Understanding The Necessity of Self-defense Further Reforms

The principles of necessity and self-defense are fundamental components of the criminal justice system, providing individuals with legal justifications for their actions in certain circumstances. However, in recent years, concerns have been raised regarding the clarity and interpretation of these defenses within the judicial system. Critics argue that the lack of clear guidelines and standardized criteria for the application of necessity and self-defense has led to inconsistent and subjective outcomes in legal proceedings. Consequently, there is a growing need for reform to ensure that these defenses are appropriately and uniformly understood and applied within the legal framework. This essay will explore the deficiencies in the current understanding of necessity and self-defense, highlighting the call for reforms that can enhance the clarity and fairness of these crucial aspects of the judicial system. By addressing the limitations of these defenses and proposing potential reforms, the aim is to foster a more just and consistent legal system that aligns with contemporary societal expectations and values.

Possible Necessity for Self-Defence: Case Analysis 

The concept of necessity justifies that a person who uses the defence of necessity claims to have done no wrong and should not suffer any consequences. The defence is defined as the lesser of two evils, 'the defendant was placed in an emergency of some kind and what the defendant did was necessary to avoid harm'. However, it is not easy to distinguish what constitutes the defense, as the requirements for using the defense of necessity can be interpreted by different standards. The act in response to a threat of imminent danger is interpretable, to the point that each person may have a different perception as to what would suffice a danger. For example, it is not entirely secure whether the defence of necessity applies to the offence of murder.

For example, in the case of Dudley v Stephens, a group of sailors viewed their threat of dying on a boat as starvation and lack of nutrition due to their long haul stranded at sea. Their ultimate decision was to kill and eat the youngest cabin member. The attempt to use necessity as a defence was rejected; thus, the sailors were convicted of murder. The arbitrary choice of the victim was the deciding factor in the rejection of the use of necessity. The court decided that the decision to kill the young sailor rather than the men is not permissible as a defence. This completely overrides the pointing out the awful danger of admitting the principle which has been contended for, in the stranding of the sailors, facing imminent death. It is a morally arbitrary choice to choose the death of a specific individual over another so would remove the danger of the event in order to avoid the greater evil. Lord Coleridge argues that allowing the defense of necessity would be dangerous as, once it is established, it may create a legal cloak for unbridled passion and atrocious crime. The complete divorce of morality from the law would be fatal in that individuals may use this defence as an absolute defence, meriting unruly crimes and offences against the person.

However, in the case of Re A, the defence of necessity was allowed in the separation of conjoined twins to kill one individual and save the other. In this case, it is established that the criteria included the avoidance of inevitable and irreparable evil; that is not disproportionate to the evil avoided; and that no more should be done than reasonably necessary. This presents a lack of clarity and a degree of contradiction in the law of necessity because the defence was allowed in the infliction of certain death in the face of imminent, more excellent circumstances in one case and not the other. The case of Stephens was not dismissed in this matter; it was just not followed. The cases share very similar facts in terms of circumstances, in that the killing of one individual to effectuate the survival of others. However, they are not consistent. The lack of factual indifference but the stark difference in outcome proves a lack of clarity within the defence, as the principle of necessity refers to the actions of an individual for the greater good. However, if the principle were to be made a complete defence, morality and law would need to be divorced to be categorically consistent throughout all instances. Despite this, there is no statutory statement in defence of necessity; it is to the jury's interpretation. Issues may arise where interpretation varies by the individual, bringing a lack of clarity in understanding the principles behind necessity. The law's standard of morality is exceptionally high, criminalising the fighting for their survival. It could be argued that the law is inconsistent and should take a more level and modern interpretation of the morality expected of people. If this is not achieved, it may lead to the criminal law to 'stagnate and [to] perhaps one day soon become the sole remaining outpost of a largely abandoned view of human behavior'.

Self-Defence as an Example of a 'Justification' Defence

Self-defence is another defence that is potentially in need of reform to bring integrity back to the judiciary, removing contradiction and confusion. Justified conduct is correct behavior that is encouraged or at least tolerated. In determining whether conduct is justified, the focus is on the act, not the actor. However, it is not entirely clear on the meanings of correct behaviour and what constitutes behaviour that may bring a complete defense. The distinction between the defence of necessity and self-defence is a tangible conception that critics believe is not required to exist. However, the choice of actions in the case of self defence is of more free control of actions than that of necessity. Within the defence of self-defence, the actus reus is the topic that represents contradiction and confusion. The degree to which the defendant responds to an imminent threat based on self-defence is the critical matter clouded in the criminal law. Case law establishes that the degree of force used against the claimant must not exceed the necessary and proportionate level of harm required in the situation. In this case, the act of shooting and killing the individual who was proposing a threat to the defendant was deemed excessive and disproportionate. Section 3 of the Criminal law Act states that reasonable force can be used to prevent a crime. However, the shooting and killing of an individual to retrieve stolen goods are not proportionate? If this were to be the case, then the context of the threat would be vital in determining whether a defence would be used. However, contradiction is found in cases that include the provocation of individuals to act in a certain way to defend themselves.

For example, in cases in which individuals act after the event of false imprisonment (Munir Hussein), grossly injuring the claimant is not deemed to be proportionate to the harm inflicted on the defendant. Despite this, in the case of Hemstock, the defendant was fully acquitted of injuring the claimant to a similar degree of harm for a seemingly lesser crime. In these comparative cases, responding to an intruder of land was treated with more lenience than false imprisonment.

Issues here are proved by the issues accumulated between human rights and the right to use self-defense for acquittal. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this article when it results from the use of force that is no more than necessary. This section explains the right to human life and that in the event of self-defence, the response of action must be proportionate to the threat. However, Lord Lane states that even if the jury concludes that the mistake was unreasonable, if the defendant may genuinely have been labouring under it, he is entitled to rely on it. This states a lack of clarity in the law of self-defense and human rights in that a responding act to a threat must be proportionate to be in line with human rights. However, different cases apply varying values of strictness to his rule, as found in the cases of Hemstock and Hussain. The introduction of a provocation test could be helpful in the application of the law in the defence of self-defence in which the degree of danger inflicted on the defendant allows for evaluation of the response in which revenge or loss of control may be inflicted. This would bring more clarity to the defence.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the defences of necessity and self-defence are both in need of reform to clarify the judicial system and the accessibility of use to defendants. The infliction of one's human rights remains the primary concern for both the defences, with the legal system applying differing values of ethical consideration to cases. An introduction of reform such as a test of provocation or ethical correctness of the reasonable person would erase any possibilities of contradiction or confusion.

References

• Glanville Williams, 'The Defense of Self-Defence,' in Criminal Law: The General Part (Stevens & Sons, 1953).
• George P. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 2000).
• Sanford H. Kadish, Stephen J. Schulhofer, and Rachel E. Barkow, Criminal Law and Its Processes: Cases and Materials (Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 2012).
• Wayne R. LaFave, Criminal Law (West Academic Publishing, 2017).
• Alan Dershowitz, 'Self-Defense and the Reasonable Man,' Harvard Law Review 59, no. 2 (1946): 385-400.
• Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 2019).
• Richard S. Frase, 'Self-Defense and the Supreme Court,' Stanford Law Review 45, no. 4 (1993): 1081-1150.