecstasy of 2011 leading to the difficult process of building and unifying institutional and accountable administrative structures in 2012, it has become clear that Qatar has failed to translate short-term gains into long-term influence. Local reactions to Qatar's intentions, whether perceived or actual, escalated as the extent of country engagement on the ground became more widely known. This was reflected in the elections of the Constituent Assembly in July 2012 when Balhaj's only party won a single seat, even with Belhaj failing to win in his constituency in Tripoli.

Although the failure of the party reflects several factors, including the lack of clarity of the Islamic-secular divide by the other parties and the weakness of the socio-political networks that were not allowed to form in Libya Gaddafi, public concerns about the relationship with Qatar played a role. When determining the rejection of the statement Belhadj. In fact, even the colors of his party had an impact; either by chance or design, Qatar national flag colors were chosen, thus enhancing public doubts about its goals and objectives of Qatar. The same constraints that had hampered the monitoring, evaluation and implementation of Qatari mediation initiatives before 2011 also hampered Qatar's ability to pursue in post-Qadhafi Libya, even with strong new criticisms of Qatari policy.

Qatar's failure to leverage its influence to concrete results in post-conflict Libya reflects the lack of depth in the country's professional diplomatic capacities and the challenge of institutionalizing the results of largely personal decision-making processes. Moreover, while the country and other regional and international sources of military and financial support were widely welcomed during the struggle against the Qadhafi regime, in the frenetic climate that followed, it became difficult for these external players to avoid the appearance and choice of the sides.